Collection  of  gmertcan  literature 


3Bequeatf)ea  to 

Htbrarp  of  tfje  ©mbersttp  of 
Movti)  Carolina 


THE  LIBRARY  OF  THE 
UNIVERSITY  OF 
NORTH  CAROLINA 
AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


ENDOWED  BY  THE 
DIALECTIC  AND  PHILANTHROPIC 
SOCIETIES 


V? 

.M219 
c.  2 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2014 


https://archive.org/details/interestofamericOOmaha_0 


THE 

INTEREST  OF  AMERICA 

IN 

SEA  POWER, 
PRESENT  AND  FUTURE. 


THE 


INTEREST  OF  AMERICA 

IN 

SEA  POWER, 

PRESENT  AND  FUTURE. 


BY 

CAPTAIN  A.  T.  MAHAN,  D.C.L.,  LL.D.  (  ' 

ffltatttfj  States  Nafcg, 

AUTHOR   OF  "THE   INFLUENCE   OF   SEA   POWER   UPON   HISTORY,  l66o- 
1783,"    "THE    INFLUENCE    OF   SEA    POWER    UPON    THE  FRENCH 
REVOLUTION   AND   EMPIRE,"   OF  A    "LIFE   OF  FARRAGUT," 
AND   OF    "THE  LIFE  OF  NELSON,  THE  EMBODIMENT 
OF  THE  SEA  POWER   OF  GREAT  BRITAIN." 


BOSTON: 
LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND  COMPA 
1917, 


Copyright,  1897, 
By  Alfred  T.  Mahan. 

Copyright^  z8qo,  1893, 
By  Houghton,  Mifflin  and  Company. 

Copyright  f  1893, 
By  The  Forum  Publishing  Company. 

Copyright,  1894, 
By  Lloyd  Bryce. 

Copyright,  1895,  1897, 
By  Harper  and  Brothers. 

A II  rights  reserved* 


3Prfttt£t3 

S.  J.  Paekhill  &  Co.,  Boston,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE. 


WHATEVER  interest  may  be  possessed 
by  a  collection  of  detached  papers, 
issued  at  considerable  intervals  during  a  term 
of  several  years,  and  written  without  special 
reference  one  to  the  other,  or,  at  the  first,  with 
any  view  to  subsequent  publication,  depends 
as  much  upon  the  date  at  which  they  were 
composed,  and  the  condition  of  affairs  then 
existent,  as  it  does  upon  essential  unity  of 
treatment.  If  such  unity  perchance  be  found 
in  these,  it  will  not  be  due  to  antecedent  pur- 
pose, but  to  the  fact  that  they  embody  the 
thought  of  an  individual  mind,  consecutive  in 
the  line  of  its  main  conceptions,  but  adjusting 
itself  continually  to  changing  conditions,  which 
the  progress  of  events  entails. 
{j~  The  author,  therefore,  has  not  sought  to 
bring  these  papers  down  to  the  present  date; 

^0 


vi 


Preface. 


to  reconcile  seeming  contradictions,  if  such 
there  be;  to  suppress  repetitions;  or  to  weld 
into  a  consistent  whole  the  several  parts 
which  in  their  origin  were  independent.  Such 
changes  as  have  been  made  extend  only  to 
phraseology,  with  the  occasional  modification 
of  an  expression  that  seemed  to  err  by  excess 
or  defect  The  dates  at  the  head  of  each 
article  show  the  time  of  its  writing,  not  of  its 
publication. 

The  thanks  of  the  author  are  expressed  to 
the  proprietors  of  the  "  Atlantic  Monthly," 
of  the  "  Forum,"  of  the  "  North  American 
Review,"  and  of  "  Harper  s  New  Monthly 
Magazine,"  who  have  kindly  permitted  the 
republication  of  the  articles  originally  con- 
tributed to  their  pages. 

A.  T.  MAHAN. 

November,  1897. 


CONTENTS. 


Page 

I.  The  United  States  Looking  Outward  .    .  3 

From  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  December,  1890. 

II.   Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power  ...  31 

From  the  Forum,  March,  1893. 

III.  The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power  59 

From  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  September,  1893. 

IV.  Possibilities  of  an  Anglo-American  Reunion  107 

From  the  North  American  Review,  November,  1894. 

V.  The  Future  in  Relation  to  American  Naval 

Power  137 

Harper's  New  Monthly  Magazine,  October,  1895. 

VI.   Preparedness  for  Naval  War  175 

Harper's  New  Monthly  Magazine,  March,  1897. 

VII.  A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook    .    .    .    .  217 

Harper's  New  Monthly  Magazine,  September,  1897. 

VIII.  Strategic  Features  of  the  Caribbean  Sea 

and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  271 

Harper's  New  Monthly  Magazine,  October,  1897. 


MAPS. 


The  Pacific  To  face  page  3 

The  Gulf  and  Caribbean  "    "  "27 


THE  UNITED  STATES  LOOKING 
OUTWARD. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  LOOKING 
OUTWARD. 


August,  1890. 

INDICATIONS  are  not  wanting  of  an  ap- 
proaching change  in  the  thoughts  and 
policy  of  Americans  as  to  their  relations  with 
the  world  outside  their  own  borders.  For  the 
past  quarter  of  a  century,  the  predominant  idea, 
which  has  asserted  itself  successfully  at  the 
polls  and  shaped  the  course  of  the  govern- 
ment, has  been  to  preserve  the  home  market 
for  the  home  industries.  The  employer  and 
the  workman  alike  have  been  taught  to  look 
at  the  various  economical  measures  proposed 
from  this  point  of  view,  to  regard  with  hostility 
any  step  favoring  the  intrusion  of  the  foreign 
producer  upon  their  own  domain,  and  rather  to 
demand  increasingly  rigorous  measures  of  ex- 
clusion than  to  acquiesce  in  any  loosening  of 
the  chain  that  binds  the  consumer  to  them. 


4      The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


The  inevitable  consequence  has  followed,  as 
in  all  cases  when  the  mind  or  the  eye  is  exclu- 
sively fixed  in  one  direction,  that  the  danger  of 
loss  or  the  prospect  of  advantage  in  another 
quarter  has  been  overlooked ;  and  although  the 
abounding  resources  of  the  country  have  main- 
tained the  exports  at  a  high  figure,  this  flattering 
result  has  been  due  more  to  the  superabundant 
bounty  of  Nature  than  to  the  demand  of  other 
nations  for  our  protected  manufactures. 

For  nearly  the  lifetime  of  a  generation,  there- 
fore, American  industries  have  been  thus  pro- 
tected, until  the  practice  has  assumed  the  force 
of  a  tradition,  and  is  clothed  in  the  mail  of  con- 
servatism. In  their  mutual  relations,  these 
industries  resemble  the  activities  of  a  modern 
ironclad  that  has  heavy  armor,  but  inferior 
engines  and  guns;  mighty  for  defence,  weak 
for  offence.  Within,  the  home  market  is  se- 
cured ;  but  outside,  beyond  the  broad  seas, 
there  are  the  markets  of  the  world,  that  can 
be  entered  and  controlled  only  by  a  vigorous 
contest,  to  which  the  habit  of  trusting  to  pro- 
tection by  statute  does  not  conduce. 

At  bottom,  however,  the  temperament  of  the 
American  people  is  essentially  alien  to  such  a 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  5 


sluggish  attitude.  Independently  of  all  bias 
for  or  against  protection,  it  is  safe  to  predict 
that,  when  the  opportunities  for  gain  abroad 
are  understood,  the  course  of  American  enter- 
prise will  cleave  a  channel  by  which  to  reach 
them.  Viewed  broadly,  it  is  a  most  welcome 
as  well  as  significant  fact  that  a  prominent  and 
influential  advocate  of  protection,  a  leader  of 
the  party  committed  to  its  support,  a  keen 
reader  of  the  signs  of  the  times  and  of  the 
drift  of  opinion,  has  identified  himself  with  a 
line  of  policy  which  looks  to  nothing  less  than 
such  modifications  of  the  tariff  as  may  expand 
the  commerce  of  the  United  States  to  all 
quarters  of  the  globe.  Men  of  all  parties  can 
unite  on  the  words  of  Mr.  Blaine,  as  reported 
in  a  recent  speech  :  "  It  is  not  an  ambitious 
destiny  for  so  great  a  country  as  ours  to  manu- 
facture only  what  we  can  consume,  or  produce 
only  what  we  can  eat."  In  face  of  this  utter- 
ance of  so  shrewd  and  able  a  public  man,  even 
the  extreme  character  of  the  recent  tariff  legis- 
lation seems  but  a  sign  of  the  coming  change, 
and  brings  to  mind  that  famous  Continental 
System,  of  which  our  own  is  the  analogue,  to 
support  which  Napoleon  added  legion  to  legion 


6      The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


and  enterprise  to  enterprise,  till  the  fabric  of 
the  Empire  itself  crashed  beneath  the  weight. 

The  interesting  and  significant  feature  of 
this  changing  attitude  is  the  turning  of  the 
eyes  outward,  instead  of  inward  only,  to  seek 
the  welfare  of  the  country.  To  affirm  the  im- 
portance of  distant  markets,  and  the  relation  to 
them  of  our  own  immense  powers  of  produc- 
tion, implies  logically  the  recognition  of  the 
link  that  joins  the  products  and  the  markets, 
—  that  is,  the  carrying  trade ;  the  three  together 
constituting  that  chain  of  maritime  power  to 
which  Great  Britain  owes  her  wealth  and  great- 
ness. Further,  is  it  too  much  to  say  that,  as 
two  of  these  links,  the  shipping  and  the  mar- 
kets, are  exterior  to  our  own  borders,  the 
acknowledgment  of  them  carries  with  it  a  view 
of  the  relations  of  the  United  States  to  the 
world  radically  distinct  from  the  simple  idea  of 
self-sufficingness  ?  We  shall  not  follow  far  this 
line  of  thought  before  there  will  dawn  the  reali- 
zation of  America's  unique  position,  facing  the 
older  worlds  of  the  East  and  West,  her  shores 
washed  by  the  oceans  which  touch  the  one 
or  the  other,  but  which  are  common  to  her 
alone. 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  7 


Coincident  with  these  signs  of  change  in  our 
own  policy  there  is  a  restlessness  in  the  world 
at  large  which  is  deeply  significant,  if  not  omi- 
nous. It  is  beside  our  purpose  to  dwell  upon 
the  internal  state  of  Europe,  whence,  if  disturb- 
ances arise,  the  effect  upon  us  may  be  but 
partial  and  indirect.  But  the  great  seaboard 
powers  there  do  not  stand  on  guard  against 
their  continental  rivals  only  ;  they  cherish  also 
aspirations  for  commercial  extension,  for  colo- 
nies, and  for  influence  in  distant  regions,  which 
may  bring,  and,  even  under  our  present  con- 
tracted policy,  already  have  brought  them  into 
collision  with  ourselves.  The  incident  of  the 
Samoa  Islands,  trivial  apparently,  was  neverthe- 
less eminently  suggestive  of  European  ambi- 
tions. America  then  roused  from  sleep  as  to 
interests  closely  concerning  her  future.  At 
this  moment  internal  troubles  are  imminent  in 
the  Sandwich  Islands,  where  it  should  be  our 
fixed  determination  to  allow  no  foreign  influ- 
ence to  equal  our  own.  All  over  the  world 
German  commercial  and  colonial  push  is  com- 
ing into  collision  with  other  nations:  witness 
the  affair  of  the  Caroline  Islands  with  Spain; 
the  partition  of  New  Guinea  with  England ; 


8       The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


the  yet  more  recent  negotiation  between  these 
two  powers  concerning  their  share  in  Africa, 
viewed  with  deep  distrust  and  jealousy  by 
France;  the  Samoa  affair;  the  conflict  between 
German  control  and  American  interests  in  the 
islands  of  the  western  Pacific ;  and  the  alleged 
progress  of  German  influence  in  Central  and 
South  America.  It  is  noteworthy  that,  while 
these  various  contentions  are  sustained  with 
the  aggressive  military  spirit  characteristic  of 
the  German  Empire,  they  are  credibly  said  to 
arise  from  the  national  temper  more  than  from 
the  deliberate  policy  of  the  government,  which 
in  this  matter  does  not  lead,  but  follows,  the 
feeling  of  the  people,  —  a  condition  much  more 
formidable. 

There  is  no  sound  reason  for  believing  that 
the  world  has  passed  into  a  period  of  assured 
peace  outside  the  limits  of  Europe.  Unsettled 
political  conditions,  such  as  exist  in  Haiti, 
Central  America,  and  many  of  the  Pacific 
islands,  especially  the  Hawaiian  group,  when 
combined  with  great  military  or  commercial 
importance  as  is  the  -case  with  most  of  these 
positions,  involve,  now  as  always,  dangerous 
germs  of  quarrel,  against  which  it  is  prudent  at 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  9 


least  to  be  prepared.  Undoubtedly,  the  general 
temper  of  nations  is  more  averse  from  war 
than  it  was  of  old.  If  no  less  selfish  and  grasp- 
ing than  our  predecessors,  we  feel  more  dislike 
to  the  discomforts  and  sufferings  attendant 
upon  a  breach  of  peace;  but  to  retain  that 
highly  valued  repose  and  the  undisturbed 
enjoyment  of  the  returns  of  commerce,  it  is 
necessary  to  argue  upon  somewhat  equal  terms 
of  strength  with  an  adversary.  It  is  the  pre- 
paredness of  the  enemy,  and  not  acquiescence 
in  the  existing  state  of  things,  that  now  holds 
back  the  armies  of  Europe. 

On  the  other  hand,  neither  the  sanctions  of 
international  law  nor  the  justice  of  a  cause  can 
be  depended  upon  for  a  fair  settlement  of 
differences,  when  they  come  into  conflict  with 
a  strong  political  necessity  on  the  one  side 
opposed  to  comparative  weakness  on  the  other. 
In  our  still-pending  dispute  over  the  seal-fish- 
ing of  Bering  Sea,  whatever  may  be  thought 
of  the  strength  of  our  argument,  in  view  of 
generally  admitted  principles  of  international 
law,  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  our  contention  is 
reasonable,  just,  and  in  the  interest  of  the  world 
at  large.    But  in  the  attempt  to  enforce  it  we 


10     The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


have  come  into  collision  not  only  with  national 
susceptibilities  as  to  the  honor  of  the  flag, 
which  we  ourselves  very  strongly  share,  but 
also  with  a  state  governed  by  a  powerful  neces- 
sity, and  exceedingly  strong  where  we  are  par- 
ticularly weak  and  exposed.  Not  only  has 
Great  Britain  a  mighty  navy  and  we  a  long 
defenceless  seacoast,  but  it  is  a  great  commer- 
cial and  political  advantage  to  her  that  her 
larger  colonies,  and  above  all  Canada,  should 
feel  that  the  power  of  the  mother  country  is 
something  which  they  need,  and  upon  which 
they  can  count.  The  dispute  is  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada,  not  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain ;  but  it  has  been  ably 
used  by  the  latter  to  promote  the  solidarity 
of  sympathy  between  herself  and  her  colony. 
With  the  mother  country  alone  an  equitable 
arrangement,  conducive  to  well-understood  mu- 
tual interests,  could  be  reached  readily ;  but 
the  purely  local  and  peculiarly  selfish  wishes 
of  Canadian  fishermen  dictate  the  policy  of 
Great  Britain,  because  Canada  is  the  most 
important  link  uniting  her  to  her  colonies  and 
maritime  interests  in  the  Pacific.  In  case  of  a 
European  war,  it  is  possible  that  the  British 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.     1 1 


navy  will  not  be  able  to  hold  open  the  route 
through  the  Mediterranean  to  the  East;  but 
having  a  strong  naval  station  at  Halifax,  and 
another  at  Esquimalt,  on  the  Pacific,  the  two 
connected  by  the  Canadian  Pacific  Railroad, 
England  possesses  an  alternate  line  of  commu- 
nication far  less  exposed  to  maritime  aggression 
than  the  former,  or  than  the  third  route  by  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  as  well  as  two  bases  essen- 
tial to  the  service  of  her  commerce,  or  other 
naval  operations,  in  the  North  Atlantic  and 
the  Pacific.  Whatever  arrangement  of  this 
question  is  finally  reached,  the  fruit  of  Lord 
Salisbury's  attitude  scarcely  can  fail  to  be  a 
strengthening  of  the  sentiments  of  attachment 
to,  and  reliance  upon,  the  mother  country,  not 
only  in  Canada,  but  in  the  other  great  colonies. 
These  feelings  of  attachment  and  mutual  de- 
pendence supply  the  living  spirit,  without  which 
the  nascent  schemes  for  Imperial  Federation 
are  but  dead  mechanical  contrivances  ;  nor  are 
they  without  influence  upon  such  generally 
unsentimental  considerations  as  those  of  buying 
and  selling,  and  the  course  of  trade. 

This  dispute,  seemingly  paltry  yet  really 
serious,  sudden   in   its  appearance  and  de- 


1 2     The  United  States  Looking  Outzvard. 


pendent  for  its  issue  upon  other  considera- 
tions than  its  own  merits,  may  serve  to 
convince  us  of  many  latent  and  yet  unfore- 
seen dangers  to  the  peace  of  the  western 
hemisphere,  attendant  upon  the  opening  of 
a  canal  through  the  Central  American  Isth- 
mus. In  a  general  way,  it  is  evident  enough 
that  this  canal,  by  modifying  the  direction 
of  trade  routes,  will  induce  a  great  increase 
of  commercial  activity  and  carrying  trade 
throughout  the  Caribbean  Sea;  and  that  this 
now  comparatively  deserted  nook  of  the  ocean 
will  become,  like  the  Red  Sea,  a  great 
thoroughfare  of  shipping,  and  will  attract, 
as  never  before  in  our  day,  the  interest  and 
ambition  of  maritime  nations.  Every  position 
in  that  sea  will  have  enhanced  commercial 
and  military  value,  and  the  canal  itself  will 
become  a  strategic  centre  of  the  most  vital 
importance.  Like  the  Canadian  Pacific  Rail- 
road, it  will  be  a  link  between  the  two 
oceans;  but,  unlike  it,  the  use,  unless  most 
carefully  guarded  by  treaties,  will  belong  wholly 
to  the  belligerent  which  controls  the  sea  by  its 
<  naval  power.  In  case  of  war,  the  United 
States  will  unquestionably  command  the  Ca- 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  13 


nadian  Railroad,  despite  the  deterrent  force 
of  operations  by  the  hostile  navy  upon  our 
seaboard ;  but  no  less  unquestionably  will 
she  be  impotent,  as  against  any  of  the  great 
maritime  powers,  to  control  the  Central  Amer- 
ican canal.  Militarily  speaking,  and  having 
reference  to  European  complications  only,  the 
piercing  of  the  Isthmus  is  nothing  but  a  dis- 
aster to  the  United  States,  in  the  present 
state  of  her  military  and  naval  preparation. 
It  is  especially  dangerous  to  the  Pacific  coast ; 
but  the  increased  exposure  of  one  part  of  our 
seaboard  reacts  unfavorably  upon  the  whole 
military  situation. 

Despite  a  certain  great  original  superiority 
conferred  by  our  geographical  nearness  and 
immense  resources,  —  due,  in  other  words,  to 
our  natural  advantages,  and  not  to  our  intel- 
ligent preparations,  —  the  United  States  is 
wofully  unready,  not  only  in  fact  but  in  pur- 
pose, to  assert  in  the  Caribbean  and  Central 
America  a  weight  of  influence  proportioned  to 
the  extent  of  her  interests.  We  have  not  the 
navy,  and,  what  is  worse,  we  are  not  willing  to 
have  the  navy,  that  will  weigh  seriously  in  any 
disputes  with  those  nations  whose  interests  will 


14     The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


conflict  there  with  our  own.  We  have  not, 
and  we  are  not  anxious  to  provide,  the  defence 
of  the  seaboard  which  will  leave  the  navy 
free  for  its  work  at  sea.  We  have  not,  but 
many  other  powers  have,  positions,  either 
within  or  on  the  borders  of  the  Caribbean, 
which  not  only  possess  great  natural  advan- 
tages for  the  control  of  that  sea,  but  have 
received  and  are  receiving  that  artificial 
strength  of  fortification  and  armament  which 
will  make  them  practically  inexpugnable.  On 
the  contrary,  we  have  not  on  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  even  the  beginning  of  a  navy  yard 
which  could  serve  as  the  base  of  our  opera- 
tions. Let  me  not  be  misunderstood.  I  am 
not  regretting  that  we  have  not  the  means  to 
meet  on  terms  of  equality  the  great  navies 
of  the  Old  World.  I  recognize,  what  few  at 
least  say,  that,  despite  its  great  surplus  reve- 
nue, this  country  is  poor  in  proportion  to  its 
length  of  seaboard  and  its  exposed  points. 
That  which  I  deplore,  and  which  is  a  sober, 
just,  and  reasonable  cause  of  deep  national 
concern,  is  that  the  nation  neither  has  nor 
cares  to  have  its  sea  frontier  so  defended, 
and  its  navy  of  such  power,  as  shall  suffice, 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  15 


with  the  advantages  of  our  position,  to  weigh 
seriously  when  inevitable  discussions  arise, — 
such  as  we  have  recently  had  about  Samoa 
and  Bering  Sea,  and  which  may  at  any  moment 
come  up  about  the  Caribbean  Sea  or  the 
canal.  Is  the  United  States,  for  instance, 
prepared  to  allow  Germany  to  acquire  the 
Dutch  stronghold  of  Cura9ao,  fronting  the 
Atlantic  outlet  of  both  the  proposed  canals  of 
Panama  and  Nicaragua?  Is  she  prepared  to 
acquiesce  in  any  foreign  power  purchasing 
from  Haiti  a  naval  station  on  the  Wind- 
ward Passage,  through  which  pass  our  steamer 
routes  to  the  Isthmus  ?  Would  she  acquiesce 
in  a  foreign  protectorate  over  the  Sandwich 
Islands,  that  great  central  station  of  the  Pa- 
cific, equidistant  from  San  Francisco,  Samoa, 
and  the  Marquesas,  and  an  important  post 
on  our  lines  of  communication  with  both  Aus- 
tralia and  China?  Or  will  it  be  maintained 
that  any  one  of  these  questions,  supposing 
it  to  arise,  is  so  exclusively  one-sided,  the 
arguments  of  policy  and  right  so  exclusively 
with  us,  that  the  other  party  will  at  once 
yield  his  eager  wish,  and  gracefully  withdraw  ? 
Was  it  so  at  Samoa?    Is  it  so  as  regards 


1 6     The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


Bering  Sea  ?  The  motto  seen  on  so  many 
ancient  cannon,  Ultima  ratio  regum,  is  not 
without  its  message  to  republics. 

It  is  perfectly  reasonable  and  legitimate, 
in  estimating  our  needs  of  military  prepa- 
ration, to  take  into  account  the  remoteness 
of  the  chief  naval  and  military  nations  from 
our  shores,  and  the  consequent  difficulty 
of  maintaining  operations  at  such  a  distance. 
It  is  equally  proper,  in  framing  our  policy, 
to  consider  the  jealousies  of  the  European 
family  of  states,  and  their  consequent  unwill- 
ingness to  incur  the  enmity  of  a  people  so 
strong  as  ourselves;  their  dread  of  our  re- 
venge in  the  future,  as  well  as  their  inability 
to  detach  more  than  a  certain  part  of  their 
forces  to  our  shores  without  losing  much  of 
their  own  weight  in  the  councils  of  Europe. 
In  truth,  a  careful  determination  of  the  force 
that  Great  Britain  or  France  could  probably 
spare  for  operations  against  our  coasts,  if  the 
latter  were  suitably  defended,  without  weak- 
ening their  European  position  or  unduly  ex- 
posing their  colonies  and  commerce,  is  the 
starting-point  from  which  to  calculate  the 
strength  of  our  own  navy-    If  the  latter  be 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  17 


superior  to  the  force  that  thus  can  be  sent 
against  it,  and  the  coast  be  so  defended 
as  to  leave  the  navy  free  to  strike  where  it 
will,  we  can  maintain  our  rights ;  not  merely 
the  rights  which  international  law  concedes, 
and  which  the  moral  sense  of  nations  now 
supports,  but  also  those  equally  real  rights 
which,  though  not  conferred  by  law,  depend 
upon  a  clear  preponderance  of  interest,  upon 
obviously  necessary  policy,  upon  self-preser- 
vation, either  total  or  partial.  Were  we  so 
situated  now  in  respect  of  military  strength, 
we  could  secure  our  perfectly  just  claim  as  to 
the  seal  fisheries ;  not  by  seizing  foreign  ships 
on  the  open  sea,  but  by  the  evident  fact  that, 
our  cities  being  protected  from  maritime  at- 
tack, our  position  and  superior  population 
lay  open  the  Canadian  Pacific,  as  well  as 
the  frontier  of  the  Dominion,  to  do  with  as 
we  please.  Diplomats  do  not  flourish  such 
disagreeable  truths  in  each  others  faces ; 
they  look  for  a  modus  vivendi,  and  find  it. 

While,  therefore,  the  advantages  of  our  own 
position  in  the  western  hemisphere,  and  the 
disadvantages  under  which  the  operations  of 
a  European  state  would  labor,  are  undeniable 


1 8    The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


and  just  elements  in  the  calculations  of  the 
statesman,  it  is  folly  to  look  upon  them  as 
sufficient  alone  for  our  security.  Much  more 
needs  to  be  cast  into  the  scale  that  it  may 
incline  in  favor  of  our  strength.  They  are 
mere  defensive  factors,  and  partial  at  that. 
Though  distant,  our  shores  can  be  reached ; 
being  defenceless,  they  can  detain  but  a  short 
time  a  force  sent  against  them.  With  a  proba- 
bility of  three  months'  peace  in  Europe,  no 
maritime  power  would  fear  to  support  its  de- 
mands by  a  number  of  ships  with  which  it 
would  be  loath  indeed  to  part  for  a  year. 

Yet,  were  our  sea  frontier  as  strong  as  it 
now  is  weak,  passive  self-defence,  whether  in 
trade  or  war,  would  be  but  a  poor  policy,  so 
long  as  this  world  continues  to  be  one  of 
struggle  and  vicissitude.  All  around  us  now 
is  strife ;  "  the  struggle  of  life,"  "  the  race  of 
life,"  are  phrases  so  familiar  that  we  do  not 
feel  their  significance  till  we  stop  to  think 
about  them.  Everywhere  nation  is  arrayed 
against  nation ;  our  own  no  less  than  others. 
What  is  our  protective  system  but  an  organ- 
ized warfare?  In  carrying  it  on,  it  is  true, 
we  have  only  to  use  certain  procedures  which 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  19 


all  states  now  concede  to  be  a  legal  exercise 
of  the  national  power,  even  though  injurious 
to  themselves.  It  is  lawful,  they  say,  to  do 
what  we  will  with  our  own.  Are  our  people, 
however,  so  unaggressive  that  they  are  likely 
not  to  want  their  own  way  in  matters  where 
their  interests  turn  on  points  of  disputed  right, 
or  so  little  sensitive  as  to  submit  quietly  to 
encroachment  by  others,  in  quarters  where  they 
long  have  considered  their  own  influence  should 
prevail  ? 

Our  self-imposed  isolation  in  the  matter  of 
markets,  and  the  decline  of  our  shipping  in- 
terest in  the  last  thirty  years,  have  coincided 
singularly  with  an  actual  remoteness  of  this 
continent  from  the  life  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 
The  writer  has  before  him  a  map  of  the  North 
and  South  Atlantic  oceans,  showing  the  direc- 
tion of  the  principal  trade  routes  and  the  pro- 
portion of  tonnage  passing  over  each ;  and  it  is 
curious  to  note  what  deserted  regions,  compara- 
tively, are  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the  Caribbean 
Sea,  and  the  adjoining  countries  and  islands, 
A  broad  band  stretches  from  our  northern 
Atlantic  coast  to  the  English  Channel ;  another 
as  broad  from  the  British  Islands  to  the  East, 


20    The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


through  the  Mediterranean  and  Red  Sea,  over- 
flowing the  borders  of  the  latter  in  order  to 
express  the  volume  of  trade.  Around  either 
cape — Good  Hope  and  Horn  —  pass  strips  of 
about  one-fourth  this  width,  joining  near  the 
equator,  midway  between  Africa  and  South 
America.  From  the  West  Indies  issues  a 
thread,  indicating  the  present  commerce  of 
Great  Britain  with  a  region  which  once,  in  the 
Napoleonic  wars,  embraced  one-fourth  of  the 
whole  trade  of  the  Empire.  The  significance 
is  unmistakable:  Europe  has  now  little  mer- 
cantile interest  in  the  Caribbean  Sea. 

When  the  Isthmus  is  pierced,  this  isolation 
will  pass  away,  and  with  it  the  indifference  of 
foreign  nations.  From  wheresoever  they  come 
and  whithersoever  they  afterward  go,  all  ships 
that  use  the  canal  will  pass  through  the  Carib- 
bean. Whatever  the  effect  produced  upon  the 
prosperity  of  the  adjacent  continent  and  islands 
by  the  thousand  wants  attendant  upon  maritime 
activity,  around  such  a  focus  of  trade  will  centre 
large  commercial  and  political  interests.  To 
protect  and  develop  its  own,  each  nation  will 
seek  points  of  support  and  means  of  influence 
in  a  quarter  where  the  United  States  always 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  21 


has  been  jealously  sensitive  to  the  intru- 
sion of  European  powers.  The  precise  value 
of  the  Monroe  doctrine  is  understood  very 
loosely  by  most  Americans,  but  the  effect  of 
the  familiar  phrase  has  been  to  develop  a 
national  sensitiveness,  which  is  a  more  frequent 
cause  of  war  than  material  interests ;  and  over 
disputes  caused  by  such  feelings  there  will  pre- 
side none  of  the  calming  influence  due  to  the 
moral  authority  of  international  law,  with  its 
recognized  principles,  for  the  points  in  dispute 
will  be  of  policy,  of  interest,  not  of  conceded 
right.  Already  France  and  Great  Britain  are 
giving  to  ports  held  by  them  a  degree  of  arti- 
ficial strength  uncalled  for  by  their  present 
importance.  They  look  to  the  near  future. 
Among  the  islands  and  on  the  mainland  there 
are  many  positions  of  great  importance,  held 
now  by  weak  or  unstable  states.  Is  the  United 
States  willing  to  see  them  sold  to  a  powerful 
rival  ?  But  what  right  will  she  invoke  against 
the  transfer?  She  can  allege  but  one,  —  that 
of  her  reasonable  policy  supported  by  her 
might. 

Whether  they  will  or  no,  Americans  must  now 
begin  to  look  outward.    The  growing  produc- 


22     The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


tion  of  the  country  demands  it.  An  increasing 
volume  of  public  sentiment  demands  it.  The 
position  of  the  United  States,  between  the 
two  Old  Worlds  and  the  two  great  oceans, 
makes  the  same  claim,  which  will  soon  be 
strengthened  by  the  creation  of  the  new  link 
joining  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific.  The  ten- 
dency will  be  maintained  and  increased  by 
the  growth  of  the  European  colonies  in  the 
Pacific,  by  the  advancing  civilization  of  Japan, 
and  by  the  rapid  peopling  of  our  Pacific  States 
with  men  who  have  all  the  aggressive  spirit 
of  the  advanced  line  of  national  progress.  No- 
where does  a  vigorous  foreign  policy  find  more 
favor  than  among  the  people  wTest  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains. 

It  has  been  said  that,  in  our  present  state  of 
unpreparedness,  a  trans-isthmian  canal  will  be  a 
military  disaster  to  the  United  States,  and  es- 
pecially to  the  Pacific  coast.  When  the  canal 
is  finished,  the  Atlantic  seaboard  will  be  neither 
more  nor  less  exposed  than  it  now  is ;  it  will 
merely  share  with  the  country  at  large  the  in- 
creased danger  of  foreign  complications  with 
inadequate  means  to  meet  them.  The  danger 
of  the  Pacific  coast  will  be  greater  by  so  much 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  23 


as  the  way  between  it  and  Europe  is  shortened 
through  a  passage  which  the  stronger  maritime 
power  can  control.  The  danger  will  lie  not 
merely  in  the  greater  facility  for  despatching  a 
hostile  squadron  from  Europe,  but  also  in  the 
fact  that  a  more  powerful  fleet  than  formerly  can 
be  maintained  on  that  coast  by  a  European 
power,  because  it  can  be  called  home  so  much 
more  promptly  in  case  of  need.  The  greatest 
weakness  of  the  Pacific  ports,  however,  if  wisely 
met  by  our  government,  will  go  far  to  insure  our 
naval  superiority  there.  The  two  chief  centres, 
San  Francisco  and  Puget  Sound,  owing  to  the 
width  and  the  great  depth  of  the  entrances,  can- 
not be  effectively  protected  by  torpedoes ;  and 
consequently,  as  fleets  can  always  pass  batteries 
through  an  unobstructed  channel,  they  cannot 
obtain  perfect  security  by  means  of  fortifications 
only.  Valuable  as  such  works  will  be  to  them, 
they  must  be  further  garrisoned  by  coast-defence 
ships,  whose  part  in  repelling  an  enemy  will  be 
co-ordinated  with  that  of  the  batteries.  The 
sphere  of  action  of  such  ships  should  not  be 
permitted  to  extend  far  beyond  the  port  to 
which  they  are  allotted,  and  of  whose  defence 
they  form  an  essential  part;  but  within  that 


24    The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


sweep  they  will  always  be  a  powerful  reinforce- 
ment to  the  sea-going  navy,  when  the  strategic 
conditions  of  a  war  cause  hostilities  to  centre 
around  their  port.  By  sacrificing  power  to  go 
long  distances,  the  coast-defence  ship  gains  pro- 
portionate weight  of  armor  and  guns ;  that  is, 
of  defensive  and  offensive  strength.  It  there- 
fore adds  an  element  of  unique  value  to  the 
fleet  with  which  it  for  a  time  acts.  No  foreign 
states,  except  Great  Britain,  have  ports  so  near 
our  Pacific  coast  as  to  bring  it  within  the  radius 
of  action  of  their  coast-defence  ships ;  and  it  is 
very  doubtful  whether  even  Great  Britain  will 
put  such  ships  at  Vancouver  Island,  the  chief 
value  of  which  will  be  lost  to  her  when  the 
Canadian  Pacific  is  severed,  —  a  blow  always 
in  the  power  of  this  country.  It  is  upon 
our  Atlantic  seaboard  that  the  mistress  of 
Halifax,  of  Bermuda,  and  of  Jamaica  will  now 
defend  Vancouver  and  the  Canadian  Pacific. 
In  the  present  state  of  our  seaboard  defence 
she  can  do  so  absolutely.  What  is  all  Canada 
compared  with  our  exposed  great  cities  ?  Even 
were  the  coast  fortified,  she  still  could  do  so, 
if  our  navy  be  no  stronger  than  is  designed  as 
yet.    What  harm  can  we  do  Canada  propor- 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  25 


tionate  to  the  injury  we  should  suffer  by  the 
interruption  of  our  coasting  trade,  and  by  a 
blockade  of  Boston,  New  York,  the  Delaware, 
and  the  Chesapeake?  Such  a  blockade  Great 
Britain  certainly  could  make  technically  effi- 
cient, under  the  somewhat  loose  definitions  of 
international  law.  Neutrals  would  accept  it 
as  such. 

The  military  needs  of  the  Pacific  States,  as 
well  as  their  supreme  importance  to  the  whole 
country,  are  yet  a  matter  of  the  future,  but  of 
a  future  so  near  that  provision  should  begin 
immediately.  To  weigh  their  importance,  con- 
sider what  influence  in  the  Pacific  would  be 
attributed  to  a  nation  comprising  only  the 
States  of  Washington,  Oregon,  and  California, 
when  filled  with  such  men  as  now  people  them 
and  still  are  pouring  in,  and  which  controlled 
such  maritime  centres  as  San  Francisco,  Puget 
Sound,  and  the  Columbia  River.  Can  it  be 
counted  less  because  they  are  bound  by  the 
ties  of  blood  and  close  political  union  to  the 
great  communities  of  the  East  ?  But  such 
influence,  to  work  without  jar  and  friction, 
requires  underlying  military  readiness,  like  the 
proverbial  iron  hand  under  the  velvet  glove. 


26    The  United  States  Looking  Outward. 


To  provide  this,  three  things  are  needful : 
First,  protection  of  the  chief  harbors,  by  for- 
tifications and  coast-defence  ships,  which  gives 
defensive  strength,  provides  security  to  the 
community  within,  and  supplies  the  bases  nec- 
essary to  all  military  operations.  Secondly, 
naval  force,  the  arm  of  offensive  power,  which 
alone  enables  a  country  to  extend  its  influence 
outward.  Thirdly,  it  should  be  an  inviolable 
resolution  of  our  national  policy,  that  no  for- 
eign state  should  henceforth  acquire  a  coaling 
position  within  three  thousand  miles  of  San 
Francisco,  —  a  distance  which  includes  the 
Hawaiian  and  Galapagos  islands  and  the  coast 
of  Central  America.  For  fuel  is  the  life  of 
modern  naval  war;  it  is  the  food  of  the  ship; 
without  it  the  modern  monsters  of  the  deep 
die  of  inanition.  Around  it,  therefore,  cluster 
some  of  the  most  important  considerations  of 
naval  strategy.  In  the  Caribbean  and  in  the 
Atlantic  we  are  confronted  with  many  a  for- 
eign coal  depot,  bidding  us  stand  to  our  arms, 
even  as  Carthage  bade  Rome ;  but  let  us  not 
acquiesce  in  an  addition  to  our  dangers,  a  fur- 
ther diversion  of  our  strength,  by  being  fore- 
stalled in  the  North  Pacific. 


The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  27 

In  conclusion,  while  Great  Britain  is  undoubt- 
edly the  most  formidable  of  our  possible  ene- 
mies, both  by  her  great  navy  and  by  the  strong 
positions  she  holds  near  our  coasts,  it  must  be 
added  that  a  cordial  understanding  with  that 
country  is  one  of  the  first  of  our  external  inter- 
ests. Both  nations  doubtless,  and  properly, 
seek  their  own  advantage ;  but  both,  also,  are 
controlled  by  a  sense  of  law  and  justice,  drawn 
from  the  same  sources,  and  deep-rooted  in 
their  instincts.  Whatever  temporary  aberra- 
tion may  occur,  a  return  to  mutual  standards 
of  right  will  certainly  follow.  Formal  alliance 
between  the  two  is  out  of  the  question,  but  a 
cordial  recognition  of  the  similarity  of  char- 
acter and  ideas  will  give  birth  to  sympathy, 
which  in  turn  will  facilitate  a  co-operation  ben- 
eficial to  both ;  for  if  sentimentality  is  weak, 
sentiment  is  strong. 


HAWAII  AND  OUR  FUTURE  SEA 
POWER. 


f 


HAWAII  AND  OUR  FUTURE  SEA 
POWER. 

[The  origin  of  the  ensuing  article  was  as  follows :  At  the 
time  of  the  Revolution  in  Hawaii,  at  the  beginning  of  1893,  the 
author  addressed  to  the  "  New  York  Times  "  a  letter,  which 
appeared  in  the  issue  of  January  31.  This,  falling  under  the 
eye  of  the  Editor  of  the  "  Forum,"  suggested  to  him  to  ask  an 
article  upon  the  general  military  —  or  naval  —  value  of  the 
Hawaiian  group.    The  letter  alluded  to  ran  thus  :  — 

To  the  Editor  of  the  11  New  York  Times  "  :  — 

There  is  one  aspect  of  the  recent  revolution  in  Hawaii 
which  seems  to  have  been  kept  out  of  sight,  and  that  is  the 
relation  of  the  islands,  not  merely  to  our  own  and  to  European 
countries,  but  to  China.  How  vitally  important  that  may  be- 
come in  the  future  is  evident  from  the  great  number  of  Chinese, 
relatively  to  the  whole  population,  now  settled  in  the  islands. 

It  is  a  question  for  the  whole  civilized  world  and  not  for  the 
United  States  only,  whether  the  Sandwich  Islands,  with  their 
geographical  and  military  importance,  unrivalled  by  that  of  any 
other  position  in  the  North  Pacific,  shall  in  the  future  be  an  out- 
post of  European  civilization,  or  of  the  comparative  barbarism 
of  China.  It  is  sufficiently  known,  but  not,  perhaps,  generally 
noted  in  our  country,  that  many  military  men  abroad,  familiar 
with  Eastern  conditions  and  character,  look  with  apprehension 
toward  the  day  when  the  vast  mass  of  China  —  now  inert  —  may 
yield  to  one  of  those  impulses  which  have  in  past  ages  buried 
civilization  under  a  wave  of  barbaric  invasion.  The  great  armies 
of  Europe,  whose  existence  is  so  frequently  deplored,  may  be 


32    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


providentially  intended  as  a  barrier  to  that  great  movement,  if  it 
come.  Certainly,  while  China  remains  as  she  is,  nothing  more 
disastrous  for  the  future  of  the  world  can  be  imagined  than  that 
general  disarmament  of  Europe  which  is  the  Utopian  dream  of 
some  philanthropists. 

China,  however,  may  burst  her  barriers  eastward  as  well 
as  westward,  toward  the  Pacific  as  well  as  toward  the  European 
Continent.  In  such  a  movement  it  would  be  impossible  to  ex- 
aggerate the  momentous  issues  dependent  upon  a  firm  hold  of 
the  Sandwich  Islands  by  a  great,  civilized,  maritime  power. 
By  its  nearness  to  the  scene,  and  by  the  determined  animosity 
to  the  Chinese  movement  which  close  contact  seems  to  inspire, 
our  own  country,  with  its  Pacific  coast,  is  naturally  indicated  as 
the  proper  guardian  for  this  most  important  position.  To  hold 
it,  however,  whether  in  the  supposed  case  or  in  war  with  a 
European  state,  implies  a  great  extension  of  our  naval  power. 
Are  we  ready  to  undertake  this  ? 

A.  T.  Mahan, 
Captain,  United  States  Navy. 

New  York,  Jan.  30,  1893.] 

THE  suddenness  —  so  far,  at  least,  as  the 
general  public  is  concerned  —  with 
which  the  long-existing  troubles  in  Hawaii 
have  come  to  a  head,  and  the  character  of  the 
advances  reported  to  be  addressed  to  the 
United  States  by  the  revolutionary  govern- 
ment, formally  recognized  as  de  facto  by  our 
representative  on  the  spot,  add  another  to  the 
many  significant  instances  furnished  by  history, 
that,  as  men  in  the  midst  of  life  are  in  death, 
so  nations  in  the  midst  of  peace  find  them- 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  33 

selves  confronted  with  unexpected  causes  of 
dissension,  conflicts  of  interests,  whose  results 
may  be,  on  the  one  hand,  war,  or,  on  the  other, 
abandonment  of  clear  and  imperative  national 
advantage  in  order  to  avoid  an  issue  for  which 
preparation  has  not  been  made.  By  no  pre- 
meditated contrivance  of  our  own,  by  the  co- 
operation of  a  series  of  events  which,  however 
dependent  step  by  step  upon  human  action, 
were  not  intended  to  prepare  the  present  crisis, 
the  United  States  finds  herself  compelled  to 
answer  a  question  —  to  make  a  decision  —  not 
unlike  and  not  less  momentous  than  that  re- 
quired of  the  Roman  senate,  when  the  Mamer- 
tine  garrison  invited  it  to  occupy  Messina,  and 
so  to  abandon  the  hitherto  traditional  policy 
which  had  confined  the  expansion  of  Rome  to 
the  Italian  peninsula.  For  let  it  not  be  over- 
looked that,  whether  we  wish  or  no,  we  must 
answer  the  question,  we  must  make  the  de- 
cision. The  issue  cannot  be  dodged.  Absolute 
inaction  in  such  a  case  is  a  decision  as  truly  as 
the  most  vehement  action.  We  can  now  ad- 
vance, but,  the  conditions  of  the  world  being 
what  they  are,  if  we  do  not  advance  we  recede ; 
for  there  is  involved  not  so  much  a  particular 

3 


34    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


action  as  a  question  of  principle,  pregnant  of 
great  consequences  in  one  direction  or  in  the 
other. 

Occasion  of  serious  difficulty,  indeed,  should 
not  arise  here.  Unlike  the  historical  instance 
just  cited,  the  two  nations  whose  interests 
have  come  now  into  contact  —  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  —  are  so  alike  in  in- 
herited traditions,  habits  of  thought,  and  views 
of  right,  that  injury  to  the  one  need  not  be 
anticipated  from  the  predominance  of  the 
other  in  a  quarter  where  its  interests  also 
predominate.  Despite  the  heterogeneous  char- 
acter of  the  immigration  which  the  past  few 
years  have  been  pouring  into  our  country,  our 
political  traditions  and  racial  characteristics 
still  continue  English  —  Mr.  Douglas  Campbell 
would  say  Dutch,  but  even  so  the  stock  is  the 
same.  Though  thus  somewhat  gorged  with 
food  not  wholly  to  its  taste,  our  political  diges- 
tion has  contrived  so  far  to  master  the  incon- 
gruous mass  of  materials  it  has  been  unable  to 
reject;  and  if  assimilation  has  been  at  times 
imperfect,  our  political  constitution  and  spirit 
remain  English  in  essential  features.  Imbued 
with  like  ideals  of  liberty,  of  law,  of  right,  cer- 


4 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  35 


tainly  not  less  progressive  than  our  kin  be- 
yond sea,  we  are,  in  the  safeguards  deliberately 
placed  around  our  fundamental  law,  even  more 
conservative  than  they.  That  which  we  re- 
ceived of  the  true  spirit  of  freedom  we  have 
kept — liberty  and  law  —  not  the  one  or  the 
other,  but  both.  In  that  spirit  we  not  only 
have  occupied  our  original  inheritance,  but 
also,  step  by  step,  as  Rome  incorporated  the 
other  nations  of  the  peninsula,  we  have  added 
to  it,  spreading  and  perpetuating  everywhere 
the  same  foundation  principles  of  free  and 
good  government  which,  to  her  honor  be  it 
said,  Great  Britain  also  has  maintained  through- 
out her  course.  And  now,  arrested  on  the 
south  by  the  rights  of  a  race  wholly  alien  to 
us,  and  on  the  north  by  a  body  of  states  of  like 
traditions  to  our  own,  whose  freedom  to  choose 
their  own  affiliations  we  respect,  we  have  come 
to  the  sea.  In  our  infancy  we  bordered  upon 
the  Atlantic  only ;  our  youth  carried  our  boun- 
dary to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico;  to-day  maturity 
sees  us  upon  the  Pacific.  Have  we  no  right 
or  no  call  to  progress  farther  in  any  direction  ? 
Are  there  for  us  beyond  the  sea  horizon  none 
of  those  essential  interests,  of  those  evident 


36    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


dangers,  which  impose  a  policy  and  confer 
rights  ? 

This  is  the  question  that  long  has  been 
looming  upon  the  brow  of  a  future  now  rapidly 
passing  into  the  present.  Of  it  the  Hawaiian 
incident  is  a  part — intrinsically,  perhaps,  a 
small  part  —  but  in  its  relations  to  the  whole 
so  vital  that,  as  has  been  said  before,  a  wrong 
decision  does  not  stand  by  itself,  but  involves, 
not  only  in  principle  but  in  fact,  recession 
along  the  whole  line.  In  our  natural,  neces- 
sary, irrepressible  expansion,  we  are  come  here 
into  contact  with  the  progress  of  another  great 
people,  the  law  of  whose  being  has  impressed 
upon  it  a  principle  of  growth  which  has  wrought 
mightily  in  the  past,  and  in  the  present  is  vis- 
ible by  recurring  manifestations.  Of  this 
working,  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Cyprus,  Egypt, 
Aden,  India,  in  geographical  succession  though 
not  in  strict  order  of  time,  show  a  completed 
chain ;  forged  link  by  link,  by  open  force  or 
politic  bargain,  but  always  resulting  from  the 
steady  pressure  of  a  national  instinct,  so  power- 
ful and  so  accurate  that  statesmen  of  every 
school,  willing  or  unwilling,  have  found  them- 
selves carried  along  by  a  tendency  which  no  in- 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  37 


dividuality  can  resist  or  greatly  modify.  Both 
unsubstantial  rumor  and  incautious  personal 
utterance  have  suggested  an  impatient  desire 
in  Mr.  Gladstone  to  be  rid  of  the  occupation 
of  Egypt ;  but  scarcely  has  his  long  exclusion 
from  office  ended  when  the  irony  of  events 
signalizes  his  return  thereto  by  an  increase  in 
the  force  of  occupation.  Further,  it  may  be 
noted  profitably  of  the  chain  just  cited,  that 
the  two  extremities  were  first  possessed  —  first 
India,  then  Gibraltar,  far  later  Malta,  Aden, 
Cyprus,  Egypt  —  and  that,  with  scarce  an  ex- 
ception, each  step  has  been  taken  despite  the 
jealous  vexation  of  a  rival.  Spain  has  never 
ceased  angrily  to  bewail  Gibraltar.  "  I  had 
rather  see  the  English  on  the  heights  of  Mont- 
martre,"  said  the  first  Napoleon,  "than  in 
Malta."  The  feelings  of  France  about  Egypt 
are  matter  of  common  knowledge,  not  even 
dissembled ;  and,  for  our  warning  be  it  added, 
her  annoyance  is  increased  by  the  bitter  sense 
of  opportunity  rejected. 

It  is  needless  here  to  do  more  than  refer  to  that 
other  chain  of  maritime  possessions  —  Hali- 
fax, Bermuda,  Santa  Lucia,  Jamaica  —  which 
strengthen  the  British  hold  upon  the  Atlantic, 


38    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


the  Caribbean,  and  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
In  the  Pacific  the  position  is  for  them  much 
less  satisfactory  —  nowhere,  perhaps,  is  it  less 
so,  and  from  obvious  natural  causes.  The 
commercial  development  of  the  eastern  Pacific 
has  been  far  later,  and  still  is  less  complete, 
than  that  of  its  western  shores.  The  latter 
when  first  opened  to  European  adventure  were 
already  the  seat  of  ancient  economies  in 
China  and  Japan,  furnishing  abundance  of 
curious  and  luxurious  products  to  tempt  the 
trader  by  good  hopes  of  profit.  The  western 
coast  of  America,  for  the  most  part  peopled  by 
savages,  offered  little  save  the  gold  and  silver 
of  Mexico  and  Peru,  and  these  were  monop- 
olized jealously  by  the  Spaniards  —  not  a  com- 
mercial nation — during  their  long  ascendency. 
Being  so  very  far  from  England  and  affording 
so  little  material  for  trade,  Pacific  America  did 
not  draw  the  enterprise  of  a  country  the  chief 
and  honorable  inducement  of  whose  seamen 
was  the  hope  of  gain,  in  pursuit  of  which  they 
settled  and  annexed  point  after  point  in  the 
regions  where  they  penetrated,  and  upon  the 
routes  leading  thither.  The  western  coasts  of 
North  America,  being  reached  only  by  the  long 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  39 


and  perilous  voyage  around  Cape  Horn,  or  by 
a  more  toilsome  and  dangerous  passage  across 
the  continent,  remained  among  the  last  of  the 
temperate  productive  seaboards  of  the  earth  to 
be  possessed  by  white  men.  The  United 
States  were  already  a  nation,  in  fact  as  well  as 
in  form,  when  Vancouver  was  exploring  Puget 
Sound  and  passed  first  through  the  channel 
separating  the  mainland  of  British  America 
from  the  island  which  now  bears  his  name. 
Thus  it  has  happened  that,  from  the  late  devel- 
opment of  British  Columbia  in  the  northeastern 
Pacific,  and  of  Australia  and  New  Zealand 
in  the  southwestern,  Great  Britain  is  found 
again  holding  the  two  extremities  of  a  line, 
between  which  she  must  inevitably  desire  the 
intermediate  links ;  nor  is  there  any  good 
reason  why  she  should  not  have  them,  except 
the  superior,  more  urgent,  more  vital  necessi- 
ties of  another  people  —  our  own.  Of  these 
links  the  Hawaiian  group  possesses  unique 
importance  —  not  from  its  intrinsic  commer- 
cial value,  but  from  its  favorable  position  for 
maritime  and  military  control. 

The  military  or  strategic  value  of  a  naval 
position  depends  upon  its  situation,  upon  its 


40    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


strength,  and  upon  its  resources.  Of  the 
three,  the  first  is  of  most  consequence,  because 
it  results  from  the  nature  of  things;  whereas 
the  two  latter,  when  deficient,  can  be  supplied 
artificially,  in  whole  or  in  part.  Fortifications 
remedy  the  weaknesses  of  a  position,  foresight 
accumulates  beforehand  the  resources  which 
nature  does  not  yield  on  the  spot ;  but  it  is 
not  within  the  power  of  man  to  change  the 
geographical  situation  of  a  point  which  lies 
outside  the  limit  of  strategic  effect.  It  is  in- 
structive, and  yet  apparent  to  the  most  super- 
ficial reading,  to  notice  how  the  first  Napoleon, 
in  commenting  upon  a  region  likely  to  be  the 
scene  of  war,  begins  by  considering  the  most 
conspicuous  natural  features,  and  then  enu- 
merates the  commanding  positions,  their  dis- 
tances from  each  other,  the  relative  directions, 
or,  as  the  sea  phrase  is,  their  "bearings,"  and 
the  particular  facilities  each  offers  for  opera- 
tions of  war.  This  furnishes  the  ground  plan, 
the  skeleton,  detached  from  confusing  second- 
ary considerations,  and  from  which  a  clear  esti- 
mate of  the  decisive  points  can  be  made.  The 
number  of  such  points  varies  greatly,  accord- 
ing to  the  character  of  the  region.    In  a  moun- 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  41 


tainous,  broken  country  they  may  be  very 
many ;  whereas  in  a  plain  devoid  of  natural 
obstacles  there  may  be  few,  or  none  save  those 
created  by  man.  If  few,  the  value  of  each  is 
necessarily  greater  than  if  many ;  and  if  there 
be  but  one,  its  importance  is  not  only  unique, 
but  extreme,  —  measured  only  by  the  size  of 
the  field  over  which  its  unshared  influence 
extends. 

The  sea,  until  it  approaches  the  land,  real- 
izes the  ideal  of  a  vast  plain  unbroken  by 
obstacles.  On  the  sea,  says  an  eminent  French 
tactician,  there  is  no  field  of  battle,  meaning 
that  there  is  none  of  the  natural  conditions 
which  determine,  and  often  fetter,  the  move- 
ments of  the  general.  But  upon  a  plain,  how- 
ever flat  and  monotonous,  causes,  possibly 
slight,  determine  the  concentration  of  popula- 
tion into  towns  and  villages,  and  the  necessary 
communications  between  the  centres  create 
roads.  Where  the  latter  converge,  or  cross, 
tenure  confers  command,  depending  for  impor- 
tance upon  the  number  of  routes  thus  meeting, 
and  upon  their  individual  value.  It  is  just  so 
at  sea.  While  in  itself  the  ocean  opposes  no 
obstacle  to  a  vessel  taking  any  one  of  the 


42    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


numerous  routes  that  can  be  traced  upon  the 
surface  of  the  globe  between  two  points,  con- 
ditions of  distance  or  convenience,  of  traffic  or 
of  wind,  do  prescribe  certain  usual  courses. 
Where  these  pass  near  an  ocean  position,  still 
more  where  they  use  it,  it  has  an  influence 
over  them,  and  where  several  routes  cross 
near  by  that  influence  becomes  very  great,— 
is  commanding. 

Let  us  now  apply  these  considerations  to 
the  Hawaiian  group.  To  any  one  viewing  a 
map  that  shows  the  full  extent  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  with  its  shores  on  either  side,  two  strik- 
ing circumstances  will  be  apparent  immedi- 
ately. He  will  see  at  a  glance  that  the  Sand- 
wich Islands  stand  by  themselves,  in  a  state 
of  comparative  isolation,  amid  a  vast  expanse  of 
sea  ;  and,  again,  that  they  form  the  centre  of 
a  large  circle  whose  radius  is  approximately  — 
and  very  closely  — -  the  distance  from  Hono- 
lulu to  San  Francisco.  The  circumference  of 
this  circle,  if  the  trouble  is  taken  to  describe 
it  with  compass  upon  the  map,  will  be  seen,  on 
the  west  and  south,  to  pass  through  the  outer 
fringe  of  the  system  of  archipelagoes  which, 
from  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  extend  to 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  43 


the  northeast  toward  the  American  continent 
Within  the  circle  a  few  scattered  islets,  bare 
and  unimportant,  seem  only  to  emphasize  the 
failure  of  nature  to  bridge  the  interval  sepa- 
rating Hawaii  from  her  peers  of  the  Southern 
Pacific.  Of  these,  however,  it  may  be  noted 
that  some,  like  Fanning  and  Christmas  Islands, 
have  within  a  few  years  been  taken  into  Brit- 
ish possession.  The  distance  from  San  Fran- 
cisco to  Honolulu,  twenty-one  hundred  miles 
—  easy  steaming  distance  —  is  substantially 
the  same  as  that  from  Honolulu  to  the  Gilbert, 
Marshall,  Samoan,  Society,  and  Marquesas 
groups,  all  under  European  control,  except 
Samoa,  in  which  we  have  a  part  influence. 

To  have  a  central  position  such  as  this,  and 
to  be  alone,  having  no  rival  and  admitting  no 
alternative  throughout  an  extensive  tract,  are 
conditions  that  at  once  fix  the  attention  of 
the  strategist,  —  it  maybe  added,  of  the  states- 
men of  commerce  likewise.  But  to  this  strik- 
ing combination  are  to  be  added  the  remarkable 
relations,  borne  by  these  singularly  placed 
islands,  to  the  greater  commercial  routes  trav- 
ersing this  vast  expanse  known  to  us  as  the 
Pacific,  —  not  only,  however,  to   those  now 


44    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


actually  in  use,  important  as  they  are,  but  also 
to  those  that  must  be  called  into  being  neces- 
sarily by  that  future  to  which  the  Hawaiian 
incident  compels  our  too  unwilling  attention. 
Circumstances,  as  already  remarked,  create  cen- 
tres, between  which  communication  necessarily 
follows;  and  in  the  vista  of  the  future  all  dis- 
cern, however  dimly,  a  new  and  great  centre  that 
must  largely  modify  existing  sea  routes,  as  well 
as  bring  new  ones  into  existence.  Whether 
the  canal  of  the  Central  American  isthmus  be 
eventually  at  Panama  or  at  Nicaragua  matters 
little  to  the  question  now  in  hand,  although, 
in  common  with  most  Americans  who  have 
thought  upon  the  subject,  I  believe  it  surely  will 
be  at  the  latter  point.  Whichever  it  be,  the 
convergence  there  of  so  many  ships  from  the 
Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  will  constitute  a  cen- 
tre of  commerce,  interoceanic,  and  inferior  to 
few,  if  to  any,  in  the  world ;  one  whose 
approaches  will  be  watched  jealously,  and  whose 
relations  to  the  other  centres  of  the  Pacific  by 
the  lines  joining  it  to  them  must  be  examined 
carefully.  Such  study  of  the  commercial  routes 
and  of  their  relations  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
taken  together  with  the  other  strategic  con- 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  45 


siderations  previously  set  forth,  completes  the 
synopsis  of  facts  which  determine  the  value  of 
the  group  for  conferring  either  commercial  or 
naval  control. 

Referring  again  to  the  map,  it  will  be  seen 
that  while  the  shortest  routes  from  the  Isthmus 
to  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  as  well  as  those 
to  South  America,  go  well  clear  of  any  prob* 
able  connection  with  or  interference  fron* 
Hawaii,  those  directed  toward  China  and 
Japan  pass  either  through  the  group  or  in 
close  proximity  to  it.  Vessels  from  Central 
America  bound  to  the  ports  of  North  America 
come,  of  course,  within  the  influence  of  our 
own  coast.  These  circumstances,  and  the  ex- 
isting recognized  distribution  of  political  power 
in  the  Pacific,  point  naturally  to  an  interna- 
tional acquiescence  in  certain  defined  spheres 
of  influence,  for  our  own  country  and  for 
others,  such  as  has  been  reached  already 
between  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  Holland 
in  the  Southwestern  Pacific,  to  avoid  conflict 
there  between  their  respective  claims.  Though 
artificial  in  form,  such  a  recognition,  in  the 
case  here  suggested,  would  depend  upon  per- 
fectly natural  as  well  as  indisputable  conditions. 


46    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


The  United  States  is  by  far  the  greatest,  in  num- 
bers, interests,  and  power,  of  the  communities 
bordering  upon  the  eastern  shores  of  the  North 
Pacific;  and  the  relations  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  to  her  naturally  would  be,  and  actually 
are,  more  numerous  and  more  important  than 
they  can  be  to  any  other  state.  This  is  true, 
although,  unfortunately  for  the  equally  natural 
wishes  of  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies,  the 
direct  routes  from  British  Columbia  to  Eastern 
Australia  and  New  Zealand,  which  depend 
upon  no  building  of  a  future  canal,  pass  as 
near  the  islands  as  those  already  mentioned. 
Such  a  fact,  that  this  additional  great  highway 
runs  close  to  the  group,  both  augments  and 
emphasizes  their  strategic  importance;  but  it 
does  not  affect  the  statement  just  made,  that 
the  interest  of  the  United  States  in  them  sur- 
passes that  of  Great  Britain,  and  depend- 
ent upon  a  natural  cause,  nearness,  which 
has  been  admitted  always  as  a  reasonable 
ground  for  national  self-assertion.  It  is  unfor- 
tunate,  doubtless,  for  the  wishes  of  British 
Columbia,  and  for  the  communications,  com- 
mercial and  military,  depending  upon  the  Ca- 
nadian Pacific  Railway,  that  the  United  States 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  47 


lies  between  them  and  the  South  Pacific,  and 
is  the  state  nearest  to  Hawaii;  but,  the  fact 
being  so,  the  interests  of  our  sixty-five  million 
people,  in  a  position  so  vital  to  our  part  in  the 
Pacific,  must  be  allowed  to  outweigh  those  of 
the  six  millions  of  Canada. 

From  the  foregoing  considerations  may  be 
inferred  the  importance  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
as  a  position  powerfully  influencing  the  com- 
mercial and  military  control  of  the  Pacific,  and 
especially  of  the  Northern  Pacific,  in  which  the 
United  States,  geographically,  has  the  strongest 
right  to  assert  herself.  These  are  the  main 
advantages,  which  can  be  termed  positive : 
those,  namely,  which  directly  advance  com- 
mercial security  and  naval  control.  To  the 
negative  advantages  of  possession,  by  remov- 
ing conditions  which,  if  the  islands  were  in  the 
hands  of  any  other  power,  would  constitute  to 
us  disadvantages  and  threats,  allusion  only  will 
be  made.  The  serious  menace  to  our  Pacific 
coast  and  our  Pacific  trade,  if  so  important  a 
position  were  held  by  a  possible  enemy,  has 
been  mentioned  frequently  in  the  press,  and 
dwelt  upon  in  the  diplomatic  papers  which 
from  time  to  time  are  given  to  the  public. 


48    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


It  may  be  assumed  that  it  is  generally  acknowl- 
edged. Upon  one  particular,  however,  too 
much  stress  cannot  be  laid,  one  to  which  naval 
officers  cannot  but  be  more  sensitive  than  the 
general  public,  and  that  is  the  immense  dis- 
advantage to  us  of  any  maritime  enemy  having 
a  coaling-station  well  within  twenty-five  hun- 
dred miles,  as  this  is,  of  every  point  of  our 
coast-line  from  Puget  Sound  to  Mexico.  Were 
there  many  others  available,  we  might  find  it 
difficult  to  exclude  from  all.  There  is,  how- 
ever, but  the  one.  Shut  out  from  the  Sandwich 
Islands  as  a  coal  base,  an  enemy  is  thrown  back 
for  supplies  of  fuel  to  distances  of  thirty-five 
hundred  or  four  thousand  miles,  —  or  between 
seven  thousand  and  eight  thousand,  going  and 
coming,  —  an  impediment  to  sustained  mari- 
time operations  well-nigh  prohibitive.  The 
coal-mines  of  British  Columbia  constitute,  of 
course,  a  qualification  to  this  statement;  but 
upon  them,  if  need  arose,  we  might  hope  at 
least  to  impose  some  trammels  by  action  from 
the  land  side.  It  is  rarely  that  so  important  a 
factor  in  the  attack  or  defence  of  a  coast-line  — 
of  a  sea  frontier  —  is  concentrated  in  a  single 
position ;  and  the  circumstance  renders  doubly 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  49 


imperative  upon  us  to  secure  it,  if  we  right- 
eously can. 

It  is  to  be  hoped,  also,  that  the  opportunity 
thus  thrust  upon  us  may  not  be  viewed  nar- 
rowly, as  though  it  concerned  but  one  section 
of  our  country  or  one  portion  of  its  external 
trade  or  influence.  This  is  no  mere  question 
of  a  particular  act,  for  which,  possibly,  just 
occasion  may  not  have  offered  yet;  but  of  a 
principle,  a  policy,  fruitful  of  many  future  acts, 
to  enter  upon  which,  in  the  fulness  of  our 
national  progress,  the  time  now  has  arrived. 
The  principle  being  accepted,  to  be  conditioned 
only  by  a  just  and  candid  regard  for  the  rights 
and  reasonable  susceptibilities  of  other  nations, 
—  none  of  which  is  contravened  by  the  step 
here  immediately  under  discussion,  —  the  an- 
nexation, even,  of  Hawaii  would  be  no  mere 
sporadic  effort,  irrational  because  disconnected 
from  an  adequate  motive,  but  a  first-fruit  and 
a  token  that  the  nation  in  its  evolution  has 
aroused  itself  to  the  necessity  of  carrying  its 
life — that  has  been  the  happiness  of  those 
under  its  influence  —  beyond  the  borders  which 
heretofore  have  sufficed  for  its  activities.  That 
the  vaunted  blessings  of  our  economy  are  not 

4 


50    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


to  be  forced  upon  the  unwilling  may  be  con- 
ceded ;  but  the  concession  does  not  deny  the 
right  nor  the  wisdom  of  gathering  in  those  who 
wish  to  come.  Comparative  religion  teaches 
that  creeds  which  reject  missionary  enterprise 
are  foredoomed  to  decay.  May  it  not  be  so 
with  nations  ?  Certainly  the  glorious  record  of 
England  is  consequent  mainly  upon  the  spirit, 
and  traceable  to  the  time,  when  she  launched 
out  into  the  deep  —  without  formulated  policy, 
it  is  true,  or  foreseeing  the  future  to  which  her 
star  was  leading,  but  obeying  the  instinct  which 
in  the  infancy  of  nations  anticipates  the  more 
reasoned  impulses  of  experience.  Let  us,  too, 
learn  from  her  experience.  Not  all  at  once  did 
England  become  the  great  sea  power  which  she 
is,  but  step  by  step,  as  opportunity  offered,  she 
has  moved  on  to  the  world-wide  pre-eminence 
now  held  by  English  speech,  and  by  institutions 
sprung  from  English  germs.  How  much 
poorer  would  the  world  have  been,  had  Eng- 
lishmen heeded  the  cautious  hesitancy  that 
now  bids  us  reject  every  advance  beyond  our 
shore-lines !  And  can  any  one  doubt  that  a 
cordial,  if  unformulated,  understanding  between 
the  two  chief  states  of  English  tradition,  to 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  51 


spread  freely,  without  mutual  jealousy  and  in 
mutual  support,  would  increase  greatly  the 
worlds  sum  of  happiness  ? 

But  if  a  plea  of  the  world's  welfare  seem  sus- 
piciously like  a  cloak  for  national  self-interest, 
let  the  latter  be  accepted  frankly  as  the  ade- 
quate motive  which  it  assuredly  is.  Let  us  not 
shrink  from  pitting  a  broad  self-interest  against 
the  narrow  self-interest  to  which  some  would 
restrict  us.  The  demands  of  our  three  great 
seaboards,  the  Atlantic,  the  Gulf,  and  the 
Pacific,  —  each  for  itself,  and  all  for  the  strength 
that  comes  from  drawing  closer  the  ties  between 
them,  —  are  calling  for  the  extension,  through 
the  Isthmian  Canal,  of  that  broad  sea  common 
along  which,  and  along  which  alone,  in  all  the 
ages  prosperity  has  moved.  Land  carriage, 
always  restricted  and  therefore  always  slow, 
toils  enviously  but  hopelessly  behind,  vainly 
seeking  to  replace  and  supplant  the  royal  high- 
way of  nature's  own  making.  Corporate  in- 
terests, vigorous  in  that  power  of  concentration 
which  is  the  strength  of  armies  and  of  minori- 
ties, may  here  withstand  for  a  while  the  ill- 
organized  strivings  of  the  multitude,  only  dimly 
conscious  of  its  wants ;  yet  the  latter,  however 


52    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


temporarily  opposed  and  baffled,  is  sure  at  last, 
like  the  blind  forces  of  nature,  to  overwhelm  all 
that  stand  in  the  way  of  its  necessary  prog- 
ress. So  the  Isthmian  Canal  is  an  inevitable 
part  in  the  future  of  the  United  States; 
yet  one  that  cannot  be  separated  from  other 
necessary  incidents  of  a  policy  dependent 
upon  it,  whose  details  cannot  be  foreseen  ex- 
actly. But  because  the  precise  steps  that  here- 
after may  be  opportune  or  necessary  cannot 
yet  be  foretold  certainly,  is  not  a  reason  the 
less,  but  a  reason  the  more,  for  establishing  a 
principle  of  action  which  may  serve  to  guide  as 
opportunities  arise.  Let  us  start  from  the 
fundamental  truth,  warranted  by  history,  that 
the  control  of  the  seas,  and  especially  along  the 
great  lines  drawn  by  national  interest  or  national 
commerce,  is  the  chief  among  the  merely 
material  elements  in  the  power  and  prosperity 
of  nations.  It  is  so  because  the  sea  is  the 
world's  great  medium  of  circulation.  From 
this  necessarily  follows  the  principle  that,  as 
subsidiary  to  such  control,  it  is  imperative  to 
take  possession,  when  it  can  be  done  righteously, 
of'  such  maritime  positions  as  contribute  to 
secure  command.    If  this  principle  be  adopted, 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  53 


there  will  be  no  hesitation  about  taking  the 
positions  —  and  they  are  many — upon  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  Isthmus,  whose  interests  incline 
them  to  seek  us.  It  has  its  application  also  to 
the  present  case  of  Hawaii. 

There  is,  however,  one  caution  to  be  given 
from  the  military  point  of  view,  beyond  the 
need  of  which  the  world  has  not  yet  passed. 
Military  positions,  fortified  posts,  by  land  or  by 
sea,  however  strong  or  admirably  situated,  do 
not  confer  control  by  themselves  alone.  People 
often  say  that  such  an  island  or  harbor  will  give 
control  of  such  a  body  of  water.  It  is  an  utter, 
deplorable,  ruinous  mistake.  The  phrase  indeed 
may  be  used  by  some  only  loosely,  without  for- 
getting other  implied  conditions  of  adequate 
protection  and  adequate  navies ;  but  the  con- 
fidence of  our  own  nation  in  its  native  strength, 
and  its  indifference  to  the  defence  of  its  ports 
and  the  sufficiency  of  its  fleet,  give  reason 
to  fear  that  the  full  consequences  of  a  forward 
step  may  not  be  weighed  soberly.  Napoleon, 
who  knew  better,  once  talked  this  way.  "  The 
islands  of  San  Pietro,  Corfu,  and  Malta,"  he 
wrote,  "  will  make  us  masters  of  the  whole 
Mediterranean."     Vain  boast !     Within  one 


54    Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power. 


year  Corfu,  in  two  years  Malta,  were  rent  away 
from  the  state  that  could  not  support  them  by 
its  ships.  Nay,  more :  had  Bonaparte  not 
taken  the  latter  stronghold  out  of  the  hands  of 
its  degenerate  but  innocuous  government,  that 
citadel  of  the  Mediterranean  would  perhaps  — 
would  probably  —  never  have  passed  into  those 
of  his  chief  enemy.  There  is  here  also  a  lesson 
for  us. 

It  is  by  no  means  logical  to  leap,  from  this 
recognition  of  the  necessity  of  adequate  naval 
force  to  secure  outlying  dependencies,  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  United  States  would  need 
for  that  object  a  navy  equal  to  the  largest  now 
existing.  A  nation  as  far  removed  as  is  our 
own  from  the  bases  of  foreign  naval  strength 
may  reasonably  reckon  upon  the  qualification 
that  distance  —  not  to  speak  of  the  complex 
European  interests  close  at  hand  —  impresses 
upon  the  exertion  of  naval  strength  by  European 
powers.  The  mistake  is  when  our  remoteness, 
unsupported  by  carefully  calculated  force,  is 
regarded  as  an  armor  of  proof,  under  cover  of 
which  any  amount  of  swagger  may  be  indulged 
safely.  An  estimate  of  what  is  an  adequate 
naval  force  for   our  country   may  properly 


Hawaii  and  our  Future  Sea  Power.  55 


take  into  account  the  happy  interval  which 
separates  both  our  present  territory  and  our 
future  aspirations  from  the  centres  of  interest 
really  vital  to  European  states.  If  to  these  safe- 
guards be  added,  on  our  part,  a  sober  recogni- 
tion of  what  our  reasonable  sphere  of  influence 
is,  and  a  candid  justice  in  dealing  with  foreign 
interests  within  that  sphere,  there  will  be  little 
disposition  to  question  our  preponderance 
therein. 

Among  all  foreign  states,  it  is  especially  to 
be  hoped  that  each  passing  year  may  render 
more  cordial  the  relations  between  ourselves 
and  the  great  nation  from  whose  loins  we 
sprang.  The  radical  identity  of  spirit  which 
underlies  our  superficial  differences  of  polity 
surely  will  draw  us  closer  together,  if  we  do  not 
set  our  faces  wilfully  against  a  tendency  which 
would  give  our  race  the  predominance  over  the 
seas  of  the  world.  To  force  such  a  consumma- 
tion is  impossible,  and  if  possible  would  not  be 
wise  ;  but  surely  it  would  be  a  lofty  aim,  fraught 
with  immeasurable  benefits,  to  desire  it,  and 
to  raise  no  needless  impediments  by  advocating 
perfectly  proper  acts,  demanded  by  our  evident 
interests,  in  offensive  or  arrogant  terms. 


THE  ISTHMUS  AND  SEA  POWER. 


THE  ISTHMUS  AND  SEA  POWER. 


June,  1893. 

FOR  more  than  four  hundred  years  the 
mind  of  man  has  been  possessed  with 
a  great  idea,  which,  although  by  its  wide 
diffusion  and  prophetic  nature  resembling 
one  of  those  fundamental  instincts,  whose 
very  existence  points  to  a  necessary  fulfil- 
ment, first  quickened  into  life  in  the  thought 
of  Christopher  Columbus.  To  him  the  vis- 
ion, dimly  seen  through  the  scanty  and  inac- 
curate knowledge  of  his  age,  imaged  a  close 
and  facile  communication,  by  means  of  the 
sea,  that  great  bond  of  nations,  between  two 
ancient  and  diverse  civilizations,  which  cen- 
tred, the  one  around  the  Mediterranean,  the 
birthplace  of  European  commerce,  refinement, 
and  culture,  the  other  upon  the  shores  of 
that  distant  Eastern  Ocean  which  lapped  the 
dominions  of  the  Great  Khan,  and  held  upon 

1  The  Map  of  the  Gulf  and  Caribbean,  p.  271,  will  serve  for 
geographical  references  of  this  article. 


6o  The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


its  breast  the  rich  island  of  Zipangu.  Hith- 
erto an  envious  waste  of  land,  entailing  years 
of  toilsome  and  hazardous  journey,  had  barred 
them  asunder.  A  rare  traveller  now  and  again 
might  penetrate  from  one  to  the  other,  but 
it  was  impossible  to  maintain  by  land  the  con- 
stant exchange  of  influence  and  benefit  which, 
though  on  a  contracted  scale,  had  constituted 
the  advantage  and  promoted  the  development 
of  the  Mediterranean  peoples.  The  micro- 
cosm of  the  land-girt  sea  typified  then 
that  future  greater  family  of  nations,  which 
one  by  one  have  been  bound  since  into  a 
common  tie  of  interest  by  the  broad  enfold- 
ing ocean,  that  severs  only  to  knit  them  more 
closelv  together.  So  with  a  seers  eve,  albeit 
as  in  a  glass  darkly,  saw  Columbus,  and  was 
persuaded,  and  embraced  the  assurance.  As 
the  bold  adventurer,  walking  by  faith  and  not 
by  sight,  launched  his  tiny  squadron  upon  its 
voyage,  making  the  first  step  in  the  great 
progress  which  was  to  be,  and  still  is  not 
completed,  he  little  dreamed  that  the  mere 
incident  of  stumbling  upon  an  unknown  re- 
gion that  lay  across  his  route  should  be  with 
posterity  his  chief  title  to  fame,  obscuring  the 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power 


61 


true  glory  of  his  grand  conception,  as  well  as 
delaying  its  fulfilment  to  a  far  distant  future. 

The  story  of  his  actual  achievement  is 
sufficiently  known  to  all  readers,  and  need  not 
be  repeated  here.  Amid  the  many  disap- 
pointments and  humiliations  which  succeeded 
the  brief  triumphant  blaze  of  his  first  return, 
and  clouded  the  latter  years  of  his  life,  Co- 
lumbus was  spared  the  pang  of  realizing  that 
the  problem  was  insoluble  for  the  time.  Like 
many  a  prophet  before  him,  he  knew  not  what, 
nor  what  manner  of  time,  the  spirit  that  was 
in  him  foretold,  and  died  the  happier  for  his 
ignorance.  The  certainty  that  a  wilderness, 
peopled  by  savages  and  semi-barbarians,  had 
been  added  to  the  known  world,  would  have 
been  a  poor  awakening  from  the  golden  dreams 
of  beneficent  glory  as  well  as  of  profit  which 
so  long  had  beckoned  him  on.  That  the 
western  land  he  had  discovered  interposed 
a  barrier  to  the  further  progress  of  ships 
towards  his  longed-for  goal,  as  inexorable 
as  the  mountain  ranges  and  vast  steppes  of 
Asia,  was  mercifully  concealed  from  his  eyes ; 
and  the  elusive  "  secret  of  the  strait  "  through 
which  he  to  the  last  hoped  to  pass,  though 


62 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


tantalizing  in  its  constant  evasion,  kept  in 
tension  the  springs  of  hope  and  moral  energy 
which  might  have  succumbed  under  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  truth. 

It  fell  to  the  great  discoverer,  in  his  last 
voyage,  to  approach  the  continent,  and  to 
examine  its  shores  along  the  region  where  the 
true  secret  of  the  strait  lay  hidden,  —  where,  if 
ever,  it  shall  pass  from  a  dream  to  a  reality, 
by  the  hand  of  man.  In  the  autumn  of  1502, 
after  many  trials  and  misadventures,  Columbus, 
having  skirted  the  south  side  of  Cuba,  reached 
the  north  coast  of  Honduras.  There  was  little 
reason,  except  in  his  own  unaccountable  con- 
viction, for  continuing  thence  in  one  direction 
rather  than  in  the  other ;  but  by  some  process 
of  thought  he  had  convinced  himself  that 
the  sought-for  strait  lay  to  the  south  rather 
than  to  the  north.  He  therefore  turned  to 
the  eastward,  though  the  wind  was  contrary, 
and,  after  a  hard  buffet  against  it,  doubled 
Cape  Gracias  a  Dios,  which  still  retains  its 
expressive  name,  significant  of  his  relief  at 
finding  that  the  trend  of  the  beach  at  last 
permitted  him  to  follow  his  desired  course  with 
a  fair  wind.    During  the  next  two  months 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


63 


he  searched  the  entire  coast-line  as  far  as 
Porto  Bello,  discovering  and  examining  several 
openings  in  the  land  which  since  have  been 
of  historical  importance,  among  others  the 
mouth  of  the  San  Juan  River  and  the  Chiriqui 
Lagoon,  one  of  whose  principal  divisions  still 
recalls  his  visit  in  its  name,  Almirante  Bay, 
the  Bay  of  the  Admiral.  A  little  beyond,  to 
the  eastward  of  Porto  Bello,  he  came  to  a 
point  already  known  to  the  Spaniards,  having 
been  reached  from  Trinidad.  The  explorer 
thus  acquired  the  certainty  that,  from  the 
latter  island  to  Yucatan,  there  was  no  break 
in  the  obdurate  shore  which  barred  his  access 
to  Asia. 

Every  possible  site  for  an  interoceanic  canal 
lies  within  the  strip  of  land  thus  visited  by 
Columbus  shortly  before  his  death  in  1504. 
How  narrow  the  insurmountable  obstacle,  and 
how  tantalizing,  in  the  apparent  facilities  for 
piercing  it  extended  by  the  formation  of  the 
land,  were  not  known  until  ten  years  later, 
when  Balboa,  led  on  by  the  reports  of  the 
natives,  reached  the  eminence  whence  he.  first 
among  Europeans,  saw  the  South  Sea,  —  a 
name  long  and  vaguely  applied  to  the  Pacific, 


64 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


because  of  the  direction  in  which  it  lay  from 
its  discoverer.  During  these  early  years  the 
history  of  the  region  we  now  know  as  Central 
America  was  one  of  constant  strife  among  the 
various  Spanish  leaders,  encouraged  rather 
than  stifled  by  the  jealous  home  government ; 
but  it  was  also  one  of  unbroken  and  venture- 
some exploration,  a  healthier  manifestation  of 
the  same  restless  and  daring  energy  that  pro- 
voked their  internal  collisions.  In  January, 
1522,  one  Gil  Gonzalez  started  from  Panama 
northward  on  the  Pacific  side,  with  a  few  frail 
barks,  and  in  March  discovered  Lake  Nicara- 
gua, which  has  its  name  from  the  cacique, 
Nicaragua,  or  Nicarao,  whose  town  stood  upon 
its  shores.  Five  years  later,  another  adventurer 
took  his  vessel  to  pieces  on  the  coast,  trans- 
ported it  thus  to  the  lake,  and  made  the  circuit 
of  the  latter ;  discovering  its  outlet,  the  San 
Juan,  just  a  quarter  of  a  century  after  Colum- 
bus had  visited  the  mouth  of  the  river. 

The  conquest  of  Peru,  and  the  gradual 
extension  of  Spanish  domination  and  settle- 
ments in  Central  America  and  along  the 
shores  of  the  Pacific,  soon  bestowed  upon  the 
Isthmus  an  importance,  vividly  suggestive  of 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


65 


its  rise  into  political  prominence  consequent 
upon  the  acquisition  of  California  by  the 
United  States,  and  upon  the  spread  of  the 
latter  along  the  Pacific  coast.  The  length 
and  severity  of  the  voyage  round  Cape  Horn, 
then  as  now,  impelled  men  to  desire  some 
shorter  and  less  arduous  route ;  and,  incon- 
venient as  the  land  transport  with  its  repeated 
lading  and  unlading  was,  it  presented  before 
the  days  of  steam  the  better  alternative,  as 
to  some  extent  it  still  does.  So  the  Isthmus 
and  its  adjoining  regions  became  a  great  cen- 
tre of  commerce,  a  point  where  many  highways 
converged  and  whence  they  parted ;  where 
the  East  and  the  West  met  in  intercourse, 
sometimes  friendly,  more  often  hostile.  Thus 
was  realized  partially,  though  most  incom- 
pletely, the  vision  of  Columbus;  and  thus,  after 
many  fluctuations,  and  despite  the  immense 
expansion  of  these  latter  days,  partial  and 
incomplete  his  great  conception  yet  remains. 
The  secret  of  the  strait  is  still  the  problem 
and  the  reproach  of  mankind. 

By  whatever  causes  produced,  where  such  a 
centre  of  commerce  exists,  there  always  will  be 
found  a  point  of  general  interest  to  mankind, 

5 


66 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


—  to  all,  at  least,  of  those  peoples  who,  whether 
directly  commercial  or  not,  share  in  the  wide- 
spreading  benefits  and  inconveniences  arising 
from  the  fluctuations  of  trade.  But  enterpris- 
ing commercial  countries  are  not  content  to  be 
mere  passive  recipients  of  these  diverse  in- 
fluences. By  the  very  characteristics  which 
make  them  what  they  are,  they  are  led  per- 
force to  desire,  and  to  aim  at,  control  of  these 
decisive  regions ;  for  their  tenure,  like  the  key 
of  a  military  position,  exerts  a  vital  effect  upon 
the  course  of  trade,  and  so  upon  the  struggle, 
not  only  for  bare  existence,  but  for  that  in- 
crease of  wealth,  of  prosperity,  and  of  general 
consideration,  which  affect  both  the  happiness 
and  the  dignity  of  nations.  Consequently,  in 
every  age,  according  to  its  particular  tempera- 
ment and  circumstances,  there  will  be  found 
manifested  this  desire  for  control ;  sometimes 
latent  in  an  attitude  of  simple  watchfulness ; 
sometimes  starting  into  vivid  action  under  the 
impulse  of  national  jealousies,  and  issuing  in 
diplomatic  rivalries  or  hostile  encounter. 

Such,  accordingly,  has  been  the  history  of 
the  Central  American  Isthmus  since  the  time 
when  it  became  recognized  as  the  natural  cen- 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


67 


tre,  towards  which,  if  not  thwarted  by  adverse 
influences,  the  current  of  intercourse  between 
East  and  West  inevitably  must  tend.  Here 
the  direction  of  least  resistance  was  indicated 
clearly  by  nature;  and  a  concurrence  of  cir- 
cumstances, partly  inherent  in  the  general 
character  of  the  region,  partly  adventitious  or 
accidental,  contributed  at  an  early  date,  and 
until  very  recently,  to  emphasize  and  enlarge 
the  importance  consequent  upon  the  geo- 
graphical situation  and  physical  conformation 
of  this  narrow  barrier  between  two  great  seas. 
For  centuries  the  West  India  Islands,  circling 
the  Caribbean,  and  guarding  the  exterior  ap- 
proaches to  the  Isthmus,  continued  to  be  the 
greatest  single  source  of  tropical  products 
which  had  become  increasingly  necessary  to 
the  civilized  nations  of  Europe.  In  them,  and 
in  that  portion  of  the  continent  which  ex- 
tended on  either  side  of  the  Isthmus,  known 
under  the  vague  appellation  of  the  Spanish 
Main,  Great  Britain,  during  her  desperate 
strife  with  the  first  Napoleon,  —  a  strife  for 
very  existence,  —  found  the  chief  support  of 
the  commercial  strength  and  credit  that  alone 
carried  her  to  the  triumphant  end.    The  Isth- 


68         The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


mus  and  the  Caribbean  were  vital  elements  in 
determining  the  issue  of  that  stern  conflict. 
For  centuries,  also,  the  treasures  of  Mexico 
and  Peru,  upon  which  depended  the  vigorous 
action  of  the  great  though  decadent  military 
kingdom  of  Spain,  flowed  towards  and  accumu- 
lated around  the  Isthmus,  where  they  were 
reinforced  by  the  tribute  of  the  Philippine 
Islands,  and  whence  they  took  their  way  in  the 
lumbering  galleons  for  the  ports  of  the  Penin- 
sula. Where  factors  of  such  decisive  influence 
in  European  politics  were  at  stake,  it  was  in- 
evitable that  the  rival  nations,  in  peace  as 
well  as  in  open  war,  should  carry  their  ambi- 
tions to  the  scene  ;  and  the  unceasing  struggle 
for  the  mastery  would  fluctuate  with  the  con- 
trol of  the  waters,  which,  as  in  all  maritime 
regions,  must  depend  mainly  upon  naval  pre- 
ponderance, but  also  in  part  upon  possession 
of  those  determining  positions,  of  whose  ten- 
ure Napoleon  said  that  "  war  is  a  business  of 
positions."  Among  these  the  Isthmus  was 
chief. 

The  wild  enterprises  and  bloody  cruelties  of 
the  early  buccaneers  were  therefore  not  merely 
a  brutal  exhibition  of  unpitying  greed,  indica- 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


69 


tive  of  the  scum  of  nations  as  yet  barely  emerg- 
ing from  barbarism.  They  were  this,  doubt- 
less, but  they  were  something  more.  In  the 
march  of  events,  these  early  marauders  played 
the  same  part,  in  relation  to  what  was  to  suc- 
ceed them,  as  the  rude,  unscrupulous,  lawless 
adventurers  who  now  precede  the  ruthless 
march  of  civilized  man,  who  swarm  over  the 
border,  occupy  the  outposts,  and  by  their  ex- 
cesses stain  the  fair  fame  of  the  race  whose 
pioneers  they  are.  But,  while  thus  libels  upon 
and  reproaches  to  the  main  body,  they  never- 
theless belong  to  it,  share  its  essential  charac- 
ter, and  foretell  its  inevitable  course.  Like 
driftwood  swept  forward  on  the  crest  of  a  tor- 
rent, they  betoken  the  approaching  flood.  So 
with  the  celebrated  freebooters  of  the  Spanish 
Main.  Of  the  same  general  type,  —  though 
varying  greatly  in  individual  characteristics,  in 
breadth  of  view,  and  even  in  elevation  of  pur- 
pose, —  their  piratical  careers  not  only  evi- 
denced the  local  wealth  of  the  scene  of  their 
exploits,  but  attested  the  commercial  and  stra- 
tegic importance  of  the  position  upon  which 
in  fact  that  wealth  depended.  The  carcass 
was  there,  and  the  eagles  as  well  as  the  vul- 


7o 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


tures,  the  far-sighted  as  well  as  the  mere  car- 
rion birds  of  prey,  were  gathering  round  it. 
"  The  spoil  of  Granada,"  said  one  of  these  mer- 
cenary chieftains,  two  centuries  ago,  "  I  count 
as  naught  beside  the  knowledge  of  the  great 
Lake  Nicaragua,  and  of  the  route  between  the 
Northern  and  Southern  seas  which  depends 
upon  it." 

As  time  passed,  the  struggle  for  the  mastery 
inevitably  resulted,  by  a  kind  of  natural  selec- 
tion, in  the  growing  predominance  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  British  Islands,  in  whom  commercial 
enterprise  and  political  instinct  were  blended 
so  happily.  The  very  lawlessness  of  the  period 
favored  the  extension  of  their  power  and  influ- 
ence; for  it  removed  from  the  free  play  of  a 
nation's  innate  faculties  the  fetters  which  are 
imposed  by  our  present  elaborate  framework  of 
precedents,  constitutions,  and  international  law. 
Admirably  adapted  as  these  are  to  the  con- 
servation and  regular  working  of  a  political 
system,  they  are,  nevertheless,  however  wise, 
essentially  artificial,  and  hence  are  ill  adapted 
to  a  transition  state,  —  to  a  period  in  which 
order  is  evolving  out  of  chaos,  where  the  result 
is  durable  exactly  in  proportion  to  the  freedom 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  71 


with  which  the  natural  forces  are  allowed  to 
act,  and  to  reach  their  own  equilibrium  without 
extraneous  interference.  Nor  are  such  periods 
confined  to  the  early  days  of  mere  lawlessness. 
They  recur  whenever  a  crisis  is  reached  in  the 
career  of  a  nation;  when  old  traditions,  ac- 
cepted maxims,  or  written  constitutions  have 
been  outgrown,  in  whole  or  in  part ;  when  the 
time  has  come  for  a  people  to  recognize  that 
the  limits  imposed  upon  its  expansion,  by  the 
political  wisdom  of  its  forefathers,  have  ceased 
to  be  applicable  to  its  own  changed  conditions 
and  those  of  the  world.  The  question  then 
raised  is  not  whether  the  constitution,  as  writ- 
ten, shall  be  respected.  It  is  how  to  reach 
modifications  in  the  constitution  —  and  that 
betimes  —  so  that  the  genius  and  awakened 
intelligence  of  the  people  may  be  free  to  act, 
without  violating  that  respect  for  its  fundamen- 
tal law  upon  which  national  stability  ultimately 
depends.  It  is  a  curious  feature  of  our  current 
journalism  that  it  is  clear-sighted  and  prompt 
to  see  the  unfortunate  trammels  in  which  cer- 
tain of  our  religious  bodies  are  held,  by  the 
cast-iron  tenets  imposed  upon  them  by  a  past 
generation,  while  at  the  same  time  political 


72 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


tenets,  similarly  ancient,  and  imposed  with  a 
like  ignorance  of  a  future  which  is  our  present, 
are  invoked  freely  to  forbid  this  nation  from 
extending  its  power  and  necessary  enterprise 
into  and  beyond  the  seas,  to  which  on  every 
side  it  now  has  attained. 

During  the  critical  centuries  when  Great 
Britain  was  passing  through  that  protracted 
phase  of  her  history  in  which,  from  one  of  the 
least  among  states,  she  became,  through  the 
power  of  the  sea,  the  very  keystone  and  foun- 
dation upon  which  rested  the  commercial  — 
for  a  time  even  the  political  —  fabric  of  Europe, 
the  free  action  of  her  statesmen  and  people 
was  clogged  by  no  uneasy  sense  that  the  na- 
tional genius  was  in  conflict  with  artificial, 
self-imposed  restrictions.  She  plunged  into 
the  brawl  of  nations  that  followed  the  discovery 
of  a  new  world,  of  an  unoccupied  if  not  un- 
claimed inheritance,  with  a  vigor  and  an  initia- 
tive which  gained  ever-accelerated  momentum 
and  power  as  the  years  rolled  by.  Far  and 
wide,  in  every  sea,  through  every  clime,  her 
seamen  and  her  colonists  spread;  but  while 
their  political  genius  and  traditions  enabled 
them,  in  regions  adapted  to  the  physical  well- 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  73 


being  of  the  race,  to  found  self-governing  colo- 
nies which  have  developed  into  one  of  the 
greatest  of  free  states,  they  did  not  find,  and 
never  have  found,  that  the  possession  of  and 
rule  over  barbarous,  or  semi-civilized,  or  inert 
tropical  communities,  were  inconsistent  with 
the  maintenance  of  political  liberty  in  the 
mother  country.  The  sturdy  vigor  of  the 
broad  principle  of  freedom  in  the  national  life 
is  attested  sufficiently  by  centuries  of  steady 
growth,  that  surest  evidence  of  robust  vitality. 
But,  while  conforming  in  the  long  run  to  the 
dictates  of  natural  justice,  no  feeble  scrupulos- 
ity impeded  the  nation's  advance  to  power,  by 
which  alone  its  mission  and  the  law  of  its 
being  could  be  fulfilled.  No  artificial  fetters 
were  forged  to  cramp  the  action  of  the  state, 
nor  was  it  drugged  with  political  narcotics  to 
dwarf  its  growth. 

In  the  region  here  immediately  under  con- 
sideration, Great  Britain  entered  the  contest 
under  conditions  of  serious  disadvantage.  The 
glorious  burst  of  maritime  and  colonial  enter- 
prise which  marked  the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  as 
the  new  era  dawned  when  the  country  rec- 
ognized the  sphere  of  its  true  greatness,  was 


74 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


confronted  by  the  full  power  of  Spain,  as  yet 
outwardly  unshaken,  in  actual  tenure  of  the 
most  important  positions  in  the  Caribbean  and 
the  Spanish  Main,  and  claiming  the  right  to 
exclude  all  others  from  that  quarter  of  the 
world.  How  brilliantly  this  claim  was  resisted 
is  well  known;  yet,  had  they  been  then  in 
fashion,  there  might  have  been  urged,  to  turn 
England  from  the  path  which  has  made  her 
what  she  is,  the  same  arguments  that  now  are 
freely  used  to  deter  our  own  country  from  even 
accepting  such  advantages  as  are  ready  to  drop 
into  her  lap.  If  it  be  true  that  Great  Britain's 
maritime  policy  now  is  imposed  to  some  extent 
by  the  present  necessities  of  the  little  group  of 
islands  which  form  the  nucleus  of  her  strength, 
it  is  not  true  that  any  such  necessities  first 
impelled  her  to  claim  her  share  of  influence  in 
the  world,  her  part  in  the  great  drama  of 
nations.  Not  for  such  reasons  did  she  launch 
out  upon  the  career  which  is  perhaps  the 
noblest  yet  run  by  any  people.  It  then  could 
have  been  said  to  her,  as  it  now  is  said  to  us, 
"  Why  go  beyond  your  own  borders  ?  Within 
them  you  have  what  suffices  for  your  needs 
and  those  of  your  population.    There  are  mani- 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  75 


fold  abuses  within  to  be  corrected,  manifold 
miseries  to  be  relieved.  Let  the  outside  world 
take  care  of  itself.  Defend  yourself,  if  attacked  ; 
being,  however,  always  careful  to  postpone 
preparation  to  the  extreme  limit  of  imprudence. 
4 Sphere  of  influence/  'part  in  the  world/ 
'national  prestige,'  —  there  are  no  such  things; 
or  if  there  be,  they  are  not  worth  fighting  for." 
What  England  would  have  been,  had  she  so 
reasoned,  is  matter  for  speculation  ;  that  the 
world  would  have  been  poorer  may  be  confi- 
dently affirmed. 

As  the  strength  of  Spain  waned  apace  during 
the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the 
external  efforts  of  Great  Britain  also  slackened 
through  the  rise  of  internal  troubles,  which 
culminated  in  the  Great  Rebellion,  and  ab- 
sorbed for  the  time  all  the  energies  of  the  peo- 
ple. The  momentum  acquired  under  Drake, 
Raleigh,  and  their  associates  was  lost,  and  an 
occasion,  opportune  through  the  exhaustion  of 
the  great  enemy,  Spain,  passed  unimproved. 
But,  though  thus  temporarily  checked,  the 
national  tendency  remained,  and  quickly  re- 
sumed its  sway  when  Cromwell's  mighty  hand 
had  composed  the  disorders  of  the  Common- 


76 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


wealth.  His  clear-sighted  statesmanship,  as 
well  as  the  immediate  necessities  of  his  internal 
policy,  dictated  the  strenuous  assertion  by  sea 
of  Great  Britain's  claims,  not  only  to  external 
respect,  which  he  rigorously  exacted,  but  also 
to  her  due  share  in  influencing  the  world  out- 
side her  borders.  The  nation  quickly  re- 
sponded to  his  proud  appeal,  and  received 
anew  the  impulse  upon  the  road  to  sea  power 
which  never  since  has  been  relaxed.  To  him 
were  due  the  measures  —  not,  perhaps,  eco- 
nomically the  wisest,  judged  by  modern  lights, 
but  more  than  justified  by  the  conditions  of  his 
times — which  drew  into  English  hands  the 
carrying  trade  of  the  world.  The  glories  of  the 
British  navy  as  an  organized  force  date  also 
from  his  short  rule ;  and  it  was  he  who,  in 
1655,  laid  a  firm  basis  for  the  development  of 
the  country's  sea  power  in  the  Caribbean,  by 
the  conquest  of  Jamaica,  from  a  military  stand- 
point the  most  decisive  of  all  single  positions  in 
that  sea  for  the  control  of  the  Isthmus.  It  is 
true  that  the  successful  attempt  upon  this 
island  resulted  from  the  failure  of  the  leaders 
to  accomplish  Cromwell's  more  immediate  pur- 
pose of  reducing  Santo  Domingo,  —  that  in  so 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


77 


far  the  particular  fortunate  issue  was  of  the 
nature  of  an  accident;  but  this  fact  serves  only 
to  illustrate  more  emphatically  that,  when  a 
general  line  of  policy,  whether  military  or  politi- 
cal, is  correctly  chosen  upon  sound  principles, 
incidental  misfortunes  or  disappointments  do 
not  frustrate  the  conception.  The  sagacious, 
far-seeing  motive,  which  prompted  Cromwell's 
movement  against  the  West  Indian  posses- 
sions of  Spain,  was  to  contest  the  latter's  claim 
to  the  monopoly  of  that  wealthy  region  ;  and  he 
looked  upon  British  extension  in  the  islands 
as  simply  a  stepping-stone  to  control  upon  the 
adjacent  continent.  It  is  a  singular  commen- 
tary upon  the  blindness  of  historians  to  the  true 
secret  of  Great  Britain's  rise  among  the  nations, 
and  of  the  eminent  position  she  so  long  has 
held,  that  writers  so  far  removed  from  each 
other  in  time  and  characteristics  as  Hume  and 
the  late  J.  R.  Green  should  detect  in  this  far- 
reaching  effort  of  the  Protector,  only  the  dulled 
vision  of  "  a  conservative  and  unspeculative 
temper  misled  by  the  strength  of  religious 
enthusiasm."  "  A  statesman  of  wise  political 
genius,"  according  to  them,  would  have  fast- 
ened his  eyes  rather  upon  the  growing  power  of 


78 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


France,  "  and  discerned  the  beginning  of  that 
great  struggle  for  supremacy"  which  was 
fought  out  under  Louis  XIV.  But  to  do  so 
would  have  been  only  to  repeat,  by  anticipa- 
tion, the  fatal  error  of  that  great  monarch,  which 
forever  forfeited  for  France  the  control  of  the 
seas,  in  which  the  surest  prosperity  of  nations 
is  to  be  found ;  a  mistake,  also,  far  more  ruin- 
ous to  the  island  kingdom  than  it  was  to  her 
continental  rival,  bitter  though  the  fruits  thereof 
have  been  to  the  latter.  Hallam,  with  clearer 
insight,  says:  "When  Cromwell  declared  against 
Spain,  and  attacked  her  West  Indian  posses- 
sions, there  was  little  pretence,  certainly,  of  jus- 
tice, but  not  by  any  means,  as  I  conceive,  the 
impolicy  sometimes  charged  against  him.  So 
auspicious  was  his  star,  that  the  very  failure  of 
that  expedition  obtained  a  more  advantageous 
possession  for  England  than  all  the  triumphs  of 
her  former  kings."  Most  true ;  but  because 
his  star  was  despatched  in  the  right  direction  to 
look  for  fortune,  —  by  sea,  not  by  land. 

The  great  aim  of  the  Protector  was  checked 
by  his  untimely  death,  which  perhaps  also  defi- 
nitely frustrated  a  fulfilment,  in  the  actual  pos- 
session of  the  Isthmus,  that  in  his  strong  hands 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  79 


might  have  been  feasible.  His  idea,  however, 
remained  prominent  among  the  purposes  of  the 
English  people,  as  distinguished  from  their 
rulers ;  and  in  it,  as  has  been  said  before,  is  to 
be  recognized  the  significance  of  the  exploits  of 
the  buccaneers,  during  the  period  of  external 
debility  which  characterized  the  reigns  of  the 
second  Charles  and  James.  With  William  of 
Orange  the  government  again  placed  itself  at 
the  head  of  the  national  aspirations,  as  their 
natural  leader;  and  the  irregular  operations 
of  the  freebooters  were  merged  in  a  settled 
national  policy.  This,  although  for  a  moment 
diverted  from  its  course  by  temporary  exigen- 
cies, was  clearly  formulated  in  the  avowed 
objects  with  which,  in  1702,  the  wise  Dutch- 
man entered  upon  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession,  the  last  great  act  of  his  political 
life.  From  the  Peace  of  Utrecht,  which  closed 
this  war  in  171 3,  the  same  design  was  pursued 
with  ever-increasing  intensity,  but  with  steady 
success,  and  with  it  was  gradually  associated 
the  idea  of  controlling  also  the  communication 
between  the  two  oceans  by  way  of  the  Isthmus. 
The  best  known  instance  of  this,  because  of  its 
connection  with  the  great  name  of  Nelson,  was 


So         The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


the  effort  made  by  him,  in  conjunction  with  a 
land  force,  in  1 780,  when  still  a  simple  captain, 
to  take  possession  of  the  course  of  the  San 
Juan  River,  and  so  of  the  interoceanic  route 
through  Lake  Nicaragua.  The  attempt  ended 
disastrously,  owing  partly  to  the  climate,  and 
partly  to  the  strong  series  of  works,  numbering 
no  less  than  twelve,  which  the  Spaniards,  duly 
sensible  of  the  importance  of  the  position,  had 
constructed  between  the  lake  and  the  sea. 

Difficulties  such  as  were  encountered  by 
Nelson  withstood  Great  Britain's  advance 
throughout  this  region.  While  neither  blind 
nor  indifferent  to  the  advantages  conferred  by 
actual  possession,  through  which  she  had  prof- 
ited elsewhere  abundantly,  the  prior  and  long- 
established  occupation  by  Spain  prevented 
her  obtaining  by  such  means  the  control  she 
ardently  coveted,  and  in  great  measure  really 
exercised.  The  ascendency  which  made  her, 
and  still  makes  her,  the  dominant  factor  in  the 
political  system  of  the  West  Indies  and  the 
Isthmus  resulted  from  her  sea  power,  under- 
stood in  its  broadest  sense.  She  was  the  great 
trader,  source  of  supplies,  and  medium  of  inter- 
course between  the  various  colonies  themselves, 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


81 


and  from  them  to  the  outer  world ;  while  the 
capital  and  shipping  employed  in  this  traffic 
were  protected  by  a  powerful  navy,  which, 
except  on  very  rare  occasions,  was  fully  com- 
petent to  its  work.  Thus,  while  unable  to 
utilize  and  direct  the  resources  of  the  countries, 
as  she  could  have  done  had  they  been  her  own 
property,  she  secured  the  fruitful  use  and 
reaped  the  profit  of  such  commercial  transac- 
tions as  were  possible  under  the  inert  and 
narrow  rule  of  the  Spaniards.  The  fact  is 
instructive,  for  the  conditions  to-day  are  sub- 
stantially the  same  as  those  of  a  century  ago. 
Possession  still  vests  in  states  and  races  which 
have  not  attained  yet  the  faculty  of  developing 
by  themselves  the  advantages  conferred  by 
nature ;  and  control  will  abide  still  with  those 
whose  ships,  whose  capital,  whose  traders  sup- 
port the  industrial  system  of  the  region,  provided 
these  are  backed  by  a  naval  force  adequate  to 
the  demands  of  the  military  situation,  rightly 
understood.  To  any  foreign  state,  control  at 
the  Central  American  Isthmus  means  naval 
control,  naval  predominance,  to  which  tenure  of 
the  land  is  at  best  but  a  convenient  incident.  ~f 

Such,  in  brief,  was  the  general  tendency  of 
6 


82 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


events  until  the  time  when  the  Spanish  colonial 
empire  began  to  break  up,  in  1808-10,  and  the 
industrial  system  of  the  West  India  islands  to 
succumb  under  the  approaching  abolition  of 
slavery.  The  concurrence  of  these  two  deci- 
sive incidents,  and  the  confusion  which  ensued 
in  the  political  and  economical  conditions,  rap- 
idly reduced  the  Isthmus  and  its  approaches  to 
an  insignificance  from  which  the  islands  have 
not  yet  recovered.  The  Isthmus  is  partially 
restored.  Its  importance,  however,  depends 
upon  causes  more  permanent,  in  the  natural 
order  of  things,  than  does  that  of  the  islands, 
which,  under  existing  circumstances,  and  under 
any  circumstances  that  can  be  foreseen  as  yet, 
derive  their  consequence  chiefly  from  the  effect 
which  may  be  exerted  from  them  upon  the 
tenure  of  the  Isthmus.  Hence  the  latter,  after  a 
period  of  comparative  obscurity,  again  emerged 
into  notice  as  a  vital  political  factor,  when  the 
spread  of  the  United  States  to  the  Pacific  raised 
the  question  of  rapid  and  secure  communication 
between  our  two  great  seaboards.  The  Mexi- 
can War,  the  acquisition  of  California,  the  dis- 
covery of  gold,  and  the  mad  rush  to  the  diggings 
which  followed,  hastened,  but  by  no  means  origi- 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  83 


nated,  the  necessity  for  a  settlement  of  the  in- 
tricate problems  involved,  in  which  the  United 
States,  from  its  positions  on  the  two  seas,  has  the 
predominant  interest.  But,  though  predomi- 
nant, ours  is  not  the  sole  interest ;  though  less 
vital,  those  of  other  foreign  states  are  great  and 
consequential ;  and,  accordingly,  no  settlement 
can  be  considered  to  constitute  an  equilibrium, 
much  less  a  finality,  which  does  not  effect  our 
preponderating  influence,  and  at  the  same  time 
insure  the  natural  rights  of  other  peoples.  So 
far  as  the  logical  distinction  between  commer- 
cial and  political  will  hold,  it  may  be  said  that 
our  interest  is  both  commercial  and  political, 
that  of  other  states  almost  wholly  commercial. 

The  same  national  characteristics  that  of  old 
made  Great  Britain  the  chief  contestant  in  all 
questions  of  maritime  importance  —  with  the 
Dutch  in  the  Mediterranean,  with  France  in 
the  East  Indies,  and  with  Spain  in  the  West 
—  have  made  her  also  the  exponent  of  foreign 
opposition  to  our  own  asserted  interest  in  the 
Isthmus.  The  policy  initiated  by  Cromwell, 
of  systematic  aggression  in  the  Caribbean,  and 
of  naval  expansion  and  organization,  has  re- 
sulted in  a  combination  of  naval  force  with 


84         The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


naval  positions  unequalled,  though  not  wholly 
unrivalled,  in  that  sea.  And  since,  as  the  great 
sea  carrier,  Great  Britain  has  a  preponderating 
natural  interest  in  every  new  route  open  to 
commerce,  it  is  inevitable  that  she  should  scru- 
tinize jealously  every  proposition  for  the  modi- 
fication of  existing  arrangements,  conscious  as 
she  is  of  power  to  assert  her  claims,  in  case 
the  question  should  be  submitted  to  the  last 
appeal. 

Nevertheless,  although  from  the  nature  of 
the  occupations  which  constitute  the  welfare 
of  her  people,  as  well  as  from  the  character- 
istics of  her  power,  Great  Britain  seemingly 
has  the  larger  immediate  stake  in  a  prospective 
interoce'anic  canal,  it  has  been  recognized 
tacitly  on  her  part,  as  on  our  side  openly  as- 
serted, that  the  bearing  of  all  questions  of 
Isthmian  transit  upon  our  national  progress, 
safety,  and  honor,  is  more  direct  and  more 
urgent  than  upon  hers.  That  she  has  felt  so 
is  plain  from  the  manner  in  which  she  has 
yielded  before  our  tenacious  remonstrances,  in 
cases  where  the  control  of  the  Isthmus  was 
evidently  the  object  of  her  action,  —  as  in  the 
matters  of  the  tenure  of  the  Bay  Islands  and 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  85 


of  the  protectorate  of  the  Mosquito  Coast.  Our 
superior  interest  appears  also  from  the  nature 
of  the  conditions  which  will  follow  from  the  con- 
struction of  a  canal  So  far  as  these  changes 
are  purely  commercial,  they  will  operate  to 
some  extent  to  the  disadvantage  of  Great 
Britain ;  because  the  result  will  be  to  bring 
our  Atlantic  seaboard,  the  frontier  of  a  rival 
manufacturing  and  commercial  state,  much 
nearer  to  the  Pacific  than  it  now  is,  and 
nearer  to  many  points  of  that  ocean  than  is 
England.  To  make  a  rough  general  statement, 
easily  grasped  by  a  reader  without  the  map 
before  him,  Liverpool  and  New  York  are  at 
present  about  equidistant,  by  water,  from  all 
points  on  the  west  coast  of  America,  from 
Valparaiso  to  British  Columbia.  This  is  due 
to  the  fact  that,  to  go  through  the  Straits  of 
Magellan,  vessels  from  both  ports  must  pass 
near  Cape  St.  Roque,  on  the  east  coast  of 
Brazil,  which  is  nearly  the  same  distance  from 
each.  If  the  Nicaragua  Canal  existed,  the  line 
on  the  Pacific  equidistant  from  the  two  cities 
named  would  pass,  roughly,  by  Yokohama, 
Shanghai,  Hong  Kong,  and  Melbourne,  or 
along  the  coasts  of  Japan,  China,  and  eastern 


86         The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


Australia,  —  Liverpool,  in  this  case,  using  the 
Suez  Canal,  and  New  York  that  of  Nicaragua. 
In  short,  the  line  of  equidistance  would  be 
shifted  from  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Pacific  to 
its  western  coast,  and  all  points  of  that  ocean 
east  of  Japan,  China,  and  Australia  —  for  ex- 
ample, the  Hawaiian  Islands  —  would  be  nearer 
to  New  York  than  to  Liverpool. 

A  recent  British  writer  has  calculated  that 
about  one-eighth  of  the  existing  trade  of  the 
British  Islands  would  be  affected  unfavorably  by 
the  competition  thus  introduced.  But  this  re- 
sult, though  a  matter  of  national  concern,  is 
political  only  in  so  far  as  commercial  prosperity 
or  adversity  modifies  a  nation's  current  history  ; 
that  is,  indirectly.  The  principal  questions 
affecting  the  integrity  or  security  of  the  British 
Empire  are  not  involved  seriously,  for  almost 
all  of  its  component  parts  lie  within  the 
regions  whose  mutual  bond  of  union  and  short- 
est line  of  approach  are  the  Suez  Canal.  No- 
where has  Great  Britain  so  little  territory  at 
stake,  nowhere  has  she  such  scanty  posses- 
sions, as  in  the  eastern  Pacific,  upon  whose 
relations  to  the  world  at  large,  and  to  ourselves 
in  particular,  the  Isthmian  Canal  will  exert 
the  greatest  influence. 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


87 


The  chief  political  result  of  the  Isthmian 
Canal  will  be  to  bring  our  Pacific  coast  nearer, 
not  only  to  our  Atlantic  seaboard,  but  also  to 
the  great  navies  of  Europe.  Therefore,  while 
the  commercial  gain,  through  an  uninterrupted 
water  carriage,  will  be  large,  and  is  clearly  in- 
dicated by  the  acrimony  with  which  a  leading 
journal,  apparently  in  the  interest  of  the  great 
transcontinental  roads,  has  lately  maintained 
the  singular  assertion  that  water  transit  is 
obsolete  as  compared  with  land  carriage,  it  is 
still  true  that  the  canal  will  present  an  element 
of  much  weakness  from  the  military  point  of 
view.  Except  to  those  optimists  whose  robust 
faith  in  the  regeneration  of  human  nature 
rejects  war  as  an  impossible  contingency,  this 
consideration  must  occasion  serious  thought 
concerning  the  policy  to  be  adopted  by  the 
United  States. 

The  subject,  so  far,  has  given  rise  only  to 
diplomatic  arrangement  and  discussion,  within 
which  it  is  permissible  to  hope  it  always  may 
be  confined ;  but  the  misunderstandings  and 
protracted  disputes  that  followed  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty,  and  the  dissatisfaction  with  the 
existing  status  that  still  obtains  among  many 


88         The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


of  our  people,  give  warning  that  our  steps,  as 
a  nation,  should  be  governed  by  some  settled 
notions,  too  universally  held  to  be  set  aside  by 
a  mere  change  of  administration  or  caprice 
of  popular  will.  Reasonable  discussion,  which 
tends,  either  by  its  truth  or  by  its  evident 
errors,  to  clarify  and  crystallize  public  opinion 
on  so  important  a  matter,  never  can  be  amiss. 

This  question,  from  an  abstract,  speculative 
phase  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  took  on  the 
concrete  and  somewhat  urgent  form  of  security 
for  our  trans- Isthmian  routes  against  foreign 
interference  towards  the  middle  of  this  cen- 
tury, when  the  attempt  to  settle  it  was  made 
by  the  oft-mentioned  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty, 
signed  April  19,  1850.  Great  Britain  was 
found  then  to  be  in  possession,  actual  or  con- 
structive, of  certain  continental  positions,  and 
of  some  outlying  islands,  which  would  contrib- 
ute not  only  to  military  control,  but  to  that 
kind  of  political  interference  which  experience 
has  shown  to  be  the  natural  consequence  of 
the  proximity  of  a  strong  power  to  a  weak  one. 
These  positions  depended  upon,  indeed  their 
tenure  originated  in,  the  possession  of  Jamaica, 
thus  justifying  Cromwell's  forecast.    Of  them, 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power,  89 

the  Belize,  a  strip  of  coast  two  hundred  miles 
long,  on  the  Bay  of  Honduras,  immediately 
south  of  Yucatan,  was  so  far  from  the  Isthmus 
proper,  and  so  little  likely  to  affect  the  canal 
question,  that  the  American  negotiator  was 
satisfied  to  allow  its  tenure  to  pass  unques- 
tioned, neither  admitting  nor  denying  anything 
as  to  the  rights  of  Great  Britain  thereto.  Its 
first  occupation  had  been  by  British  freeboot- 
ers, who  "  squatted"  there  a  very  few  years 
after  Jamaica  fell.  They  went  to  cut  logwood, 
succeeded  in  holding  their  ground  against  the 
efforts  of  Spain  to  dislodge  them,  and  their 
right  to  occupancy  and  to  fell  timber  was 
allowed  afterwards  by  treaty.  Since  the  signa- 
ture of  the  Clayton- Bui wer  Treaty,  this  "settle- 
ment," as  it  was  styled  in  that  instrument,  has 
become  a  British  "  possession,"  by  a  convention 
with  Guatemala  contracted  in  1859.  Later,  in 
1862,  the  quondam  "settlement"  and  recent 
"  possession  "  was  erected,  by  royal  commission, 
into  a  full  colony,  subordinate  to  the  govern- 
ment of  Jamaica.  Guatemala  being  a  Central 
American  state,  this  constituted  a  distinct 
advance  of  British  dominion  in  Central  Amer- 
ica, contrary  to  the  terms  of  our  treaty. 


90         The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 

A  more  important  claim  of  Great  Britain 
was  to  the  protectorate  of  the  Mosquito  Coast, 
—  a  strip  understood  by  her  to  extend  from 
Cape  Gracias  a  Dios  south  to  the  San  Juan 
River.  In  its  origin,  this  asserted  right  dif- 
fered little  from  similar  transactions  between 
civilized  man  and  savages,  in  all  times  and  all 
places.  In  1687,  thirty  years  after  the  island 
was  acquired,  a  chief  of  the  aborigines  there 
settled  was  carried  to  Jamaica,  received  some 
paltry  presents,  and  accepted  British  protec- 
tion. While  Spanish  control  lasted,  a  certain 
amount  of  squabbling  and  fighting  went  on 
between  the  two  nations ;  but  when  the  ques- 
tions arose  between  England  and  the  United 
States,  the  latter  refused  to  acquiesce  in  the 
so-called  protectorate,  which  rested,  in  her  opin- 
ion, upon  no  sufficient  legal  ground  as  against 
the  prior  right  of  Spain,  that  was  held  to  have 
passed  to  Nicaragua  when  the  latter  achieved 
its  independence.  The  Mosquito  Coast  was 
too  close  to  the  expected  canal  for  its  tenure 
to  be  considered  a  matter  of  indifference.  Sim- 
ilar ground  was  taken  with  regard  to  the  Bay 
Islands,  Ruatan  and  others,  stretching  along 
the  south  side  of  the  Bay  of  Honduras,  near 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  91 


the  coast  of  the  republic  of  that  name,  and  so 
uniting,  under  the  control  of  the  great  naval 
power,  the  Belize  to  the  Mosquito  Coast.  The 
United  States  maintained  that  these  islands, 
then  occupied  by  Great  Britain,  belonged  in 
full  right  to  Honduras. 

Under  these  de  facto  conditions  of  British 
occupation,  the  United  States  negotiator,  in 
his  eagerness  to  obtain  the  recession  of  the 
disputed  points  to  the  Spanish-American  re- 
publics, seems  to  have  paid  too  little  regard 
to  future  bearings  of  the  subject.  Men's  minds 
also  were  dominated  then,  as  they  are  now 
notwithstanding  the  intervening  experience  of 
nearly  half  a  century,  by  the  maxims  delivered 
as  a  tradition  by  the  founders  of  the  republic 
who  deprecated  annexations  of  territory  abroad. 
The  upshot  was  that,  in  consideration  of  Great 
Britain's  withdrawal  from  Mosquitia  and  the 
Bay  Islands,  to  which,  by  our  contention,  she 
had  no  right,  and  therefore  really  yielded  noth- 
ing but  a  dispute,  we  bound  ourselves,  as  did 
she,  without  term,  to  acquire  no  territory  in 
Central  America,  and  to  guarantee  the  neutral- 
ity not  only  of  the  contemplated  canal,  but  of 
any  other  that  might  be  constructed.    A  special 


92 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


article,  the  eighth,  was  incorporated  in  the 
treaty  to  this  effect,  stating  expressly  that  the 
wish  of  the  two  governments  was  "  not  only 
to  accomplish  a  particular  object,  but  to  estab- 
lish a  general  principle." 

Considerable  delay  ensued  in  the  restoration 
of  the  islands  and  of  the  Mosquito  Coast  to 
Honduras  and  Nicaragua,  —  a  delay  attended 
with  prolonged  discussion  and  serious  mis- 
understanding between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain.  The  latter  claimed  that,  by  the 
wording  of  the  treaty,  she  had  debarred  herself 
only  from  future  acquisitions  of  territory  in 
Central  America ;  whereas  our  government 
asserted,  and  persistently  instructed  its  agents, 
that  its  understanding  had  been  that  an  entire 
abandonment  of  all  possession,  present  and 
future,  was  secured  by  the  agreement.  It  is 
difficult,  in  reading  the  first  article,  not  to  feel 
that,  although  the  practice  may  have  been  per- 
haps somewhat  sharp,  the  wording  can  sustain 
the  British  position  quite  as  well  as  the  more 
ingenuous  confidence  of  the  United  States 
negotiator ;  an  observation  interesting  chiefly 
as  showing  the  eagerness  on  the  one  side, 
whose  contention  was  the  weaker  in  all  save 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  93 


right,  and  the  wariness  on  the  other,  upon 
whom  present  possession  and  naval  power  con- 
ferred a  marked  advantage  in  making  a  bar- 
gain. By  i860,  however,  the  restorations  had 
been  made,  and  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty 
since  then  has  remained  the  international 
agreement,  defining  our  relations  to  Great 
Britain  on  the  Isthmus. 

Of  the  subsequent  wrangling  over  this  un- 
fortunate treaty,  if  so  invidious  a  term  may 
be  applied  to  the  dignified  utterances  of 
diplomacy,  it  is  unnecessary  to  give  a  detailed 
account.  Our  own  country  cannot  but  regret 
and  resent  any  formal  stipulations  which  fetter 
its  primacy  of  influence  and  control  on  the 
American  continent  and  in  American  seas ; 
and  the  concessions  of  principle  over-eagerly 
made  in  1850,  in  order  to  gain  compensating 
advantages  which  our  weakness  could  not 
extort  otherwise,  must  needs  cause  us  to  chafe 
now,  when  we  are  potentially,  though,  it  must 
be  confessed  sorrowfully,  not  actually,  stronger 
by  double  than  we  were  then.  The  interest 
of  Great  Britain  still  lies,  as  it  then  lay,  in  the 
maintenance  of  the  treaty.  So  long  as  the 
United   States  jealously  resents  all  foreign 


94 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


interference  in  the  Isthmus,  and  at  the  same 
time  takes  no  steps  to  formulate  a  policy  or 
develop  a  strength  that  can  give  shape  and 
force  to  her  own  pretensions,  just  so  long  will 
the  absolute  control  over  any  probable  con- 
tingency of  the  future  rest  with  Great  Britain, 
by  virtue  of  her  naval  positions,  her  naval 
power,  and  her  omnipresent  capital. 

A  recent  unofficial  British  estimate  of  the 
British  policy  at  the  Isthmus,  as  summarized 
in  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  may  here  have 
interest :  "  In  the  United  States  was  recog- 
nized a  coming  formidable  rival  to  British 
trade.  In  the  face  of  the  estimated  disad- 
vantage to  European  trade  in  general,  and  that 
of  Great  Britain  in  particular,  to  be  looked 
for  from  a  Central  American  canal,  British 
statesmen,  finding  their  last  attempt  to  control 
the  most  feasible  route  (by  Nicaragua)  abor- 
tive, accomplished  the  next  best  object  in  the 
interest  of  British  trade.  They  cast  the  onus 
of  building  the  canal  on  the  people  who  would 
reap  the  greatest  advantage  from  it,  and  who 
were  bound  to  keep  every  one  else  out,  but 
were  at  the  same  time  very  unlikely  to  under- 
take such  a  gigantic  enterprise  outside  their 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


95 


own  undeveloped  territories  for  many  a  long 
year;  while  at  the  same  time  they  skilfully 
handicapped  that  country  in  favor  of  British 
sea  powrer  by  entering  into  a  joint  guarantee 
to  respect  its  neutrality  when  built.  This 
secured  postponement  of  construction  indefi- 
nitely, and  yet  forfeited  no  substantial  advan- 
tage necessary  to  establish  effective  naval 
control  in  the  interests  of  British  carrying 
trade." 

Whether  this  passage  truly  represents  the 
deliberate  purpose  of  successive  British  govern- 
ments may  be  doubtful,  but  it  is  an  accurate 
enough  estimate  of  the  substantial  result,  as 
long  as  our  policy  continues  to  be  to  talk  loud 
and  to  do  nothing,  —  to  keep  others  out,  while 
refusing  ourselves  to  go  in.  We  neutralize 
effectually  enough,  doubtless  ;  for  we  neutralize 
ourselves  while  leaving  other  powers  to  act 
efficiently  whenever  it  becomes  worth  while. 

In  a  state  like  our  own,  national  policy 
means  public  conviction,  else  it  is  but  as 
sounding  brass  and  a  tinkling  cymbal.  But 
public  conviction  is  a  very  different  thing  from 
popular  impression,  differing  by  all  that  sepa- 
rates a  rational  process,  resulting  in  manly 


g6         The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power* 


resolve,  from  a  weakly  sentiment  that  finds 
occasional  hysterical  utterance.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine,  as  popularly  apprehended  and  in- 
dorsed, is  a  rather  nebulous  generality,  which 
has  condensed  about  the  Isthmus  into  a  faint 
point  of  more  defined  luminosity.  To  those 
who  will  regard,  it  is  the  harbinger  of  the 
day,  incompletely  seen  in  the  vision  of  the 
great  discoverer,  when  the  East  and  the  West 
shall  be  brought  into  closer  communion  by  the 
realization  of  the  strait  that  baffled  his  eager 
search.  But,  with  the  strait,  time  has  intro- 
duced a  factor  of  which  he  could  not  dream, 
—  a  great  nation  midway  between  the  West 
he  knew  and  the  East  he  sougnt,  spanning 
the  continent  he  unwittingly  found,  itself  both 
East  and  West  in  one.  To  such  a  state, 
which  in  itself  sums  up  the  two  conditions  of 
Columbus's  problem ;  to  which  the  control 
of  the  strait  is  a  necessity,  if  not  of  existence, 
at  least  of  its  full  development  and  of  its 
national  security,  who  can  deny  the  right  to 
predominate  in  influence  over  a  region  so  vital 
to  it  ?  None  can  deny  save  its  own  people ; 
and  they  do  it,  —  not  in  words,  perhaps,  but 
in  act.    For  let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  failure 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  97 


to  act  at  an  opportune  moment  is  action  as 
real  as,  though  less  creditable  than,  the  most 
strenuous  positive  effort. 

Action,  however,  to  be  consistent  and  well 
proportioned,  must  depend  upon  well-settled 
conviction ;  and  conviction,  if  it  is  to  be 
reasonable,  and  to  find  expression  in  a  sound 
and  continuous  national  policy,  must  result 
from  a  careful  consideration  of  present  con- 
ditions in  the  light  of  past  experiences.  Here, 
unquestionably,  strong  differences  of  opinion 
will  be  manifested  at  first,  both  as  to  the 
true  significance  of  the  lessons  of  the  past, 
and  the  manner  of  applying  them  to  the 
present.  Such  differences  need  not  cause  re- 
gret. Their  appearance  is  a  sign  of  attention 
aroused ;  and  when  discussion  has  become 
general  and  animated,  we  may  hope  to  see 
the  gradual  emergence  of  a  sound  and  opera- 
tive public  sentiment.  What  is  to  be  depre- 
cated and  feared  is  indolent  drifting,  in  wilful 
blindness  to  the  approaching  moment  when 
action  must  be  taken;  careless  delay  to  re- 
move fetters,  if  such  there  be  in  the  Constitu- 
tion or  in  traditional  prejudice,  which  may 
prevent  our  seizing  opportunity  when  it  oc- 

7 


98 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


curs.  Whatever  be  the  particular  merits  of 
the  pending  Hawaiian  question,  it  scarcely  can 
be  denied  that  its  discussion  has  revealed  the 
existence,  real  or  fancied,  of  such  clogs  upon 
our  action,  and  of  a  painful  disposition  to 
consider  each  such  occurrence  as  merely  an 
isolated  event,  instead  of  being,  as  it  is,  a 
warning  that  the  time  has  come  when  we 
must  make  up  our  minds  upon  a  broad  issue 
of  national  policy.  That  there  should  be  two 
opinions  is  not  bad,  but  it  is  very  bad  to 
halt  long  between  them. 

There  is  one  opinion  —  which  it  is  needless 
to  say  the  writer  does  not  share — that,  be- 
cause many  years  have  gone  by  without  armed 
collision  with  a  great  power,  the  teaching  of 
the  past  is  that  none  such  can  occur;  and 
that,  in  fact,  the  weaker  we  are  in  organized 
military  strength,  the  more  easy  it  is  for  our 
opponents  to  yield  our  points.  Closely  as- 
sociated wdth  this  view  is  the  obstinate  rejec- 
tion of  any  political  action  which  involves 
implicitly  the  projection  of  our  physical  power, 
if  needed,  beyond  the  waters  that  gird  our 
shores.  Because  our  reasonable,  natural  — 
it  might  almost  be  called  moral  —  claim  to 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


99 


preponderant  influence  at  the  Isthmus  hereto- 
fore has  compelled  respect,  though  reluctantly 
conceded,  it  is  assumed  that  no  circumstances 
can  give  rise  to  a  persistent  denial  of  it. 

It  appears  to  the  writer  —  and  to  many 
others  with  whom  he  agrees,  though  without 
claim  to  represent  them  —  that  the  true  state 
of  the  case  is  more  nearly  as  follows  :  Since 
our  nation  came  into  being,  a  century  ago, 
with  the  exception  of  a  brief  agitation  about 
the  year  1850,  —  due  to  special  causes,  which, 
though  suggestive,  were  not  adequate,  and 
summarized  as  to  results  in  the  paralyzing 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  —  the  importance  of 
the  Central  American  Isthmus  has  been  merely 
potential  and  dormant.  But,  while  thus  tem- 
porarily obscured,  its  intrinsic  conditions  of 
position  and  conformation  bestow  upon  it  a 
consequence  in  relation  to  the  rest  of  the 
world  which  is  inalienable,  and  therefore,  to 
become  operative,  only  awaits  those  changes 
in  external  conditions  that  must  come  in  the 
fulness  of  time.  The  indications  of  such 
changes  are  already  sufficiently  visible  to  chal- 
lenge attention.  The  rapid  peopling  of  our 
territory  entails  at  least  two.    The  growth  of 


IOO 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


the  Pacific  States  enhances  the  commercial 
and  political  importance  of  the  Pacific  Ocean 
to  the  world  at  large,  and  to  ourselves  in  par- 
ticular ;  while  the  productive  energies  of  the 
country,  and  its  advent  to  the  three  seas, 
impel  it  necessarily  to  seek  outlet  by  them 
and  access  to  the  regions  beyond.  Under  such 
conditions,  perhaps  not  yet  come,  but  plainly 
coming,  the  consequence  of  an  artificial  water- 
way that  shall  enable  the  Atlantic  coast  to 
compete  with  Europe,  on  equal  terms  as  to 
distance,  for  the  markets  of  eastern  Asia,  and 
shall  shorten  by  two-thirds  the  sea  route  from 
New  York  to  San  Francisco,  and  by  one- 
half  that  to  Valparaiso,  is  too  evident  for 
insistence. 

In  these  conditions,  not  in  European  neces- 
sities, is  to  be  found  the  assurance  that  the 
canal  will  be  made.  Not  to  ourselves  only, 
however,  though  to  ourselves  chiefly,  will  it  be 
a  matter  of  interest  when  completed.  Many 
causes  will  combine  to  retain  in  the  line  of 
the  Suez  Canal  the  commerce  of  Europe  with 
the  East ;  but  to  the  American  shores  of  the 
Pacific  the  Isthmian  canal  will  afford  a  much 
shorter  and  easier  access  for  a  trade  already  of 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  101 


noteworthy  proportions.  A  weighty  considera- 
tion also  is  involved  in  the  effect  upon  British 
navigation  of  a  war  which  should  endanger  its 
use  of  the  Suez  Canal.  The  power  of  Great 
Britain  to  control  the  long  route  from  Gibral- 
tar to  the  Red  Sea  is  seriously  doubted  by  a 
large  and  thoughtful  body  of  her  statesmen 
and  seamen,  who  favor  dependence,  in  war, 
upon  that  by  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  By 
Nicaragua,  however,  would  be  shorter  than  by 
the  Cape  to  many  pans  of  the  East ;  and  the 
Caribbean  can  be  safeguarded  against  distant 
European  states  much  more  easily  than  the 
line  through  the  Mediterranean,  which  passes 
close  by  their  ports. 

Under  this  increased  importance  of  the  Isth- 
mus, we  cannot  safely  anticipate  for  the  future 
the  cheap  acquiescence  which,  under  very  dif- 
ferent circumstances,  has  been  yielded  in  the 
past  to  our  demands.  Already  it  is  notorious 
that  European  powers  are  betraying  symptoms 
of  increased  sensitiveness  as  to  the  value  of 
Caribbean  positions,  and  are  strengthening 
their  grip  upon  those  they  now  hold.  Moral 
considerations  undoubtedly  count  for  more 
than  they  did,  and  nations  are  more  reluctant 


102        The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 


to  enter  into  war ;  but  still,  the  policy  of  states 
is  determined  by  the  balance  of  advantages, 
and  it  behooves  us  to  know  what  our  policy  is 
to  be,  and  what  advantages  are  needed  to  turn 
in  our  favor  the  scale  of  negotiations  and  the 
general  current  of  events. 

If  the  decision  of  the  nation,  following  one 
school  of  thought,  is  that  the  weaker  we  are 
the  more  likely  we  are  to  have  our  way,  there 
is  little  to  be  said.  Drifting  is  perhaps  as  good 
a  mode  as  another  to  reach  that  desirable  goal. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  determine  that  our 
interest  and  dignity  require  that  our  rights 
should  depend  upon  the  will  of  no  other  state, 
but  upon  our  own  power  to  enforce  them,  we 
must  gird  ourselves  to  admit  that  freedom  of 
interoceanic  transit  depends  upon  predomi- 
nance in  a  maritime  region  —  the  Caribbean 
Sea  —  through  which  pass  all  the  approaches 
to  the  Isthmus.  Control  of  a  maritime  region 
is  insured  primarily  by  a  navy ;  secondarily,  by 
positions,  suitably  chosen  and  spaced  one  from 
the  other,  upon  which  as  bases  the  navy  rests, 
and  from  which  it  can  exert  its  strength.  At 
present  the  positions  of  the  Caribbean  are  occu- 
pied by  foreign  powers,  nor  may  we,  however 


The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power.  103 


disposed  to  acquisition,  obtain  them  by  means 
other  than  righteous;  but  a  distinct  advance 
will  have  been  made  when  public  opinion  is 
convinced  that  we  need  them,  and  should  not 
exert  our  utmost  ingenuity  to  dodge  them 
when  flung  at  our  head.  If  the  Constitution 
really  imposes  difficulties,  it  provides  also  a 
way  by  which  the  people,  if  convinced,  can 
remove  its  obstructions.  A  protest,  however, 
may  be  entered  against  a  construction  of  the 
Constitution  which  is  liberal,  by  embracing  all 
it  can  be  constrained  to  imply,  and  then  im- 
mediately becomes  strict  in  imposing  these 
ingeniously  contrived  fetters. 

Meanwhile  no  moral  obligation  forbids  de- 
veloping our  navy  upon  lines  and  proportions 
adequate  to  the  work  it  may  be  called  upon  to 
do.  Here,  again,  the  crippling  force  is  a  public 
impression,  which  limits  our  potential  strength 
to  the  necessities  of  an  imperfectly  realized 
situation.  A  navy  "  for  defence  only "  is  a 
popular  catchword.  When,  if  ever,  people 
recognize  that  we  have  three  seaboards,  that 
the  communication  by  water  of  one  of  them 
with  the  other  two  will  depend  in  a  not  remote 
future  upon  a  strategic  position  hundreds  of 


104       The  Isthmus  and  Sea  Power. 

miles  distant  from  our  nearest  port,  —  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  —  they  will  see  also 
that  the  word  "  defence,"  already  too  narrowly 
understood,  has  its  application  at  points  far 
away  from  our  own  coast. 

That  the  organization  of  military  strength 
involves  provocation  to  war  is  a  fallacy,  which 
the  experience  of  each  succeeding  year  now 
refutes.  The  immense  armaments-  of  Europe 
are  onerous ;  but  nevertheless,  by  the  mutual 
respect  and  caution  they  enforce,  they  present 
a  cheap  alternative,  certainly  in  misery,  prob- 
ably in  money,  to  the  frequent  devastating 
wars  which  preceded  the  era  of  general  military 
preparation.  Our  own  impunity  has  resulted, 
not  from  our  weakness,  but  from  the  unimpor- 
tance to  our  rivals  of  the  points  in  dispute, 
compared  with  their  more  immediate  interests 
at  home.  With  the  changes  consequent  upon 
the  canal,  this  indifference  will  diminish.  We 
also  shall  be  entangled  in  the  affairs  of  the 
great  family  of  nations,  and  shall  have  to  ac- 
cept the  attendant  burdens.  Fortunately,  as 
regards  other  states,  we  are  an  island  power, 
and  can  find  our  best  precedents  in  the  history 
of  the  people  to  whom  the  sea  has  been  a 
nursing  mother. 


POSSIBILITIES  OF  AN  ANGLO- 
AMERICAN  REUNION. 


POSSIBILITIES  OF  AN  ANGLO- 
AMERICAN  REUNION. 


July,  1894. 

[The  following  article  was  requested  by  the  Editor  of  the 
"  North  American  Review,"  as  one  of  a  number,  by  several 
persons,  dealing  with  the  question  of  a  formal  political  con- 
nection, proposed  by  Mr.  Andrew  Carnegie,  between  the 
United  States  and  the  British  Empire,  for  the  advancement  of 
the  general  interests  of  the  English-speaking  peoples.  The  pro- 
jects advocated  by  previous  writers  embraced:  i,  a  federate 
union  ;  2,  a  merely  naval  union  or  alliance;  or,  3,  a  defensive 
alliance  of  a  kind  frequent  in  political  history.] 

TH  E  words  "  kinship  "  and  "  alliance  "  express 
two  radically  distinct  ideas,  and  rest,  for 
both  the  privileges  and  the  obligations  involved 
in  them,  upon  foundations  essentially  different. 
The  former  represents  a  natural  relation,  the 
latter  one  purely  conventional,  —  even  though 
it  may  result  from  the  feelings,  the  mutual 
interests,  and  the  sense  of  incumbent  duty 
attendant  upon  the  other.  In  its  very  etymol- 
ogy, accordingly,  is  found  implied  that  sense  of 
constraint,  of  an  artificial  bond,  that  may  prove 


io8 


Possibilities  of  an 


a  source,  not  only  of  strength,  but  of  irksome- 
ness  as  well.  Its  analogue  in  our  social  con- 
ditions is  the  marriage  tie,  —  the  strongest, 
doubtless,  of  all  bonds  when  it  realizes  in  the 
particular  case  the  supreme  affection  of  which 
our  human  nature  is  capable  ;  but  likewise,  as 
daily  experience  shows,  the  most  fretting  when, 
through  original  mistake  or  unworthy  motive, 
love  fails,  and  obligation  alone  remains. 

Personally,  I  am  happy  to  believe  that  the 
gradual  but,  as  I  think,  unmistakable  growth 
of  mutual  kindly  feelings  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  during  these  latter 
years  —  and  of  which  the  recent  articles  of  Sir 
George  Clarke  and  Mr.  Arthur  Silva  White  in 
the  u  North  American  Review "  are  pleasant 
indications  —  is  a  sure  evidence  that  a  common 
tongue  and  common  descent  are  making  them- 
selves felt,  and  are  breaking  down  the  barriers 
of  estrangement  which  have  separated  too  long 
men  of  the  same  blood.  There  is  seen  here 
the  working  of  kinship,  —  a  wholly  normal 
result  of  a  common  origin,  the  natural  affection 
of  children  of  the  same  descent,  who  have 
quarrelled  and  have  been  alienated  with  the 
proverbial  bitterness  of  civil  strife,  but  who  all 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  109 


along  have  realized  —  or  at  the  least  have  been 
dimly  conscious  —  that  such  a  state  of  things 
is  wrong  and  harmful.  As  a  matter  of  senti- 
ment only,  this  reviving  affection  well  might 
fix  the  serious  attention  of  those  who  watch  the 
growth  of  world  questions,  recognizing  how  far 
imagination  and  sympathy  rule  the  world  ;  but 
when,  besides  the  powerful  sentimental  impulse, 
it  is  remembered  that  beneath  considerable 
differences  of  political  form  there  lie  a  com- 
mon inherited  political  tradition  and  habit  of 
thought,  that  the  moral  forces  which  govern 
and  shape  political  development  are  the  same 
in  either  people,  the  possibility  of  a  gradual 
approach  to  concerted  action  becomes  increas- 
ingly striking.  Of  all  the  elements  of  the  civi- 
lization that  has  spread  over  Europe  and 
America,  none  is  so  potential  for  good  as  that 
singular  combination  of  two  essential  but 
opposing  factors  —  of  individual  freedom  with 
subjection  to  law  —  which  finds  its  most  vigor- 
ous working  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  its  only  exponents  in  which  an  approach 
to  a  due  balance  has  been  effected.  Like  other' 
peoples,  we  also  sway  between  the  two,  inclin- 
ing now  to  one  side,  now  to  the  other ;  but  the 


no 


Possibilities  of  an 


departure  from  the  normal  in  either  direction  is 
never  very  great. 

There  is  yet  another  noteworthy  condition 
common  to  the  two  states,  which  must  tend  to 
incline  them  towards  a  similar  course  of  action 
in  the  future.  Partners,  each,  in  the  great 
commonwealth  of  nations  which  share  the 
blessings  of  European  civilization,  they  alone, 
though  in  varying  degrees,  are  so  severed  geo- 
graphically from  all  existing  rivals  as  to  be 
exempt  from  the  burden  of  great  land  armies ; 
while  at  the  same  time  they  must  depend  upon 
the  sea,  in  chief  measure,  for  that  intercourse 
with  other  members  of  the  body  upon  which 
national  well-being  depends.  How  great  an 
influence  upon  the  history  of  Great  Britain  has 
been  exerted  by  this  geographical  isolation 
is  sufficiently  understood.  In  her  case  the 
natural  tendency  has  been  increased  abnor- 
mally by  the  limited  territorial  extent  of  the 
British  Islands,  which  has  forced  the  energies 
of  their  inhabitants  to  seek  fields  for  action 
outside  their  own  borders;  but  the  figures 
quoted  by  Sir  George  Clarke  sufficiently  show 
that  the  same  tendency,  arising  from  the  same 
cause,  does  exist  and  is  operative  in  the  United 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  in 


States,  despite  the  diversion  arising  from  the 
immense  internal  domain  not  yet  fully  occu- 
pied, and  the  great  body  of  home  consumers 
which  has  been  secured  by  the  protective  sys- 
tem. The  geographical  condition,  in  short,  is 
the  same  in  kind,  though  differing  in  degree, 
and  must  impel  in  the  same  direction.  To 
other  states  the  land,  with  its  privileges  and  its 
glories,  is  the  chief  source  of  national  prosperity 
and  distinction.  To  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  if  they  rightly  estimate  the  part 
they  may  play  in  the  great  drama  of  human 
progress,  is  intrusted  a  maritime  interest,  in  the 
broadest  sense  of  the  word,  which  demands,  as 
one  of  the  conditions  of  its  exercise  and  its 
safety,  the  organized  force  adequate  to  control 
the  general  course  of  events  at  sea;  to  main- 
tain, if  necessity  arise,  not  arbitrarily,  but  as 
those  in  whom  interest  and  power  alike  justify 
the  claim  to  do  so,  the  laws  that  shall  regulate 
maritime  warfare.  This  is  no  mere  specula- 
tion, resting  upon  a  course  of  specious  reason- 
ing, but  is  based  on  the  teaching  of  the  past. 
By  the  exertion  of  such  force,  and  by  the  main- 
tenance of  such  laws,  and  by  these  means  only, 
Great  Britain,  in  the  beginning  of  this  century, 


112 


Possibilities  of  an 


when  she  was  the  solitary  power  of  the  seas, 
saved  herself  from  destruction,  and  powerfully 
modified  for  the  better  the  course  of  history. 

With  such  strong  determining  conditions 
combining  to  converge  the  two  nations  into  the 
same  highway,  and  with  the  visible  dawn  of 
the  day  when  this  impulse  begins  to  find  ex- 
pression in  act,  the  question  naturally  arises, 
What  should  be  the  immediate  course  to  be 
favored  by  those  who  hail  the  growing  light, 
and  would  hasten  gladly  the  perfect  day  ?  That 
there  are  not  a  few  who  seek  a  reply  to  this 
question  is  evidenced  by  the  articles  of  Mr.  Car- 
negie, of  Sir  George  Clarke,  and  of  Mr.  White, 
all  appearing  within  a  short  time  in  the  pages 
of  the  "  North  American  Review."  And  it  is 
here,  I  own,  that,  though  desirous  as  any  one 
can  be  to  see  the  fact  accomplished,  I  shrink 
from  contemplating  it,  under  present  conditions, 
in  the  form  of  an  alliance,  naval  or  other. 
Rather  I  should  say :  Let  each  nation  be  edu- 
cated to  realize  the  length  and  breadth  of  its 
own  interest  in  the  sea ;  when  that  is  done,  the 
identity  of  these  interests  will  become  apparent. 
This  identity  cannot  be  established  firmly  in 
men's  minds  antecedent  to  the  great  teacher, 


Anglo-American  Reunion. 


"3 


Experience ;  and  experience  cannot  be  had  be- 
fore that  further  development  of  the  facts  which 
will  follow  the  not  far  distant  day,  when  the 
United  States  people  must  again  betake  them- 
selves to  the  sea  and  to  external  action,  as  did 
their  forefathers  alike  in  their  old  home  and  in 
the  new. 

There  are,  besides,  questions  in  which  at 
present  doubt,  if  not  even  friction,  might  arise 
as  to  the  proper  sphere  of  each  nation,  agree- 
ment concerning  which  is  essential  to  cordial 
co-operation ;  and  this  the  more,  because  Great 
Britain  could  not  be  expected  reasonably  to 
depend  upon  our  fulfilment  of  the  terms  of  an 
alliance,  or  to  yield  in  points  essential  to  her 
own  maritime  power,  so  long  as  the  United 
States  is  unwilling  herself  to  assure  the  security 
of  the  positions  involved  by  the  creation  of  an 
adequate  force.  It  is  just  because  in  that  pro- 
cess of  adjusting  the  parts  to  be  played  by  each 
nation,  upon  which  alone  a  satisfactory  co 
operation  can  be  established,  a  certain  amount 
of  friction  is  probable,  that  I  would  avoid  all 
premature  striving  for  alliance,  an  artificial  and 
possibly  even  an  irritating  method  of  reaching 

the  desired  end.    Instead,  I  would  dwell  con- 

8 


ii4 


Possibilities  of  an 


tinually  upon  those  undeniable  points  of 
resemblance  in  natural  characteristics,  and  in 
surrounding  conditions,  which  testify  to  com- 
mon origin  and  predict  a  common  destiny. 
Cast  the  seed  of  this  thought  into  the  ground, 
and  it  will  spring  and  grow  up,  you  know  not 
how,  —  first  the  blade,  then  the  ear,  then  the 
full  corn  in  the  ear.  Then  you  may  put  in 
your  sickle  and  reap  the  harvest  of  political 
result,  which  as  yet  is  obviously  immature. 
How  quietly  and  unmarked,  like  the  slow  pro- 
cesses of  nature,  such  feelings  may  be  wrought 
into  the  very  being  of  nations,  was  evidenced 
by  the  sudden  and  rapid  rising  of  the  North  at 
the  outbreak  of  our  civil  war,  when  the  flag 
was  fired  upon  at  Fort  Sumter.  Then  was 
shown  how  deeply  had  sunk  into  the  popular 
heart  the  devotion  to  the  Union  and  the  flag, 
fostered  by  long  dwelling  upon  the  ideas,  by 
innumerable  Fourth  of  July  orations,  often 
doubtless  vainglorious,  sometimes  perhaps  gro- 
tesque, but  whose  living  force  and  overwhelm- 
ing results  were  vividly  apparent,  as  the  fire 
leaped  from  hearthstone  to  hearthstone  through- 
out the  Northern  States.  Equally  in  the  South 
was  apparent  how  tenacious  and  compelling 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  115 

was  the  grip  which  the  constant  insistence  upon 
the  predominant  claim  of  the  State  upon  in- 
dividual loyalty  had  struck  into  the  hearts  of 
her  sons.  What  paper  bonds,  treaties,  or 
alliances  could  have  availed  then  to  hold  to- 
gether people  whose  ideals  had  drifted  so  far 
apart,  whose  interests,  as  each  at  that  time 
saw  them,  had  become  so  opposed? 

Although  I  am  convinced  firmly  that  it 
would  be  to  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States,  and  for  the  benefit  of  the 
world,  that  the  two  nations  should  act  together 
cordially  on  the  seas,  I  am  equally  sure  that 
the  result  not  only  must  be  hoped  but  also 
quietly  waited  for,  while  the  conditions  upon 
which  such  cordiality  depends  are  being  realized 
by  men.  All  are  familiar  with  the  idea  con- 
veyed by  the  words  "  forcing  process."  There 
are  things  that  cannot  be  forced,  processes 
which  cannot  be  hurried,  growths  which  are 
strong  and  noble  in  proportion  as  they  imbibe 
slowly  the  beneficent  influence  of  the  sun  and 
air  in  which  they  are  bathed.  How  far  the 
forcing  process  can  be  attempted  by  an  extrava- 
gant imagination,  and  what  the  inevitable  recoil 
of  the  mind  you  seek  to  take  by  storm,  is  amus- 


116  Possibilities  of  an 


ingly  shown  by  Mr.  Carnegie's  "  Look  Ahead," 
and  by  the  demur  thereto  of  so  ardent  a  cham- 
pion of  Anglo-American  alliance  —  on  terms 
which  appear  to  me  to  be  rational  though  pre- 
mature —  as  Sir  George  Clarke.  A  country 
with  a  past  as  glorious  and  laborious  as  that  of 
Great  Britain,  unprepared  as  yet,  as  a  whole,  to 
take  a  single  step  forward  toward  reunion,  is 
confronted  suddenly  —  as  though  the  tempta- 
tion must  be  irresistible  —  with  a  picture  of 
ultimate  results  which  I  will  not  undertake  to 
call  impossible  (who  can  say  what  is  impossi- 
ble ?  ),  but  which  certainly  deprives  the  nation 
of  much,  if  not  all,  the  hard-wrought  achieve- 
ment of  centuries.  Disunion,  loss  of  national 
identity,  changes  of  constitution  more  than 
radical,  the  exchange  of  a  world-wide  empire  for 
a  subordinate  part  in  a  great  federation,  —  such 
may  be  the  destiny  of  Great  Britain  in  the  dis- 
tant future.  I  know  not ;  but  sure  I  am,  were 
I  a  citizen  of  Great  Britain,  the  prospect  would 
not  allure  me  now  to  move  an  inch  in  such  a 
direction.  Surely  in  vain  the  net  is  spread  in 
the  sight  of  any  bird. 

The  suggestions  of  Sir  George  Clarke  and  of 
Mr.  White  are  not  open  to  the  reproach  of 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  117 


repelling  those  whom  they  seek  to  convince. 
They  are  clear,  plain,  business-like  proposi- 
tions, based  upon  indisputable  reasons  of 
mutual  advantage,  and  in  the  case  of  the 
former  quickened,  as  I  have  the  pleasure  of 
knowing  through  personal  acquaintance,  by  a 
more  than  cordial  good-will  and  breadth  of 
view  in  all  that  relates  to  the  United  States. 
Avoiding  criticism  of  details  —  of  which  I  have 
little  to  offer  —  my  objection  to  them  is  simply 
that  I  do  not  think  the  time  is  yet  ripe.  The 
ground  is  not  prepared  yet  in  the  hearts  and 
understandings  of  Americans,  and  I  doubt 
whether  in  those  of  British  citizens.  Both 
proposals  contemplate  a  naval  alliance,  though 
on  differing  terms.  The  difficulty  is  that  the 
United  States,  as  a  nation,  does  not  realize  or 
admit  as  yet  that  it  has  any  strong  interest  in 
the  sea;  and  that  the  great  majority  of  our 
people  rest  firmly  in  a  belief,  deep  rooted  in 
the  political  history  of  our  past,  that  our  ambi- 
tions should  be  limited  by  the  three  seas  that 
wash  our  eastern,  western,  and  southern  coasts. 
For  myself,  I  believe  that  this,  once  a  truth, 
can  be  considered  so  no  longer  with  reference 
even  to  the  present  —  much  less  to  a  future  so 


1 1 8  Possibilities  of  an 

near  that  it  scarcely  needs  a  prophet's  eye  to 
read;  but  even  if  it  be  but  a  prejudice,  it  must 
be  removed  before  a  further  step  can  be  taken. 
In  our  country  national  policy,  if  it  is  to  be 
steadfast  and  consistent,  must  be  identical  with 
public  conviction.  The  latter,  when  formed, 
may  remain  long  quiescent ;  but  given  the  ap- 
pointed time,  it  will  spring  to  mighty  action  — 
aye,  to  arms  —  as  did  the  North  and  the  South 
under  their  several  impulses  in  1861. 

It  is  impossible  that  one  who  sees  in  the 
sea  —  in  the  function  which  it  discharges  to- 
wards the  world  at  large  —  the  most  potent 
factor  in  national  prosperity  and  in  the  course 
of  history,  should  not  desire  a  change  in  the 
mental  attitude  of  our  countrymen  towards 
maritime  affairs.  The  subject  presents  itself 
not  merely  as  one  of  national  importance,  but 
as  one  concerning  the  world's  history  and  the 
welfare  of  mankind,  which  are  bound  up,  so  far 
as  we  can  see,  in  the  security  and  strength  of 
that  civilization  which  is  identified  with  Europe 
and  its  offshoots  in  America.  For  what,  after 
all,  is  our  not  unjustly  vaunted  European  and 
American  civilization  ?  An  oasis  set  in  the 
midst  of  a  desert  of  barbarism,  rent  with  many 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  119 


intestine  troubles,  and  ultimately  dependent, 
not  upon  its  mere  elaboration  of  organization, 
but  upon  the  power  of  that  organization  to  ex- 
press itself  in  a  menacing  and  efficient  attitude 
of  physical  force,  sufficient  to  resist  the  numeri- 
cally overwhelming,  but  inadequately  organized 
hosts  of  outsiders.  Under  present  conditions 
these  are  diked  off  by  the  magnificent  mili- 
tary organizations  of  Europe,  which  also  as 
yet  cope  successfully  with  the  barbarians  with- 
in. Of  what  the  latter  are  capable  —  at  least 
in  will  —  we  have  from  time  to  time,  and  not 
least  of  late,  terrific  warnings,  to  which  men 
scarcely  can  shut  their  eyes  and  ears ;  but  suffi- 
cient attention  hardly  is  paid  to  the  possible 
dangers  from  those  outside,  who  are  wholly 
alien  to  the  spirit  of  our  civilization ;  nor  do 
men  realize  how  essential  to  the  conservation 
of  that  civilization  is  the  attitude  of  armed 
watchfulness  between  nations,  which  is  main- 
tained now  by  the  great  states  of  Europe. 
Even  if  we  leave  out  of  consideration  the  invalu- 
able benefit  to  society,  in  this  age  of  insubordi- 
nation and  anarchy,  that  so  large  a  number 
of  youth,  at  the  most  impressionable  age, 
receive  the  lessons  of  obedience,  order,  respect 


120 


Possibilities  of  an 


for  authority  and  law,  by  which  military  train- 
ing conveys  a  potent  antidote  to  lawlessness,  it 
still  would  remain  a  mistake,  plausible  but 
utter,  to  see  in  the  hoped-for  subsidence  of  the 
military  spirit  in  the  nations  of  Europe  a  pledge 
of  surer  progress  of  the  world  towards  universal 
peace,  general  material  prosperity,  and  ease. 
That  alluring,  albeit  somewhat  ignoble,  ideal  is 
not  to  be  attained  by  the  representatives  of 
civilization  dropping  their  arms,  relaxing  the 
tension  of  their  moral  muscle,  and  from  fight- 
ing animals  becoming  fattened  cattle  fit  only 
for  slaughter. 

When  Carthage  fell,  and  Rome  moved  on- 
ward, without  an  equal  enemy  against  wrhom  to 
guard,  to  the  dominion  of  the  world  of  Mediter- 
ranean civilization,  she  approached  and  gradu- 
ally realized  the  reign  of  universal  peace,  broken 
only  by  those  intestine  social  and  political  dis- 
sensions wThich  are  finding  their  dark  analogues 
in  our  modern  times  of  infrequent  war.  As  the 
strife  between  nations  of  that  civilization  died 
away,  material  prosperity,  general  cultivation 
and  luxury,  flourished,  while  the  weapons 
dropped  nervelessly  from  their  palsied  arms. 
The  genius  of  Caesar,  in  his  Gallic  and  Ger- 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  121 


manic  campaigns,  built  up  an  outside  barrier, 
which,  like  a  dike,  for  centuries  postponed  the 
inevitable  end,  but  which  also,  like  every  artifi- 
cial barrier,  gave  way  when  the  strong  masculine 
impulse  which  first  created  it  had  degenerated 
into  that  worship  of  comfort,  wealth,  and  general 
softness,  which  is  the  ideal  of  the  peace  prophets 
of  to-day.  The  wave  of  the  invaders  broke  in, 
—  the  rain  descended,  the  floods  came,  the 
winds  blew,  and  beat  upon  the  house,  and  it 
fell,  because  not  founded  upon  the  rock  of 
virile  reliance  upon  strong  hands  and  brave 
hearts  to  defend  what  was  dear  to  them. 

Ease  unbroken,  trade  uninterrupted,  hard- 
ship done  away,  all  roughness  removed  from 
life,  —  these  are  our  modern  gods;  but  can  they 
deliver  us,  should  we  succeed  in  setting  them 
up  for  worship?  Fortunately,  as  yet  we  can- 
not do  so.  We  may,  if  we  will,  shut  our  eyes 
to  the  vast  outside  masses  of  aliens  to  our 
civilization,  now  powerless  because  we  still, 
with  a  higher  material  development,  retain  the 
masculine  combative  virtues  which  are  their 
chief  possession ;  but,  even  if  we  disregard 
them,  the  ground  already  shakes  beneath  our 
feet  with  physical  menace  of  destruction  from 


122 


Possibilities  of  an 


within,  against  which  the  only  security  is  in 
constant  readiness  to  contend.  In  the  rivalries 
of  nations,  in  the  accentuation  of  differences, 
in  the  conflict  of  ambitions,  lies  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  martial  spirit  which  alone  is  capable 
of  coping  finally  with  the  destructive  forces 
that  from  outside  and  from  within  threaten  to 
submerge  all  the  centuries  have  gained. 

It  is  not  then  merely,  nor  even  chiefly,  a 
pledge  of  universal  peace  that  may  be  seen  in 
the  United  States  becoming  a  naval  power  of 
serious  import,  with  clearly  defined  external 
ambitions  dictated  by  the  necessities  of  her 
interoceanic  position;  nor  yet  in  the  cordial 
co-operation,  as  of  kindred  peoples,  that  the 
future  may  have  in  store  for  her  and  Great 
Britain.  Not  in  universal  harmony,  nor  in 
fond  dreams  of  unbroken  peace,  rest  now  the 
best  hopes  of  the  world,  as  involved  in  the  fate 
of  European  civilization.  Rather  in  the  com- 
petition of  interests,  in  that  reviving  sense  of 
nationality,  which  is  the  true  antidote  to  what 
is  bad  in  socialism,  in  the  jealous  determina- 
tion of  each  people  to  provide  first  for  its  own, 
of  which  the  tide  of  protection  rising  through- 
out the  world,  whether  economically  an  error 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  123 


or  not,  is  so  marked  a  symptom  —  in  these 
jarring  sounds  which  betoken  that  there  is  no 
immediate  danger  of  the  leading  peoples  turn- 
ing their  swords  into  ploughshares  —  are  to  be 
heard  the  assurance  that  decay  has  not  touched 
yet  the  majestic  fabric  erected  by  so  many 
centuries  of  courageous  battling.  In  this  same 
pregnant  strife  the  United  States  doubtless  will 
be  led,  by  undeniable  interests  and  aroused  na- 
tional sympathies,  to  play  a  part,  to  cast  aside 
the  policy  of  isolation  which  befitted  her  infancy, 
and  to  recognize  that,  whereas  once  to  avoid 
European  entanglement  was  essential  to  the 
development  of  her  individuality,  now  to  take 
her  share  of  the  travail  of  Europe  is  but  to 
assume  an  inevitable  task,  an  appointed  lot,  in 
the  work  of  upholding  the  common  interests  of 
civilization.  Our  Pacific  slope,  and  the  Pacific 
colonies  of  Great  Britain,  with  an  instinc- 
tive shudder  have  felt  the  threat,  which  able 
Europeans  have  seen  in  the  teeming  multitudes 
of  central  and  northern  Asia ;  while  their  over- 
flow into  the  Pacific  Islands  shows  that  not 
only  westward  by  land,  but  also  eastward  by 
sea,  the  flood  may  sweep.  I  am  not  careful, 
however,  to  search  into  the  details  of  a  great 


1 24  Possibilities  of  an 


movement,  which  indeed  may  never  come,  but 
whose  possibility,  in  existing  conditions,  looms 
large  upon  the  horizon  of  the  future,  and  against 
which  the  only  barrier  will  be  the  warlike  spirit 
of  the  representatives  of  civilization.  Whate  er 
betide,  Sea  Power  will  play  in  those  days  the 
leading  part  which  it  has  in  all  history,  and 
the  United  States  by  her  geographical  position 
must  be  one  of  the  frontiers  from  which,  as  from 
a  base  of  operations,  the  Sea  Power  of  the 
civilized  world  will  energize. 

For  this  seemingly  remote  contingency  prep- 
aration will  be  made,  if  men  then  shall  be  found 
prepared,  by  a  practical  recognition  now  of  ex- 
isting conditions  —  such  as  those  mentioned  in 
the  opening  of  this  paper  —  and  acting  upon 
that  knowledge.  Control  of  the  sea,  by  mari- 
time commerce  and  naval  supremacy,  means 
predominant  influence  in  the  world;  because, 
however  great  the  wealth  product  of  the  land, 
nothing  facilitates  the  necessary  exchanges  as 
does  the  sea.  The  fundamental  truth  concern- 
ing the  sea  —  perhaps  we  should  rather  say  the 
water  —  is  that  it  is  Nature's  great  medium  of 
communication.  It  is  improbable  that  control 
ever  again  will  be  exercised,  as  once  it  was,  by 


Anglo- American  Reunion.  125 

a  single  nation.  Like  the  pettier  interests  of 
the  land,  it  must  be  competed  for,  perhaps 
fought  for.  The  greatest  of  the  prizes  for 
which  nations  contend,  it  too  will  serve,  like 
other  conflicting  interests,  to  keep  alive  that 
temper  of  stern  purpose  and  strenuous  emula- 
tion which  is  the  salt  of  the  society  of  civilized 
states,  whose  unity  is  to  be  found,  not  in  a  flat 
identity  of  conditions  —  the  ideal  of  socialism 
—  but  in  a  common  standard  of  moral  and 
intellectual  ideas. 

Also,  amid  much  that  is  shared  by  all  the 
nations  of  European  civilization,  there  are,  as 
is  universally  recognized,  certain  radical  differ- 
ences of  temperament  and  character,  which 
tend  to  divide  them  into  groups  having  the 
marked  affinities  of  a  common  origin.  When, 
as  frequently  happens  on  land,  the  members 
of  these  groups  are  geographically  near  each 
other,  the  mere  proximity  seems,  like  similar 
electricities,  to  develop  repulsions  which  render 
political  variance  the  rule  and  political  combi- 
nation the  exception.  But  when,  as  is  the  case 
with  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  the 
frontiers  are  remote,  and  contact  —  save  in 
Canada  —  too  slight  to  cause  political  friction, 


126 


Possibilities  of  an 


the  preservation,  advancement,  and  predomi- 
nance of  the  race  may  well  become  a  political 
ideal,  to  be  furthered  by  political  combination, 
which  in  turn  should  rest,  primarily,  not  upon 
cleverly  constructed  treaties,  but  upon  natural 
affection  and  a  clear  recognition  of  mutual 
benefit  arising  from  working  together.  If  the 
spirit  be  there,  the  necessary  machinery  for 
its  working  will  not  pass  the  wit  of  the  race  to 
provide ;  and  in  the  control  of  the  sea,  the  benefi- 
cent instrument  that  separates  us  that  we  may 
be  better  friends,  will  be  found  the  object  that 
neither  the  one  nor  the  other  can  master,  but 
which  may  not  be  beyond  the  conjoined  ener- 
gies of  the  race.  When,  if  ever,  an  Anglo- 
American  alliance,  naval  or  other,  does  come, 
may  it  be  rather  as  a  yielding  to  irresistible 
popular  impulse  than  as  a  scheme,  however 
ingeniously  wrought,  imposed  by  the  adroit- 
ness of  statesmen. 

We  may,  however,  I  think,  dismiss  from  our 
minds  the  belief,  frequently  advanced,  and  which 
is  advocated  so  ably  by  Sir  George  Clarke,  that 
such  mutual  support  would  tend  in  the  future 
to  exempt  maritime  commerce  in  general  from 
the  harassment  which  it  hitherto  has  undergone 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  127 


in  war.  I  shall  have  to  try  for  special  clearness 
here  in  stating  my  own  views,  partly  because 
to  some  they  may  appear  retrogressive,  and 
also  because  they  may  be  thought  by  others 
to  contradict  what  I  have  said  elsewhere,  in 
more  extensive  and  systematic  treatment  of 
this  subject. 

The  alliance  which,  under  one  form  or  an- 
other, —  either  as  a  naval  league,  according  to 
Sir  George,  or  as  a  formal  treaty,  according  to 
Mr.  White,  —  is  advocated  by  both  writers, 
looks  ultimately  and  chiefly  to  the  contingency 
of  war.  True,  a  leading  feature  of  either  pro- 
posal is  to  promote  good-will  and  avert  causes 
of  dissension  between  the  two  contracting 
parties ;  but  even  this  object  is  sought  largely 
in  order  that  they  may  stand  by  each  other 
firmly  in  case  of  difficulty  with  other  states. 
Thus  even  war  may  be  averted  more  surely; 
but,  should  it  come,  it  would  find  the  two  united 
upon  the  ocean,  consequently  all-powerful  there, 
and  so  possessors  of  that  mastership  of  the 
general  situation  which  the  sea  always  has  con- 
ferred upon  its  unquestioned  rulers.  Granting 
the  union  of  hearts  and  hands,  the  supremacy, 
from  my  standpoint,  logically  follows.   But  why, 


128 


Possibilities  of  an 


then,  if  supreme,  concede  to  an  enemy  immunity 
for  his  commerce  ?  "  Neither  Great  Britain  nor 
America,"  says  Sir  George  Clarke,  though  he 
elsewhere  qualifies  the  statement,  "can  see  in 
the  commerce  of  other  peoples  an  incentive  to 
attack."  Why  not  ?  For  what  purposes,  pri- 
marily, do  navies  exist  ?  Surely  not  merely  to 
fight  one  another,  —  to  gain  what  Jomini  calls 
"  the  sterile  glory  "  of  fighting  battles  in  order 
to  win  them.  If  navies,  as  all  agree,  exist  for 
the  protection  of  commerce,  it  inevitably  follows 
that  in  war  they  must  aim  at  depriving  their 
enemy  of  that  great  resource ;  nor  is  it  easy  to 
conceive  what  broad  military  use  they  can  sub- 
serve that  at  all  compares  with  the  protection  and 
destruction  of  trade.  This  Sir  George  indeed 
sees,  for  he  says  elsewhere,  "  Only  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  doing  the  utmost  injury  to  an  enemy, 
with  a  view  to  hasten  the  issue  of  war,  can 
commerce-destroying  be  justified ;  "  but  he  fails, 
I  think,  to  appreciate  the  full  importance  of  this 
qualifying  concession,  and  neither  he  nor  Mr. 
White  seems  to  admit  the  immense  importance 
of  commerce-destroying,  as  such. 

The  mistake  of  both,  I  think,  lies  in  not 
keeping  clearly  in  view  —  what  both  certainly 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  129 


perfectly  understand  —  the  difference  between 
the  guerre-de-course,  which  is  inconclusive,  and 
commerce-destroying  (or  commerce  prevention) 
through  strategic  control  of  the  sea  by  power- 
ful navies.  Some  nations  more  than  others, 
but  all  maritime  nations  more  or  less,  depend 
for  their  prosperity  upon  maritime  commerce, 
and  probably  upon  it  more  than  upon  any  other 
single  factor.  Either  under  their  own  flag  or 
that  of  a  neutral,  either  by  foreign  trade  or 
coasting  trade,  the  sea  is  the  greatest  of  boons 
to  such  a  state;  and  under  every  form  its 
sea-borne  trade  is  at  the  mercy  of  a  foe  deci- 
sively superior. ' 

Is  it,  then,  to  be  expected  that  such  foe  will 
forego  such  advantage,  —  will  insist  upon 
spending  blood  and  money  in  fighting,  or 
money  in  the  vain  effort  of  maintaining  a  fleet 
which,  having  nothing  to  fight,  also  keeps  its 
hands  off  such  an  obvious  means  of  crippling 
the  opponent  and  forcing  him  out  of  his  ports  ? 
Great  Britain's  navy,  in  the  French  wars,  not 
only  protected  her  own  commerce,  but  also 
annihilated  that  of  the  enemy;  and  both  con- 
ditions—  not  one  alone  —  were  essential  to  her 
triumph. 

9 


13° 


Possibilities  of  an 


It  is  because  Great  Britain's  sea  power,  though 
still  superior,  has  declined  relatively  to  that  of 
other  states,  and  is  no  longer  supreme,  that 
she  has  been  induced  to  concede  to  neutrals 
the  principle  that  the  flag  covers  the  goods. 
It  is  a  concession  wrung  from  relative  weak- 
ness —  or  possibly  from  a  mistaken  humanita- 
rianism ;  but,  to  whatever  due,  it  is  all  to  the 
profit  of  the  neutral  and  to  the  loss  of  the 
stronger  belligerent.  The  only  justification,  in 
policy,  for  its  yielding  by  the  latter,  is  that  she 
can  no  longer,  as  formerly,  bear  the  additional 
burden  of  hostility,  if  the  neutral  should  ally 
himself  to  the  enemy.  I  have  on  another  occa- 
sion said  that  the  principle  that  the  flag  covers 
the  goods  is  forever  secured  —  meaning  there- 
by that,  so  far  as  present  indications  go,  no 
one  power  would  be  strong  enough  at  sea  to 
maintain  the  contrary  by  arms. 

In  the  same  way  it  may  be  asserted  quite 
confidently  that  the  concession  of  immunity  to 
what  is  unthinkingly  called  the  "  private  prop- 
erty "  of  an  enemy  on  the  sea,  will  never  be  con- 
ceded by  a  nation  or  alliance  confident  in  its  own 
sea  power.  It  has  been  the  dream  of  the  weaker 
sea  belligerents  in  all  ages ;  and  their  argu- 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  131 

mentsfor  it,  at  the  first  glance  plausible,  are  very 
proper  to  urge  from  their  point  of  view.  That 
arch-robber,  the  first  Napoleon,  who  so  re- 
morselessly and  exhaustively  carried  the  princi- 
ple of  war  sustaining  war  to  its  utmost  logical 
sequence,  and  even  in  peace  scrupled  not  to 
quarter  his  armies  on  subject  countries,  main- 
taining them  on  what,  after  all,  was  simply  pri- 
vate property  of  foreigners,  —  even  he  waxes 
quite  eloquent,  and  superficially  most  con- 
vincing, as  he  compares  the  seizure  of  goods 
at  sea,  so  fatal  to  his  empire,  to  the  seizure  of 
a  wagon  travelling  an  inland  country  road. 

In  all  these  contentions  there  lies,  beneath 
the  surface  plausibility,  not  so  much  a  confu- 
sion of  thought  as  a  failure  to  recognize  an 
essential  difference  of  conditions.  Even  on 
shore  the  protection  of  private  property  rests 
upon  the  simple  principle  that  injury  is  not  to 
be  wanton,  —  that  it  is  not  to  be  inflicted 
when  the  end  to  be  attained  is  trivial,  or 
largely  disproportionate  to  the  suffering  caused. 
For  this  reason  personal  property,  not  em- 
barked in  commercial  venture,  is  respected 
in  civili/.ed  maritime  war.  Conversely,  as  we 
all  know,  the  rule  on  land  is  by  no  means  in- 


132 


Possibilities  of  an 


variable,  and  private  property  receives  scant 
consideration  when  its  appropriation  or  de- 
struction serves  the  purposes  of  an  enemy. 
The  man  who  trudges  the  highway,  cudgel  in 
hand,  may  claim  for  his  cudgel  all  the  sacred- 
ness  with  which  civilization  invests  property; 
but  if  he  use  it  to  break  his  neighbors  head, 
the  respect  for  his  property,  as  such,  quickly 
disappears.  Now,  private  property  borne  upon 
the  seas  is  engaged  in  promoting,  in  the  most 
vital  manner,  the  strength  and  resources  of  the 
nation  by  which  it  is  handled.  When  that 
nation  becomes  belligerent,  the  private  prop- 
erty, so  called,  borne  upon  the  seas,  is  sustain- 
ing the  well-being  and  endurance  of  the  nation 
at  war,  and  consequently  is  injuring  the  oppo- 
nent, to  an  extent  exceeding  all  other  sources 
of  national  power.  In  these  days  of  war  cor- 
respondents, most  of  us  are  familiar  with  the 
idea  of  the  dependence  of  an  army  upon  its 
communications,  and  we  know,  vaguely  perhaps, 
but  still  we  know,  that  to  threaten  or  harm  the 
communications  of  an  army  is  one  of  the  most 
common  and  effective  devices  of  strategy. 
Why?  Because  severed  from  its  base  an  army 
languishes  and  dies,  and  when  threatened  with 


Anglo-American  Reunion.  133 


such  an  evil  it  must  fight  at  whatever  disad- 
vantage. Well,  is  it  not  clear  that  maritime 
commerce  occupies,  to  the  power  of  a  mari- 
time state,  the  precise  nourishing  function  that 
the  communications  of  an  army  supply  to  the 
army  ?  Blows  at  commerce  are  blows  at  the 
communications  of  the  state  ;  they  intercept  its 
nourishment,  they  starve  its  life,  they  cut  the 
roots  of  its  power,  the  sinews  of  its  war.  While 
war  remains  a  factor,  a  sad  but  inevitable  fac- 
tor, of  our  history,  it  is  a  fond  hope  that  com- 
merce can  be  exempt  from  its  operations,  be- 
cause in  very  truth  blows  against  commerce 
are  the  most  deadly  that  can  be  struck ;  nor  is 
there  any  other  among  the  proposed  uses  of 
a  navy,  as  for  instance  the  bombardment  of 
seaport  towns,  which  is  not  at  once  more  cruel 
and  less  scientific.  Blockade  such  as  that 
enforced  by  the  United  States  Navy  during 
the  Civil  War,  is  evidently  only  a  special  phase 
of  commerce-destroying ;  yet  how  immense  — 
nay,  decisive  —  its  results  ! 

It  is  only  when  effort  is  frittered  away  in  the 
feeble  dissemination  of  the  guerre-de-course,  in- 
stead of  being  concentrated  in  a  great  combina- 
tion to  control  the  sea,  that  commerce-destroying 


134       An  Anglo-American  Reunion. 


justly  incurs  the  reproach  of  misdirected  effort. 
It  is  a  fair  deduction  from  analogy,  that  two 
contending  armies  might  as  well  agree  to  re- 
spect each  other's  communications,  as  two 
belligerent  states  to  guarantee  immunity  to 
hostile  commerce. 


THE  FUTURE  IN   RELATION  TO 
AMERICAN  NAVAL  POWER. 


THE    FUTURE    IN    RELATION  TO 
AMERICAN  NAVAL  POWER. 


June,  1895. 


•HAT  the  United  States  Navy  within  the 


X  last  dozen  years  should  have  been  recast 
almost  wholly,  upon  more  modern  lines,  is 
not,  in  itself  alone,  a  fact  that  should  cause 
comment,  or  give  rise  to  questions  about  its 
future  career  or  sphere  of  action.  If  this 
country  needs,  or  ever  shall  need,  a  navy  at 
all,  indisputably  in  1883  the  hour  had  come 
when  the  time-worn  hulks  of  that  day,  mostly 
the  honored  but  superannuated  survivors  of 
the  civil  war,  should  drop  out  of  the  ranks, 
submit  to  well-earned  retirement  or  inevitable 
dissolution,  and  allow  their  places  to  be  taken 
by  other  vessels,  capable  of  performing  the 
duties  to  which  they  themselves  were  no 
longer  adequate. 

It  is  therefore  unlikely  that  there  underlay 
this  re-creation  of   the  navy  —  for  such  in 


138  The  Future  in  Relation  to 

truth  it  was — any  more  recondite  cause  than 
the  urgent  necessity  of  possessing  tools  wholly 
fit  for  the  work  which  war-ships  are  called 
upon  to  do.  The  thing  had  to  be  done,  if 
the  national  fleet  was  to  be  other  than  an 
impotent  parody  of  naval  force,  a  costly  effigy 
of  straw.  But,  concurrently  with  the  process 
of  rebuilding,  there  has  been  concentrated 
upon  the  development  of  the  new  service 
a  degree  of  attention,  greater  than  can  be 
attributed  even  to  the  voracious  curiosity  of 
this  age  of  newsmongering  and  of  interviewers. 
This  attention  in  some  quarters  is  undisguis- 
edly  reluctant  and  hostile,  in  others  not  only 
friendly  but  expectant,  in  both  cases  betraying 
a  latent  impression  that  there  is,  between  the 
appearance  of  the  new-comer  and  the  era 
upon  which  we  now  are  entering,  something 
in  common.  If  such  coincidence  there  be, 
however,  it  is  indicative  not  of  a  deliberate 
purpose,  but  of  a  commencing  change  of 
conditions,  economical  and  political,  through- 
out the  world,  with  which  sea  power,  in  the 
broad  sense  of  the  phrase,  will  be  associated 
closely;  not,  indeed,  as  the  cause,  nor  even 
chiefly  as  a  result,  but  rather  as  the  leading 


American  Naval  Power.  139 


characteristic  of  activities  which  shall  cease 
to  be  mainly  internal,  and  shall  occupy  them- 
selves with  the  wider  interests  that  concern 
the  relations  of  states  to  the  world  at  large. 
And  it  is  just  at  this  point  that  the  opposing 
lines  of  feeling  divide.  Those  who  hold  that 
our  political  interests  are  confined  to  matters 
within  our  own  borders,  and  are  unwilling  to 
admit  that  circumstances  may  compel  us  in 
the  future  to  political  action  without  them, 
look  with  dislike  and  suspicion  upon  the 
growth  of  a  body  whose  very  existence  indi- 
cates that  nations  have  international  duties 
as  well  as  international  rights,  and  that  inter- 
national complications  will  arise  from  which 
we  can  no  more  escape  than  the  states  which 
have  preceded  us  in  history,  or  those  contem- 
porary with  [us.  Others,  on  the  contrary,  re- 
garding the  conditions  and  signs  of  these 
times,  and  the  extra-territorial  activities  in 
which  foreign  states  have  embarked  so  rest- 
lessly and  widely,  feel  that  the  nation,  however 
greatly  against  its  wish,  may  become  involved 
in  controversies  not  unlike  those  which  in  the 
middle  of  the  century  caused  very  serious 
friction,  but  which  the  generation  that  saw 


140  The  Future  in  Relation  to 


the  century  open  would  have  thought  too  re- 
mote for  its  concern,  and  certainly  wholly 
beyond  its  power  to  influence. 

Religious  creeds,  dealing  with  eternal  veri- 
ties, may  be  susceptible  of  a  certain  per- 
manency of  statement ;  yet  even  here  we  in 
this  day  have  witnessed  the  embarrassments 
of  some  religious  bodies,  arising  from  a  tradi- 
tional adherence  to  merely  human  formulas, 
which  reflect  views  of  the  truth  as  it  appeared 
to  the  men  who  framed  them  in  the  distant 
past.  But  political  creeds,  dealing  as  they  do 
chiefly  with  the  transient  and  shifting  condi- 
tions of  a  world  which  is  passing  away  con- 
tinually, can  claim  no  fixity  of  allegiance, 
except  where  they  express,  not  the  policy  of 
a  day,  but  the  unchanging  dictates  of  right- 
eousness. And  inasmuch  as  the  path  of  ideal 
righteousness  is  not  always  plain  nor  always 
practicable  ;  as  expediency,  policy,  the  choice 
of  the  lesser  evil,  must  control  at  times ;  as 
nations,  like  men,  will  occasionally  differ,  hon- 
estly but  irreconcilably,  on  questions  of  right, 
—  there  do  arise  disputes  where  agreement 
cannot  be  reached,  and  where  the  appeal  must 
be  made  to  force,  that  final  factor  which  under- 


American  Naval  Power.  141 


lies  the  security  of  civil  society  even  more 
than  it  affects  the  relations  of  states.  The 
well-balanced  faculties  of  Washington  saw  this 
in  his  day  with  absolute  clearness.  Jefferson 
either  would  not  or  could  not.  That  there 
should  be  no  navy  was  a  cardinal  prepossession 
of  his  political  thought,  born  of  an  exagger- 
ated fear  of  organized  military  force  as  a  politi- 
cal factor.  Though  possessed  with  a  passion 
for  annexation  which  dominated  much  of  his 
political  action,  he  prescribed  as  the  limit  of 
the  country's  geographical  expansion  the  line 
beyond  which  it  would  entail  the  maintenance 
of  a  navy.  Yet  fate,  ironical  here  as  else- 
where in  his  administration,  compelled  the 
recognition  that,  unless  a  policy  of  total  seclu- 
sion is  adopted,  —  if  even  then,  —  it  is  not 
necessary  to  acquire  territory  beyond  sea  in 
order  to  undergo  serious  international  compli- 
cations, which  could  have  been  avoided  much 
more  easily  had  there  been  an  imposing  armed 
shipping  to  throw  into  the  scale  of  the  nations 
argument,  and  to  compel  the  adversary  to  recog- 
nize the  impolicy  of  his  course  as  well  as 
what  the  United  States  then  claimed  to  be  its 
wrongfulness. 


142         The  Future  in  Relation  to 


The  difference  of  conditions  between  the 
United  States  of  to-day  and  of  the  beginning 
of  this  century  illustrates  aptly  how  necessary 
it  is  to  avoid  implicit  acceptance  of  precedents, 
crystallized  into  maxims,  and  to  seek  for  the 
quickening  principle  which  justified,  wholly 
or  in  part,  the  policy  of  one  generation,  but 
whose  application  may  insure  a  very  different 
course  of  action  in  a  succeeding  age.  When 
the  century  opened,  the  United  States  was 
not  only  a  continental  power,  as  she  now  is, 
but  she  was  one  of  several,  of  nearly  equal 
strength  as  far  as  North  America  was  con- 
cerned, with  all  of  whom  she  had  differences 
arising  out  of  conflicting  interests,  and  with 
whom,  moreover,  she  was  in  direct  geographi- 
cal contact,  —  a  condition  which  has  been 
recognized  usually  as  entailing  peculiar  prone- 
ness  to  political  friction ;  for,  while  the  in- 
terests of  two  nations  may  clash  in  quarters 
of  the  world  remote  from  either,  there  is 
both  greater  frequency  and  greater  bitterness 
when  matters  of  dispute  exist  near  at  home, 
and  especially  along  an  artificial  boundary, 
where  the  inhabitants  of  each  are  directly 
in  contact  with  the  causes  of  the  irritation. 


American  Naval  Power.  143 


It  was  therefore  the  natural  and  proper  aim 
of  the  government  of  that  day  to  abolish  the 
sources  of  difficulty,  by  bringing  all  the  terri- 
tory in  question  under  our  own  control,  if 
it  could  be  done  by  fair  means.  We  conse- 
quently entered  upon  a  course  of  action  pre- 
cisely such  as  a  European  continental  state 
would  have  followed  under  like  circumstances. 
In  order  to  get  possession  of  the  territory 
in  which  our  interests  were  involved,  we 
bargained  and  manoeuvred  and  threatened ; 
and  although  Jefferson's  methods  were  peace- 
ful enough,  few  will  be  inclined  to  claim  that 
they  were  marked  by  excess  of  scrupulousness, 
or  even  of  adherence  to  his  own  political  con- 
victions. From  the  highly  moral  standpoint, 
the  acquisition  of  Louisiana  under  the  actual 
conditions  —  being  the  purchase  from  a  gov- 
ernment which  had  no  right  to  sell,  in  defiance 
of  the  remonstrance  addressed  to  us  by  the 
power  who  had  ceded  the  territory  upon  the 
express  condition  that  it  should  not  so  be 
sold,  but  which  was  too  weak  to  enforce  its 
just  reclamation  against  both  Napoleon  and 
ourselves  —  reduces  itself  pretty  much  to  a 
choice  between  overreaching  and  violence,  as 


144  Future  in  Relation  to 


the  less  repulsive  means  of  compassing  an 
end  in  itself  both  desirable  and  proper;  nor 
does  the  attempt,  by  strained  construction, 
to  wrest  West  Florida  into  the  bargain  give 
a  higher  tone  to  the  transaction.  As  a  matter 
of  policy,  however,  there  is  no  doubt  that  our 
government  was  most  wise  ;  and  the  transfer, 
as  well  as  the  incorporation,  of  the  territory 
was  facilitated  by  the  meagreness  of  the  popu- 
lation that  went  with  the  soil.  With  all  our 
love  of  freedom,  it  is  not  likely  that  many 
qualms  were  felt  as  to  the  political  inclinations 
of  the  people  concerning  their  transfer  of  alle- 
giance. In  questions  of  great  import  to  na- 
tions or  to  the  world,  the  wishes,  or  interests, 
or  technical  rights,  of  minorities  must  yield, 
and  there  is  not  necessarily  any  more  injustice 
in  this  than  in  their  yielding  to  a  majority  at 
the  polls. 

While  the  need  of  continental  expansion 
pressed  thus  heavily  upon  the  statesmen  of 
Jefferson's  era,  questions  relating  to  more  dis- 
tant interests  were  very  properly  postponed. 
At  the  time  that  matters  of  such  immediate 
importance  were  pending,  to  enter  willingly 
upon  the  consideration  of  subjects  our  concern 


American  Naval  Power.  145 


in  which  was  more  remote,  either  in  time  or 
place,  would  have  entailed  a  dissemination  of 
attention  and  of  power  that  is  as  greatly  to  be 
deprecated  in  statesmanship  as  it  is  in  the 
operations  of  war.  Still,  while  the  government 
of  the  day  would  gladly  have  avoided  such 
complications,  it  found,  as  have  the  statesmen 
of  all  times,  that  if  external  interests  exist, 
whatsoever  their  character,  they  cannot  be 
ignored,  nor  can  the  measures  which  prudence 
dictates  for  their  protection  be  neglected  with 
safety.  Without  political  ambitions  outside 
the  continent,  the  commercial  enterprise  of  the 
people  brought  our  interests  into  violent  antag- 
onism with  clear,  unmistakable,  and  vital  inter- 
ests of  foreign  belligerent  states  ;  for  we  shall 
sorely  misread  the  lessons  of  18 12,  and  of  the 
events  which  led  to  it,  if  we  fail  to  see  that  the 
questions  in  dispute  involved  issues  more  im- 
mediately vital  to  Great  Britain,  in  her  then 
desperate  struggle,  than  they  were  to  ourselves, 
and  that  the  great  majority  of  her  statesmen 
and  people,  of  both  parties,  so  regarded  them. 
The  attempt  of  our  government  to  temporize 
with  the  difficulty,  to  overcome  violence  by 

means  of  peaceable  coercion,  instead  of  meeting 

10 


1 


146         The  Fiiture  in  Relation  to 


it  by  the  creation  of  a  naval  force  so  strong  as 
to  be  a  factor  of  consideration  in  the  interna- 
tional situation,  led  us  into  an  avoidable  war. 

The  conditions  which  now  constitute  the 
political  situation  of  the  United  States,  rela- 
tively to  the  world  at  large,  are  fundamentally 
different  from  those  that  obtained  at  the  begin- 
ning  of  the  century.  It  is  not  a  mere  question 
of  greater  growth,  of  bigger  size.  It  is  not  only 
that  we  are  larger,  stronger,  have,  as  it  were, 
reached  our  majority,  and  are  able  to  go  out 
into  the  world.  That  alone  would  be  a  differ- 
ence of  degree,  not  of  kind.  The  great  differ- 
ence between  the  past  and  the  present  is  that 
we  then,  as  regards  close  contact  with  the  power 
of  the  chief  nations  of  the  world,  were  really  in 
a  state  of  political  isolation  which  no  longer 
exists.  This  arose  from  our  geographical 
position  —  reinforced  by  the  slowness  and 
uncertainty  of  the  existing  means  of  intercom- 
munication —  and  yet  more  from  the  grave 
preoccupation  of  foreign  statesmen  with  ques- 
tions of  unprecedented  and  ominous  importance 
upon  the  continent  of  Europe.  A  policy  of 
isolation  was  for  us  then  practicable,  —  though 
even  then  only  partially.    It  was  expedient, 


American  Naval  Power.  1 47 


also,  because  we  were  weak,  and  in  order  to 
allow  the  individuality  of  the  nation  time  to 
accentuate  itself.  Save  the  questions  connected 
with  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  collision 
with  other  peoples  was  only  likely  to  arise,  and 
actually  did  arise,  from  going  beyond  our  own 
borders  in  search  of  trade.  The* reasons  now 
evoked  by  some  against  our  political  action 
outside  our  own  borders  might  have  been  used 
then  with  equal  appositeness  against  our  com- 
mercial enterprises.  Let  us  stay  at  home,  or 
we  shall  get  into  trouble.  Jefferson,  in  truth, 
averse  in  principle  to  commerce  as  to  war,  was 
happily  logical  in  his  embargo  system.  It  not 
only  punished  the  foreigner  and  diminished  the 
danger  of  international  complications,  but  it 
kept  our  own  ships  out  of  harm's  way ;  and  if 
it  did  destroy  trade,  and  cause  the  grass  to  grow 
in  the  streets  of  New  York,  the  incident,  if  in- 
convenient, had  its  compensations,  by  repressing 
hazardous  external  activities. 

Few  now,  of  course,  would  look  with  com- 
posure upon  a  policy,  whatever  its  ground, 
which  contemplated  the  peaceable  seclusion  of 
this  nation  from  its  principal  lines  of  commerce. 
In  1807,  however,  a  great  party  accepted  the 


148  The  Future  in  Relation  to 


alternative  rather  than  fight,  or  even  than 
create  a  force  which  might  entail  war,  although 
more  probably  it  would  have  prevented  it.  But 
would  it  be  more  prudent  now  to  ignore  the 
fact  that  we  are  no  longer  —  however  much  we 
may  regret  it  —  in  a  position  of  insignificance 
or  isolation,  political  or  geographical,  in  any 
way  resembling  the  times  of  Jefferson,  and  that 
from  the  changed  conditions  may  result  to  us 
a  dilemma  similar  to  that  which  confronted  him 
and  his  supporters  ?  Not  only  have  we  grown, 
—  that  is  a  detail,  —  but  the  face  of  the  world 
is  changed,  economically  and  politically.  The 
sea,  now  as  always  the  great  means  of  commu- 
nication between  nations,  is  traversed  with  a 
rapidity  and  a  certainty  that  have  minimized 
distances.  Events  which  under  former  condi- 
tions would  have  been  distant  and  of  small 
concern,  now  happen  at  our  doors  and  closely 
affect  us.  Proximity,  as  has  been  noted,  is  a 
fruitful  source  of  political  friction,  but  proximity 
is  the  characteristic  of  the  age.  The  world  has 
grown  smaller.  Positions  formerly  distant  have 
become  to  us  of  vital  importance  from  their 
nearness.  But,  while  distances  have  shortened, 
they  remain  for  us  water  distances,  and,  how- 


American  Naval  Power.  149 


ever  short,  for  political  influence  they  must  be 
traversed  in  the  last  resort  by  a  navy,  the  in- 
dispensable instrument  by  which,  when  emer- 
gencies arise,  the  nation  can  project  its  power 
beyond  its  own  shore-line. 

Whatever  seeming  justification,  therefore, 
there  may  have  been  in  the  transient  conditions 
of  his  own  day  for  Jefferson's  dictum  concern- 
ing a  navy,  rested  upon  a  state  of  things  that 
no  longer  obtains,  and  even  then  soon  passed 
away.  The  War  of  18:2  demonstrated  the  use- 
fulness of  a  navy,  —  not,  indeed,  by  the  admir- 
able but  utterly  unavailing  single-ship  victories 
that  illustrated  its  course,  but  by  the  prostration 
into  which  our  seaboard  and  external  commu- 
nications fell,  through  the  lack  of  a  navy  at  all 
proportionate  to  the  country's  needs  and  expo- 
sure. The  navy  doubtless  reaped  honor  in  that 
brilliant  sea  struggle,  but  the  honor  was  its  own 
alone ;  only  discredit  accrued  to  the  statesmen 
who,  with  such  men  to  serve  them,  none  the 
less  left  the  country  open  to  the  humiliation 
of  its  harried  coasts  and  blasted  commerce. 
Never  was  there  a  more  lustrous  example  of 
what  Jomini  calls  "  the  sterile  glory  of  fighting 
battles  merely  to  win  them."    Except  for  the 


150  The  Future  in  Relation  to 


prestige  which  at  last  awoke  the  country  to  the 
high  efficiency  of  the  petty  force  we  called  our 
navy,  and  showed  what  the  sea  might  be  to  us, 
never  was  blood  spilled  more  uselessly  than  in 
the  frigate  and  sloop  actions  of  that  day.  They 
presented  no  analogy  to  the  outpost  and  recon- 
noissance  fighting,  to  the  detached  services,  that 
are  not  only  inevitable  but  invaluable,  in  main- 
taining the  morale  of  a  military  organization  in 
campaign.  They  were  simply  scattered  efforts, 
without  relation  either  to  one  another  or  to  any 
main  body  whatsoever,  capable  of  affecting 
seriously  the  issues  of  war,  or,  indeed,  to  any 
plan  of  operations  worthy  of  the  name. 

Not  very  long  after  the  War  of  181 2,  within 
the  space  of  two  administrations,  there  came 
another  incident,  epoch-making  in  the  history 
of  our  external  policy,  and  of  vital  bearing  on 
the  navy,  in  the  enunciation  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine.  That  pronouncement  has  been  curi- 
ously warped  at  times  from  its  original  scope 
and  purpose.  In  its  name  have  been  put  forth 
theories  so  much  at  odds  with  the  relations  of 
states,  as  hitherto  understood,  that,  if  they  be 
maintained  seriously,  it  is  desirable  in  the  in- 
terests of  exact  definition  that  their  supporters 


American  Naval  Power.  151 

advance  some  other  name  for  them.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  attribute  finality  to  the  Monroe 
doctrine,  any  more  than  to  any  other  political 
dogma,  in  order  to  deprecate  the  application  of 
the  phrase  to  propositions  that  override  or  tran- 
scend it.  We  should  beware  of  being  misled 
by  names,  and  especially  where  such  error  may 
induce  a  popular  belief  that  a  foreign  state  is 
outraging  wilfully  a  principle  to  the  defence  of 
which  the  country  is  committed.  We  have  been 
committed  to  the  Monroe  doctrine  itself,  not 
perhaps  by  any  such  formal  assumption  of  obli- 
gations as  cannot  be  evaded,  but  by  certain 
precedents,  and  by  a  general  attitude,  upon  the 
whole  consistently  maintained,  from  which  we 
cannot  recede  silently  without  risk  of  national 
mortification.  If  seriously  challenged,  as  in 
Mexico  by  the  third  Napoleon,  we  should 
hardly  decline  to  emulate  the  sentiments  so 
nobly  expressed  by  the  British  government, 
when,  in  response  to  the  emperors  of  Russia 
and  France,  it  declined  to  abandon  the  strug- 
gling Spanish  patriots  to  the  government  set 
over  them  by  Napoleon  :  "  To  Spain  his  Maj- 
esty is  not  bound  by  any  formal  instrument; 
but  his  Majesty  has,  in  the  face  of  the  world, 


152  The  Future  in  Relation  to 

contracted  with  that  nation  engagements  not 
less  sacred,  and  not  less  binding  upon  his 
Majesty's  mind,  than  the  most  solemn  treaties." 
We  may  have  to  accept  also  certain  corollaries 
which  may  appear  naturally  to  result  from  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  but  we  are  by  no  means  com- 
mitted to  some  propositions  which  lately  have 
been  tallied  with  its  name.  Those  propositions 
possibly  embody  a  sound  policy,  more  applicable 
to  present  conditions  than  the  Monroe  doctrine 
itself,  and  therefore  destined  to  succeed  it ;  but 
they  are  not  the  same  thing.  There  is,  how- 
ever, something  in  common  between  it  and 
them.  Reduced  to  its  barest  statement,  and 
stripped  of  all  deductions,  natural  or  forced,  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  if  it  were  not  a  mere  political 
abstraction,  formulated  an  idea  to  which  in  the 
last  resort  effect  could  be  given  only  through 
the  instrumentality  of  a  navy  ;  for  the  gist  of 
it,  the  kernel  of  the  truth,  was  that  the  country 
had  at  that  time  distant  interests  on  the  land, 
political  interests  of  a  high  order  in  the  destiny 
of  foreign  territory,  of  which  a  distinguishing 
characteristic  was  that  they  could  be  assured 
only  by  sea. 

Like  most  stages  in  a  nation's  progress,  the 


American  Naval  Power.  153 


Monroe  doctrine,  though  elicited  by  a  partic- 
ular political  incident,  was  not  an  isolated  step 
unrelated  to  the  past,  but  a  development.  It 
had  its  antecedents  in  feelings  which  arose  be- 
fore our  War  of  Independence,  and  which  in 
1778,  though  we  were  then  in  deadly  need  of 
the  French  alliance,  found  expression  in  the 
stipulation  that  France  should  not  attempt  to 
regain  Canada.  Even  then,  and  also  in  1783, 
the  same  jealousy  did  not  extend  to  the  Flori- 
das,  which  at  the  latter  date  were  ceded  by 
Great  Britain  to  Spain ;  and  we  expressly  ac- 
quiesced in  the  conquest  of  the  British  West 
India  Islands  by  our  allies.  From  that  time 
to  181 5  no  remonstrance  was  made  against  the 
transfer  of  territories  in  the  West  Indies  and 
Caribbean  Sea  from  one  belligerent  to  another 
—  an  indifference  which  scarcely  would  be 
shown  at  the  present  time,  even  though  the 
position  immediately  involved  were  intrinsi- 
cally of  trivial  importance ;  for  the  question  at 
stake  would  be  one  of  principle,  of  conse- 
quences, far  reaching  as  Hampden's  tribute  of 
ship-money. 

It  is  beyond  the  professional  province  of  a 
naval  officer  to  inquire  how  far  the  Monroe 


154 


The  Future  in  Relation  to 


doctrine  itself  would  logically  carry  us,  or  how 
far  it  may  be  developed,  now  or  hereafter,  by 
the  recognition  and  statement  of  further  na- 
tional interests,  thereby  formulating  another 
and  wider  view  of  the  necessary  range  of  our 
political  influence.  It  is  sufficient  to  quote  its 
enunciation  as  a  fact,  and  to  note  that  it  was 
the  expression  of  a  great  national  interest,  not 
merely  of  a  popular  sympathy  with  South  Amer- 
ican revolutionists;  for, had  it  been  the  latter, it 
wrould  doubtless  have  proved  as  inoperative  and 
evanescent  as  declarations  arising  from  such 
emotions  commonly  are.  From  generation  to 
generation  we  have  been  much  stirred  by  the 
sufferings  of  Greeks,  or  Bulgarians,  or  Arme- 
nians, at  the  hands  of  Turkey  ;  but,  not  being 
ourselves  injuriously  affected,  our  feelings  have 
not  passed  into  acts,  and  for  that  very  reason 
have  been  ephemeral.  No  more  than  other 
nations  are  we  exempt  from  the  profound  truth 
enunciated  by  Washington  —  seared  into  his 
own  consciousness  by  the  bitter  futilities  of  the 
French  alliance  in  1778  and  the  following  years, 
and  by  the  extravagant  demands  based  upon  it 
by  the  Directory  during  his  Presidential  term 
—  that  it  is  absurd  to  expect  governments  to 


American  Naval  Power.  155 


act  upon  disinterested  motives.  It  is  not  as  an 
utterance  of  passing  concern,  benevolent  or  self- 
ish, but  because  it  voiced  an  enduring  prin- 
ciple of  necessary  self-interest,  that  the  Monroe 
doctrine  has  retained  its  vitality,  and  has  been 
made  so  easily  to  do  duty  as  the  expression  of 
intuitive  national  sensitiveness  to  occurrences 
of  various  kinds  in  regions  beyond  the  sea. 
At  its  christening  the  principle  was  directed 
against  an  apprehended  intervention  in  Ameri- 
can affairs,  which  depended  not  upon  actual 
European  concern  in  the  territory  involved, 
but  upon  a  purely  political  arrangement  be- 
tween certain  great  powers,  itself  the  result  of 
ideas  at  the  time  moribund.  In  its  first  appli- 
cation, therefore,  it  was  a  confession  that  dan- 
ger of  European  complications  did  exist,  under 
conditions  far  less  provocative  of  real  European 
interest  than  those  which  now  obtain  and  are 
continually  growing.  Its  subsequent  applica- 
tions have  been  many  and  various,  and  the 
incidents  giving  rise  to  them  have  been  in- 
creasingly important,  culminating  up  to  the 
present  in  the  growth  of  the  United  States  to 
be  a  great  Pacific  power,  and  in  her  probable 
dependence  in  the  near  future  upon  an  Isth- 


156  The  Future  in  Relation  to 


mian  canal  for  the  freest  and  most  copious 
intercourse  between  her  two  ocean  seaboards. 
In  the  elasticity  and  flexibleness  with  which 
the  dogma  thus  has  accommodated  itself  to 
varying  conditions,  rather  than  in  the  strict 
wording  of  the  original  statement,  is  to  be  seen 
the  essential  characteristic  of  a  living  principle 
—  the  recognition,  namely,  that  not  merely  the 
interests  of  individual  citizens,  but  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  as  a  nation,  are  bound  up 
with  regions  beyond  the  sea,  not  part  of  our 
own  political  domain,  in  which  therefore,  under 
some  imaginable  circumstances,  we  may  be 
forced  to  take  action. 

It  is  important  to  recognize  this,  for  it  will 
help  clear  away  the  error  from  a  somewhat 
misleading  statement  frequently  made,  —  that 
the  United  States  needs  a  navy  for  defence 
only,  adding  often,  explanatorily,  for  the  de- 
fence of  our  own  coasts.  Now  in  a  certain 
sense  we  all  want  a  navy  for  defence  only.  It 
is  to  be  hoped  that  the  United  States  will 
never  seek  war  except  for  the  defence  of  her 
rights,  her  obligations,  or  her  necessary  inter- 
ests. In  that  sense  our  policy  may  always  be 
defensive  only,  although  it  may  compel  us  at 


American  Naval  Power.  157 


times  to  steps  justified  rather  by  expediency 
—  the  choice  of  the  lesser  evil  —  than  by  in- 
controvertible right.  But  if  we  have  interests 
beyond  sea  which  a  navy  may  have  to  protect, 
it  plainly  follows  that  the  navy  has  more  to  do, 
even  in  war,  than  to  defend  the  coast ;  and  it 
must  be  added  as  a  received  military  axiom 
that  war,  however  defensive  in  moral  character, 
must  be  waged  aggressively  if  it  is  to  hope  for 
success. 

For  national  security,  the  correlative  of  a 
national  principle  firmly  held  and  distinctly 
avowed  is,  not  only  the  will,  but  the  power  to 
enforce  it.  The  clear  expression  of  national 
purpose,  accompanied  by  evident  and  adequate 
means  to  carry  it  into  effect,  is  the  surest  safe- 
guard against  war,  provided  always  that  the 
national  contention  is  maintained  with  a  can- 
did and  courteous  consideration  of  the  rights 
and  susceptibilities  of  other  states.  On  the 
other  hand,  no  condition  is  more  hazardous 
than  that  of  a  dormant  popular  feeling,  liable 
to  be  roused  into  action  by  a  moment  of 
passion,  such  as  that  which  swept  over  the 
North  when  the  flag  was  fired  upon  at  Sumter, 
but  behind  which  lies  no  organized  power  for 


158  The  Future  in  Relation  to 


action.  It  is  on  the  score  of  due  preparation 
for  such  an  ultimate  contingency  that  nations, 
and  especially  free  nations,  are  most  often 
deficient.  Yet,  if  wanting  in  definiteness  of 
foresight  and  persistency  of  action,  owing  to 
the  inevitable  frequency  of  change  in  the  gov- 
ernments that  represent  them,  democracies 
seem  in  compensation  to  be  gifted  with  an 
instinct,  the  result  perhaps  of  the  free  and 
rapid  interchange  of  thought  by  which  they 
are  characterized,  that  intuitively  and  uncon- 
sciously assimilates  political  truths,  and  pre- 
pares in  part  for  political  action  before  the 
time  for  action  has  come.  That  the  mass  of 
United  States  citizens  do  not  realize  under- 
standingly  that  the  nation  has  vital  political 
interests  beyond  the  sea  is  probably  true; 
still  more  likely  is  it  that  they  are  not  tracing 
any  connection  between  them  and  the  recon- 
struction of  the  navy.  Yet  the  interests  exist, 
and  the  navy  is  growing ;  and  in  the  latter  fact 
is  the  best  surety  that  no  breach  of  peace  will 
ensue  from  the  maintenance  of  the  former. 

It  is,  not,  then  the  indication  of  a  formal 
political  purpose,  far  less  of  anything  like  a 
threat,  that  is,  from  my  point  of  view,  to  be 


American  Naval  Power.  159 


recognized  in  the  recent  development  of  the 
navy.  Nations,  as  a  rule,  do  not  move  with 
the  foresight  and  the  fixed  plan  which  distin- 
guish a  very  few  individuals  of  the  human  race. 
They  do  not  practise  on  the  pistol-range  before 
sending  a  challenge;  if  they  did,  wars  would 
be  fewer,  as  is  proved  by  the  present  long- 
continued  armed  peace  in  Europe.  Gradually 
and  imperceptibly  the  popular  feeling,  which 
underlies  most  lasting  national  movements,  is 
aroused  and  swayed  by  incidents,  often  trivial, 
but  of  the  same  general  type,  whose  recurrence 
gradually  moulds  public  opinion  and  evokes 
national  action,  until  at  last  there  issues  that 
settled  public  conviction  which  alone,  in  a  free 
state,  deserves  the  name  of  national  policy. 
What  the  origin  of  those  particular  events 
whose  interaction  establishes  a  strong  political 
current  in  a  particular  direction,  it  is  perhaps 
unprofitable  to  inquire.  Some  will  see  in  the 
chain  of  cause  and  effect  only  a  chapter  of 
accidents,  presenting  an  interesting  philosophi- 
cal study,  and  nothing  more ;  others,  equally 
persuaded  that  nations  do  not  effectively  shape 
their  mission  in  the  world,  will  find  in  them 
the  ordering  of  a  Divine  ruler,  who  does  not 


160         The  Future  in  Relation  to 


permit  the  individual  or  the  nation  to  escape 
its  due  share  of  the  world's  burdens.  But, 
however  explained,  it  is  a  common  experience 
of  history  that  in  the  gradual  ripening  of 
events  there  comes  often  suddenly  and  unex- 
pectedly the  emergency,  the  call  for  action,  to 
maintain  the  nation's  contention.  That  there 
is  an  increased  disposition  on  the  part  of  civi- 
lized countries  to  deal  with  such  cases  by 
ordinary  diplomatic  discussion  and  mutual 
concession  can  be  gratefully  acknowledged ; 
but  that  such  dispositions  are  not  always  suffi- 
cient to  reach  a  peaceable  solution  is  equally 
an  indisputable  teaching  of  the  recent  past. 
Popular  emotion,  once  fairly  roused,  sweeps 
away  the  barriers  of  calm  deliberation,  and  is 
deaf  to  the  voice  of  reason.  That  the  consid- 
eration of  relative  power  enters  for  much  in 
the  diplomatic  settlement  of  international  diffi- 
culties is  also  certain,  just  as  that  it  goes  for 
much  in  the  ordering  of  individual  careers. 
M  Can,"  as  well  as  "wiU,"  plays  a  large  share  in 
the  decisions  of  life. 

Like  each  man  and  woman,  no  state  lives  to 
itself  alone,  in  a  political  seclusion  resembling 
the  physical  isolation  which  so  long  was  the 


American  Naval  Power.  161 


ideal  of  China  and  Japan.  All,  whether  they 
will  or  no,  are  members  of  a  community,  larger 
or  smaller;  and  more  and  more  those  of  the 
European  family  to  which  we  racially  belong  are 
touching  each  other  throughout  the  world,  with 
consequent  friction  of  varying  degree.  That 
the  greater  rapidity  of  communication  afforded 
by  steam  has  wrought,  in  the  influence  of  sea 
power  over  the  face  of  the  globe,  an  extension 
that  is  multiplying  the  points  of  contact  and 
emphasizing  the  importance  of  navies,  is  a  fact, 
the  intelligent  appreciation  of  which  is  daily 
more  and  more  manifest  in  the  periodical 
literature  of  Europe,  and  is  further  shown  by 
the  growing  stress  laid  upon  that  arm  of  mili- 
tary strength  by  foreign  governments;  while 
the  mutual  preparation  of  the  armies  on  the 
European  continent,  and  the  fairly  settled  ter- 
ritorial conditions,  make  each  state  yearly 
more  wary  of  initiating  a  contest,  and  thus 
entail  a  political  quiescence  there,  except  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  each  country.  The  field 
of  external  action  for  the  great  European 
states  is  now  the  world,  and  it  is  hardly  doubt- 
ful that  their   struggles,   unaccompanied  as 

yet  by  actual  clash  of  arms,  are  even  under 

ii 


l62 


The  Future  in  Relation  to 


that  condition  drawing  nearer  to  ourselves. 
Coincidently  with  our  own  extension  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  which  for  so  long  had  a  good 
international  claim  to  its  name,  that  sea  has 
become  more  and  more  the  scene  of  political 
development,  of  commercial  activities  and 
rivalries,  in  which  all  the  great  powers,  our-, 
selves  included,  have  a  share.  Through  these 
causes  Central  and  Caribbean  America,  now 
intrinsically  unimportant,  are  brought  in  turn 
into  great  prominence,  as  constituting  the 
gateway  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
when  the  Isthmian  canal  shall  have  been 
made,  and  as  guarding  the  approaches  to  it. 
The  appearance  of  Japan  as  a  strong  ambitious 
state,  resting  on  solid  political  and  military 
foundations,  but  which  scarcely  has  reached 
yet  a  condition  of  equilibrium  in  international 
standing,  has  fairly  startled  the  world;  and  it 
is  a  striking  illustration  of  the  somewhat  sud- 
den nearness  and  unforeseen  relations  into 
which  modern  states  are  brought,  that  the 
Hawaiian  Islands,  so  interesting  from  the  in- 
ternational point  of  view  to  the  countries  of 
European  civilization,  are  occupied  largely  by 
Japanese  and  Chinese. 


American  Naval  Power.  163 

In  all  these  questions  we  have  a  stake,  re- 
luctantly it  may  be,  but  necessarily,  for  our 
evident  interests  are  involved,  in  some  in- 
stances directly,  in  others  by  very  probable 
implication.  Under  existing  conditions,  the 
opinion  that  we  can  keep  clear  indefinitely 
of  embarrassing  problems  is  hardly  tenable; 
while  war  between  two  foreign  states,  which  in 
the  uncertainties  of  the  international  situation 
throughout  the  world  may  break  out  at  any 
time,  will  increase  greatly  the  occasions  of  pos- 
sible collision  with  the  belligerent  countries, 
and  the  consequent  perplexities  of  our  states- 
men seeking  to  avoid  entanglement  and  to 
maintain  neutrality. 

Although  peace  is  not  only  the  avowed  but 
for  the  most  part  the  actual  desire  of  Euro- 
pean governments,  they  profess  no  such  aver- 
sion to  distant  political  enterprises  and  colonial 
acquisitions  as  we  by  tradition  have  learned  to 
do.  On  the  contrary,  their  committal  to  such 
divergent  enlargements  of  the  national  activ- 
ities and  influence  is  one  of  the  most  pregnant 
facts  of  our  time,  the  more  so  that  their  course 
is  marked  in  the  case  of  each  state  by  a  per- 
sistence of  the  same  national  traits  that  char- 


164         The  Future  in  Relation  to 


acterized  the  great  era  of  colonization,  which 
followed  the  termination  of  the  religious  wars 
in  Europe,  and  led  to  the  world-wide  contests 
of  the  eighteenth  century.  In  one  nation  the 
action  is  mainly  political,  —  that  of  a  govern- 
ment pushed,  by  long-standing  tradition  and 
by  its  passion  for  administration,  to  extend  the 
sphere  of  its  operations  so  as  to  acquire  a 
greater  field  in  which  to  organize  and  domi- 
nate, somewhat  regardless  of  economical  ad- 
vantage. In  another  the  impulse  comes  from 
the  restless,  ubiquitous  energy  of  the  individual 
citizens,  singly  or  in  companies,  moved  pri- 
marily by  the  desire  of  gain,  but  carrying  ever 
with  them,  subordinate  only  to  the  commercial 
aim,  the  irresistible  tendency  of  the  race  to 
rule  as  well  as  to  trade,  and  dragging  the  home 
government  to  recognize  and  to  assume  the 
consequences  of  their  enterprise.  Yet  again 
there  is  the  movement  whose  motive  is 
throughout  mainly  private  and  mercantile,  in 
which  the  individual  seeks  wealth  only,  with 
little  or  no  political  ambition,  and  where  the 
government  intervenes  chiefly  that  it  may  re- 
tain control  of  its  subjects  in  regions  where 
but  for  such  intervention  they  would  become 


American  Naval  Power.  165 


estranged  from  it.  But,  however  diverse  the 
modes  of  operation,  all  have  a  common  char- 
acteristic, in  that  they  bear  the  stamp  of  the 
national  genius, — a  proof  that  the  various  im- 
pulses are  not  artificial,  but  natural,  and  that 
they  therefore  will  continue  until  an  adjust- 
ment is  reached. 

What  the  process  will  be,  and  what  the  con- 
clusion, it  is  impossible  to  foresee ;  but  that 
friction  at  times  has  been  very  great,  and  mat- 
ters dangerously  near  passing  from  the  com- 
munications of  cabinets  to  the  tempers  of  the 
peoples,  is  sufficiently  known.  If,  on  the  one 
hand,  some  look  upon  this  as  a  lesson  to  us  to 
keep  clear  of  similar  adventures,  on  the  other 
hand  it  gives  a  warning  that  not  only  do 
causes  of  offence  exist  which  may  result  at  an 
unforeseen  moment  in  a  rupture  extending  to 
many  parts  of  the  world,  but  also  that  there  is 
a  spirit  abroad  which  yet  may  challenge  our 
claim  to  exclude  its  action  and  interference  in 
any  quarter,  unless  it  finds  us  prepared  there  in 
adequate  strength  to  forbid  it,  or  to  exercise  our 
own.  More  and  more  civilized  man  is  needing 
and  seeking  ground  to  occupy,  room  over  which 
to  expand  and  in  which  to  live.    Like  all  nat- 


1 66  The  Future  in  Relation  to 


ural  forces,  the  impulse  takes  the  direction  of 
least  resistance,  but  when  in  its  course  it  comes 
upon  some  region  rich  in  possibilities,  but  un- 
fruitful through  the  incapacity  or  negligence 
of  those  who  dwell  therein,  the  incompetent 
race  or  system  will  go  down,  as  the  inferior 
race  ever  has  fallen  back  and  disappeared  be- 
fore the  persistent  impact  of  the  superior. 
The  recent  and  familiar  instance  of  Egypt  is 
entirely  in  point.  The  continuance  of  the  ex- 
isting system — if  it  can  be  called  such  —  had 
become  impossible,  not  because  of  the  native 
Egyptians,  who  had  endured  the  like  for  ages, 
but  because  there  were  involved  therein  the 
interests  of  several  European  states,  of  which 
two  principally  were  concerned  by  present  ma- 
terial interest  and  traditional  rivalry.  Of  these 
one,  and  that  the  one  most  directly  affected, 
refused  to  take  part  in  the  proposed  interfer- 
ence, with  the  result  that  this  was  not  aban- 
doned, but  carried  out  solely  by  the  other, 
which  remains  in  political  and  administrative 
control  of  the  country.  Whether  the  original 
enterprise  or  the  continued  presence  of  Great 
Britain  in  Egypt  is  entirely  clear  of  technical 
wrongs,  open  to  the  criticism  of  the  pure  moral- 


American  Naval  Power.  167 


ist,  is  as  little  to  the  point  as  the  morality  of 
an  earthquake;  the  general  action  was  justified 
by  broad  considerations  of  moral  expediency, 
being  to  the  benefit  of  the  world  at  large,  and 
of  the  people  of  Egypt  in  particular  —  however 
they  might  have  voted  in  the  matter. 

But  what  is  chiefly  instructive  in  this  occur- 
rence is  the  inevitableness,  which  it  shares  in 
common  with  the  great  majority  of  cases 
where  civilized  and  highly  organized  peoples 
have  trespassed  upon  the  technical  rights  of 
possession  of  the  previous  occupants  of  the 
land  —  of  which  our  own  dealings  with  the 
American  Indian  afford  another  example. 
The  inalienable  rights  of  the  individual  are 
entitled  to  a  respect  which  they  unfortunately 
do  not  always  get ;  but  there  is  no  inalienable 
right  in  any  community  to  control  the  use  of  a 
region  when  it  does  so  to  the  detriment  of  the 
world  at  large,  of  its  neighbors  in  particular, 
or  even  at  times  of  its  own  subjects.  Witness, 
for  example,  the  present  angry  resistance  of  the 
Arabs  at  Jiddah  to  the  remedying  of  a  condi- 
tion of  things  which  threatens  to  propagate  a 
deadly  disease  far  and  wide,  beyond  the  local- 
ity by  which  it  is  engendered ;  or  consider  the 


1 68  The  Future  in  Relation  to 


horrible  conditions  under  which  the  Armenian 
subjects  of  Turkey  have  lived  and  are  living. 
When  such  conditions  obtain,  they  can  be  pro- 
longed only  by  the  general  indifference  or  mu- 
tual jealousies  of  the  other  peoples  concerned  — 
as  in  the  instance  of  Turkey  —  or  because  there 
is  sufficient  force  to  perpetuate  the  misrule,  in 
which  case  the  right  is  inalienable  only  until 
its  misuse  brings  ruin,  or  until  a  stronger  force 
appears  to  dispossess  it.  It  is  because  so 
much  of  the  world  still  remains  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  savage,  or  of  states  whose  imperfect 
development,  political  or  economical,  does  not 
enable  them  to  realize  for  the  general  use 
nearly  the  result  of  which  the  territory  is 
capable,  while  at  the  same  time  the  redundant 
energies  of  civilized  states,  both  government 
and  peoples,  are  finding  lack  of  openings  and 
scantiness  of  livelihood  at  home,  that  there 
now  obtains  a  condition  of  aggressive  restless- 
ness with  which  all  have  to  reckon. 

That  the  United  States  does  not  now  share 
this  tendency  is  entirely  evident.  Neither  her 
government  nor  her  people  are  affected  by  it 
;o  any  great  extent.  But  the  force  of  circum- 
stances has  imposed  upon  her  the  necessity, 


American  Naval  Power.  169 


recognized  with  practical  unanimity  by  her 
people,  of  insuring  to  the  weaker  states  of 
America,  although  of  racial  and  political  ante- 
cedents different  from  her  own,  freedom  to 
develop  politically  along  their  own  lines  and 
according  to  their  own  capacities,  without 
interference  in  that  respect  from  governments 
foreign  to  these  continents.  The  duty  is  self- 
assumed;  and  resting,  as  it  does,  not  upon 
political  philanthropy,  but  simply  upon  our  own 
proximate  interests  as  affected  by  such  foreign 
interference,  has  towards  others  rather  the 
nature  of  a  right  than  a  duty.  But,  from  either 
point  of  view,  the  facility  with  which  the  claim 
has  been  allowed  heretofore  by  the  great  powers 
has  been  due  partly  to  the  lack  of  pressing 
importance  in  the  questions  that  have  arisen, 
and  partly  to  the  great  latent  strength  of  our 
nation,  which  was  an  argument  more  than 
adequate  to  support  contentions  involving  mat- 
ters of  no  greater  immediate  moment,  for  ex- 
ample, than  that  of  the  Honduras  Bay  Islands 
or  of  the  Mosquito  Coast.  Great  Britain  there 
yielded,  it  is  true,  though  reluctantly  and 
slowly;  and  it  is  also  true  that,  so  far  as  organ- 
ized force  is  concerned,  she  could  have  de- 


170  The  Ftiture  in  Relation  to 


stroyed  our  navy  then  existing  and  otherwise 
have  injured  us  greatly ;  but  the  substantial 
importance  of  the  question,  though  real,  was 
remote  in  the  future,  and,  as  it  was,  she  made  a 
political  bargain  which  was  more  to  her  advan- 
tage than  ours.  But  while  our  claim  thus  far 
has  received  a  tacit  acquiescence,  it  remains  to 
be  seen  whether  it  will  continue  to  command 
the  same  if  the  states  whose  political  freedom 
of  action  we  assert  make  no  more  decided 
advance  towards  political  stability  than  several 
of  them  have  done  yet,  and  if  our  own  organ- 
ized naval  force  remains  as  slender,  compara- 
tively, as  it  once  was,  and  even  yet  is.  It  is 
probably  safe  to  say  that  an  undertaking  like 
that  of  Great  Britain  in  Egypt,  if  attempted  in 
this  hemisphere  by  a  non-American  state, 
would  not  be  tolerated  by  us  if  able  to  prevent 
it;  but  it  is  conceivable  that  the  moral  force  of 
our  contention  might  be  weakened,  in  the  view 
of  an  opponent,  by  attendant  circumstances,  in 
which  case  our  physical  power  to  support  it 
should  be  open  to  no  doubt. 

That  we  shall  seek  to  secure  the  peaceable 
solution  of  each  difficulty  as  it  arises  is  attested 
by  our  whole  history,  and  by  the  disposition  of 


American  Naval  Power.  171 


our  people ;  but  to  do  so,  whatever  the  steps 
taken  in  any  particular  case,  will  bring  us  into 
new  political  relations  and  may  entail  serious 
disputes  with  other  states.  In  maintaining  the 
justest  policy,  the  most  reasonable  influence, 
one  of  the  political  elements,  long  dominant, 
and  still  one  of  the  most  essential,  is  military 
strength  —  in  the  broad  sense  of  the  word 
"  military,"  which  includes  naval  as  well  —  not 
merely  potential,  which  our  own  is,  but  organ- 
ized and  developed,  which  our  own  as  yet  is 
not.  We  wisely  quote  Washington's  warning 
against  entangling  alliances,  but  too  readily 
forget  his  teaching  about  preparation  for  war. 
The  progress  of  the  world  from  age  to  age,  in 
its  ever-changing  manifestations,  is  a  great 
political  drama,  possessing  a  unity,  doubtless, 
in  its  general  development,  but  in  which,  as 
act  follows  act,  one  situation  alone  can  engage, 
at  one  time,  the  attention  of  the  actors.  Of 
this  drama  war  is  simply  a  violent  and  tumult- 
uous political  incident.  A  navy,  therefore, 
whose  primary  sphere  of  action  is  war,  is,  in  the 
last  analysis  and  from  the  least  misleading 
point  of  view,  a  political  factor  of  the  utmost 
importance  in  international  affairs,  one  more 


172  American  Naval  Power. 


often  deterrent  than  irritant.  It  is  in  that 
light,  according  to  the  conditions  of  the  age 
and  of  the  nation,  that  it  asks  and  deserves  the 
appreciation  of  the  state,  and  that  it  should  be 
developed  in  proportion  to  the  reasonable 
possibilities  of  the  political  future. 


PREPAREDNESS  FOR  NAVAL  WAR. 


PREPAREDNESS  FOR  NAVAL  WAR. 


December,  1896, 


HE  problem  of  preparation  for  war  in 


A  modern  times  is  both  extensive  and 
complicated.  As  in  the  construction  of  the 
individual  ship,  where  the  attempt  to  reconcile 
conflicting  requirements  has  resulted,  accord- 
ing to  a  common  expression,  in  a  compromise, 
the  most  dubious  of  all  military  solutions, — 
giving  something  to  all,  and  all  to  none,  —  so 
preparation  for  war  involves  many  conditions, 
often  contradictory  one  to  another,  at  times 
almost  irreconcilable.  To  satisfy  all  of  these 
passes  the  ingenuity  of  the  national  Treasury, 
powerless  to  give  the  whole  of  what  is  de- 
manded by  the  representatives  of  the  different 
elements,  which,  in  duly  ordered  proportion, 
constitute  a  complete  scheme  of  national  mili- 
tary policy,  whether  for  offence  or  defence. 
Unable  to  satisfy  all,  and  too  often  equally  un- 


176       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


able  to  say,  frankly,  "  This  one  is  chief ;  to  it 
you  others  must  yield,  except  so  far  as  you 
contribute  to  its  greatest  efficiency,"  either  the 
pendulum  of  the  government's  will  swings  from 
one  extreme  to  the  other,  or,  in  the  attempt 
to  be  fair  all  round,  all  alike  receive  less 
than  they  ask,  and  for  their  theoretical  com- 
pleteness require.  In  other  words,  the  con- 
tents of  the  national  purse  are  distributed, 
instead  of  being  concentrated  upon  a  leading 
conception,  adopted  after  due  deliberation,  and 
maintained  with  conviction. 

The  creation  of  material  for  war,  under  mod- 
ern conditions,  requires  a  length  of  time  which 
does  not  permit  the  postponement  of  it  to  the 
hour  of  impending  hostilities.  To  put  into 
the  water  a  first-class  battle-ship,  fully  armored, 
within  a  year  after  the  laying  of  her  keel,  as 
has  been  done  latterly  in  England,  is  justly 
considered  an  extraordinary  exhibition  of  the 
nations  resources  for  naval  shipbuilding;  and 
there  yet  remained  to  be  done  the  placing  of 
her  battery,  and  many  other  matters  of  princi- 
pal detail  essential  to  her  readiness  for  sea. 
This  time  certainly  would  not  be  less  for  our- 
selves, doing  our  utmost. 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  177 

War  is  simply  a  political  movement,  though 
violent  and  exceptional  in  its  character.  How- 
ever sudden  the  occasion  from  which  it  arises, 
it  results  from  antecedent  conditions,  the  gen- 
eral tendency  of  which  should  be  manifest  long 
before  to  the  statesmen  of  a  nation,  and  to 
at  least  the  reflective  portion  of  the  people. 
In  such  anticipation,  such  forethought,  as  in 
the  affairs  of  common  life,  lies  the  best  hope 
of  the  best  solution,  —  peace  by  ordinary  dip- 
lomatic action ;  peace  by  timely  agreement, 
while  mens  heads  are  cool,  and  the  crisis  of 
fever  has  not  been  reached  by  the  inflamma- 
tory utterances  of  an  unscrupulous  press,  to 
which  agitated  public  apprehension  means  in- 
crease of  circulation.  But  while  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace  by  sagacious  prevision  is  the 
laurel  of  the  statesman,  which,  in  failing  to 
achieve  except  by  force,  he  takes  from  his  own 
brow  and  gives  to  the  warrior,  it  is  none  the 
less  a  necessary  part  of  his  official  competence 
to  recognize  that  in  public  disputes,  as  in  pri- 
vate, there  is  not  uncommonly  on  both  sides 
an  element  of  right,  real  or  really  believed, 
which  prevents  either  party  from  yielding,  and 

that  it  is  better  for  men  to  fight  than,  for  the 

12 


178       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


sake  of  peace,  to  refuse  to  support  their  con- 
victions of  justice.  How  deplorable  the  war 
between  the  North  and  South  !  but  more  de- 
plorable by  far  had  it  been  that  either  had 
flinched  from  the  maintenance  of  what  it 
believed  to  be  fundamental  right.  On  ques- 
tions of  merely  material  interest  men  may 
yield;  on  matters  of  principle  they  may  be 
honestly  in  the  wrong;  but  a  conviction  of 
right,  even  though  mistaken,  if  yielded  without 
contention,  entails  a  deterioration  of  character, 
except  in  the  presence  of  force  demonstrably 
irresistible  —  and  sometimes  even  then.  Death 
before  dishonor  is  a  phrase  which  at  times  has 
been  abused  infamously,  but  it  none  the  less 
contains  a  vital  truth. 

To  provide  a  force  adequate  to  maintain  the 
nation's  cause,  and  to  insure  its  readiness  for 
immediate  action  in  case  of  necessity,  are  the 
responsibility  of  the  government  of  a  state, 
in  its  legislative  and  executive  functions.  Such 
a  force  is  a  necessary  outcome  of  the  political 
conditions  which  affect,  or,  as  can  be  foreseen, 
probably  may  affect,  the  international  relations 
of  the  country.  Its  existence  at  all  and  its 
size  are,  or  should  be,  the  reflection  of  the 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  179 

national  consciousness  that  in  this,  that,  or  the 
other  direction  lie  clear  national  interests  — for 
which  each  generation  is  responsible  to  futu- 
rity —  or  national  duties,  equally  clear  from  the 
mere  fact  that  the  matter  lies  at  the  door,  like 
Lazarus  at  the  rich  man's  gate.  The  question 
of  when  or  how  action  shall  be  taken  which 
may  result  in  hostilities,  is  indeed  a  momen- 
tous one,  having  regard  to  the  dire  evils  of 
war ;  but  it  is  the  question  of  a  moment,  of 
the  last  moment  to  which  can  be  postponed  a 
final  determination  of  such  tremendous  conse- 
quence. To  this  determination  preparation  for 
war  has  only  this  relation  :  that  it  should  be 
adequate  to  the  utmost  demand  that  then  can 
be  made  upon  it,  and,  if  possible,  so  imposing 
that  it  will  prevent  war  ensuing,  upon  the  firm 
presentation  of  demands  which  the  nation 
believes  to  be  just.  Such  a  conception,  so 
stated,  implies  no  more  than  defence,  —  defence 
of  the  nation  s  rights  or  of  the  nation's  duties, 
although  such  defence  may  take  the  shape  of 
aggressive  action,  the  only  safe  course  in  war. 

Logically,  therefore,  a  nation  which  proposes 
to  provide  itself  with  a  naval  or  military  organ- 
ization adequate  to  its  needs,  must  begin  by 


180       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


considering,  not  what  is  the  largest  army  or 
navy  in  the  world,  with  the  view  of  rivalling 
it,  but  what  there  is  in  the  political  status  of 
the  world,  including  not  only  the  material  inter- 
ests but  the  temper  of  nations,  which  involves 
a  reasonable,  even  though  remote,  prospect  of 
difficulties  which  may  prove  insoluble  except 
by  war.  The  matter,  primarily,  is  political  in 
character.  It  is  not  until  this  political  deter- 
mination has  been  reached  that  the  data  for 
even  stating  the  military  problem  are  in  hand ; 
for  here,  as  always,  the  military  arm  waits  upon 
and  is  subservient  to  the  political  interests  and 
civil  power  of  the  state. 

It  is  not  the  most  probable  of  dangers,  but 
the  most  formidable,  that  must  be  selected  as 
measuring  the  degree  of  military  precaution 
to  be  embodied  in  the  military  preparations 
thenceforth  to  be  maintained.  The  lesser  is 
contained  in  the  greater;  if  equal  to  the  most 
that  can  be  apprehended  reasonably,  the  coun- 
try can  view  with  quiet  eye  the  existence  of 
more  imminent,  but  less  dangerous  complica- 
tions. Nor  should  it  be  denied  that  in  estimat- 
ing danger  there  should  be  a  certain  sobriety 
of  imagination,  equally  removed  from  undue 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  181 


confidence  and  from  exaggerated  fears.  Napo- 
leon s  caution  to  his  marshals  not  to  make  a 
picture  to  themselves  —  not  to  give  too  loose 
rein  to  fancy  as  to  what  the  enemy  might  do, 
regardless  of  the  limitations  to  which  military 
movements  are  subject  —  applies  to  antece- 
dent calculations,  like  those  which  we  are  con- 
sidering now,  as  really  as  to  the  operations  of 
the  campaign.  When  British  writers,  realizing 
the  absolute  dependence  of  their  own  country 
upon  the  sea,  insist  that  the  British  navy  must 
exceed  the  two  most  formidable  of  its  possible 
opponents,  they  advance  an  argument  which 
is  worthy  at  least  of  serious  debate  ;  but  when 
the  two  is  raised  to  three,  they  assume  con- 
ditions which  are  barely  possible,  but  lie  too 
far  without  the  limits  of  probability  to  affect 
practical  action. 

In  like  manner,  the  United  States,  in  esti- 
mating her  need  of  military  preparation  of 
whatever  kind,  is  justified  in  considering,  not 
merely  the  utmost  force  which  might  be 
brought  against  her  by  a  possible  enemy,  under 
the  political  circumstances  most  favorable  to 
the  latter,  but  the  limitations  imposed  upon 
an  opponent's  action  by  well-known  conditions 


1 82       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 

of  a  permanent  nature.  Our  only  rivals  in 
potential  military  strength  are  the  great  powers 
of  Europe.  These,  however,  while  they  have 
interests  in  the  western  hemisphere,  —  to  which 
a  certain  solidarity  is  imparted  by  their  in- 
stinctive and  avowed  opposition  to  a  policy 
to  which  the  United  States,  by  an  inward  com- 
pulsion apparently  irresistible,  becomes  more  and 
more  committed,  —  have  elsewhere  yet  wider 
and  more  onerous  demands  upon  their  atten- 
tion. Since  1884  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Germany  have  each  acquired  colonial  posses- 
sions, varying  in  extent  from  one  million  to 
two  and  a  half  million  square  miles,  —  chiefly 
in  Africa.  This  means,  as  is  generally  under- 
stood, not  merely  the  acquisition  of  so  much 
new  territory,  but  the  perpetuation  of  national 
rivalries  and  suspicions,  maintaining  in  full 
vigor,  in  this  age,  the  traditions  of  past  ani- 
mosities. It  means  uncertainties  about  boun- 
daries—  that  most  fruitful  source  of  disputes 
when  running  through  unexplored  wildernesses 
—  jealousy  of  influence  over  native  occupants 
of  the  soil,  fear  of  encroachment,  unperceived 
till  too  late,  and  so  a  constant,  if  silent,  strife 
to  insure   national    preponderance   in  these 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  183 


newly  opened  regions.  The  colonial  expan- 
sion of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centu- 
ries is  being  resumed  under  our  eyes,  bringing 
with  it  the  same  train  of  ambitions  and  feelings 
that  were  exhibited  then,  though  these  are 
qualified  by  the  more  orderly  methods  of  mod- 
ern days  and  by  a  well-defined  mutual  appre- 
hension,—  the  result  of  a  universal  prepared- 
ness for  war,  the  distinctive  feature  of  our  own 
time  which  most  guarantees  peace. 

All  this  reacts  evidently  upon  Europe,  the 
common  mother-country  of  these  various  for- 
eign enterprises,  in  whose  seas  and  lands  must 
be  fought  out  any  struggle  springing  from 
these  remote  causes,  and  upon  whose  inhab- 
itants chiefly  must  fall  both  the  expense  and 
the  bloodshed  thence  arising.  To  these  distant 
burdens  of  disquietude  —  in  the  assuming  of 
which,  though  to  an  extent  self-imposed,  the 
present  writer  recognizes  the  prevision  of 
civilization,  instinctive  rather  than  conscious, 
against  the  perils  of  the  future  —  is  to  be  added 
the  proximate  and  unavoidable  anxiety  de- 
pendent upon  the  conditions  of  Turkey  and  its 
provinces,  the  logical  outcome  of  centuries  of 
Turkish  misrule.    Deplorable  as  have  been, 


184       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 

and  to  some  extent  still  are,  political  condi- 
tions on  the  American  continents,  the  New 
World,  in  the  matter  of  political  distribution 
of  territory  and  fixity  of  tenure,  is  permanence 
itself,  as  compared  with  the  stormy  prospect 
confronting  the  Old  in  its  questions  which  will 
not  down. 

In  these  controversies,  which  range  them- 
selves under  the  broad  heads  of  colonial  ex- 
pansion and  the  Eastern  question,  all  the 
larger  powers  of  Europe,  the  powers  that  main- 
tain considerable  armies  or  navies,  or  both,  are 
directly  and  deeply  interested  —  except  Spain. 
The  latter  manifests  no  solicitude  concerning 
the  settlement  of  affairs  in  the  east  of  Europe, 
nor  is  she  engaged  in  increasing  her  still  con- 
siderable colonial  dominion.  This  preoccupa- 
tion of  the  great  powers,  being  not  factitious, 
but  necessary,  —  a  thing  that  cannot  be  dis- 
missed by  an  effort  of  the  national  will,  be- 
cause its  existence  depends  upon  the  nature  of 
things,  —  is  a  legitimate  element  in  the  mili- 
tary calculations  of  the  United  States.  It  can- 
not enter  into  her  diplomatic  considerations, 
for  it  is  her  pride  not  to  seek,  from  the  em- 
barrassments of   other  states,  advantages  or 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  185 


concessions  which  she  cannot  base  upon  the 
substantial  justice  of  her  demands.  But,  while 
this  is  true,  the  United  States  has  had  in  the 
past  abundant  experience  of  disputes,  in  which, 
though  she  believed  herself  right,  even  to  the 
point  of  having  a  just  casus  belli,  the  other 
party  has  not  seemed  to  share  the  same  con- 
viction. These  difficulties,  chiefly,  though 
not  solely,  territorial  in  character,  have  been 
the  natural  bequest  of  the  colonial  condition 
through  which  this  hemisphere  passed  on  its 
way  to  its  present  political  status.  Her  own 
view  of  right,  even  when  conceded  in  the  end, 
has  not  approved  itself  at  first  to  the  other 
party  to  the  dispute.  Fortunately  these  differ- 
ences have  been  mainly  with  Great  Britain, 
the  great  and  beneficent  colonizer,  a  state  be- 
tween which  and  ourselves  a  sympathy,  deeper 
than  both  parties  have  been  ready  always  to 
admit,  has  continued  to  exist,  because  founded 
upon  common  fundamental  ideas  of  law  and 
justice.  Of  this  the  happy  termination  of  the 
Venezuelan  question  is  the  most  recent  but 
not  the  only  instance. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  Great  Britain  is  the 
most  unpopular  state  in  Europe.    If  this  be  so, 


1 86       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


—  and  many  of  her  own  people  seem  to  accept 
the  fact  of  her  political  isolation,  though  with 
more  or  less  of  regret,  —  is  there  nothing  sig- 
nificant to  us  in  that  our  attitude  towards  her 
in  the  Venezuelan  matter  has  not  commanded 
the  sympathy  of  Europe,  but  rather  the  re- 
verse? Our  claim  to  enter,  as  of  right,  into  a 
dispute  not  originally  our  own,  and  concerning 
us  only  as  one  of  the  American  group  of  na- 
tions, has  been  rejected  in  no  doubtful  tones 
by  organs  of  public  opinion  which  have  no 
fondness  for  Great  Britain.  Whether  any  for- 
eign government  has  taken  the  same  attitude  is 
not  known,  —  probably  there  has  been  no  offi- 
cial protest  against  the  apparent  admission  of 
a  principle  which  binds  nobody  but  the  parties 
to  it.  Do  we  ourselves  realize  that,  happy  as 
the  issue  of  our  intervention  has  been,  it  may 
entail  upon  us  greater  responsibilities,  more 
serious  action,  than  we  have  assumed  before  ? 
that  it  amounts  in  fact  —  if  one  may  use  a 
military  metaphor —  to  occupying  an  advanced 
position,  the  logical  result  very  likely  of  other 
steps  in  the  past,  but  which  nevertheless  im- 
plies necessarily  such  organization  of  strength 
as  will  enable  us  to  hold  it? 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  187 


Without  making  a  picture  to  ourselves,  with- 
out conjuring  up  extravagant  contingencies,  it 
is  not  difficult  to  detect  the  existence  of  condi- 
tions, in  which  are  latent  elements  of  future 
disputes,  identical  in  principle  with  those 
through  which  we  have  passed  heretofore. 
Can  we  expect  that,  if  unprovided  with  ade- 
quate military  preparation,  we  shall  receive 
from  other  states,  not  imbued  with  our  tradi- 
tional habits  of  political  thought,  and  therefore 
less  patient  of  our  point  of  view,  the  recogni- 
tion of  its  essential  reasonableness  which  has 
been  conceded  by  the  government  of  Great 
Britain  ?  The  latter  has  found  capacity  for 
sympathy  with  our  attitude,  —  not  only  by  long 
and  close  contact  and  interlacing  of  interests 
between  the  two  peoples,  nor  yet  only  in  a 
fundamental  similarity  of  character  and  insti- 
tutions. Besides  these,  useful  as  they  are  to 
mutual  understanding,  that  government  has 
an  extensive  and  varied  experience,  extending 
over  centuries,  of  the  vital  importance  of  dis- 
tant regions  to  its  own  interests,  to  the  inter- 
ests of  its  people  and  its  commerce,  or  to  its 
political  prestige.  It  can  understand  and  allow 
for  a  determination  not  to  acquiesce  in  the  be- 


1 88       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


ginning  or  continuance  of  a  state  of  things, 
the  tendency  of  which  is  to  induce  future  em- 
barrassments, —  to  complicate  or  to  endanger 
essential  welfare.  A  nation  situated  as  Great 
Britain  is  in  India  and  Egypt  scarcely  can  fail 
to  appreciate  our  own  sensitiveness  regarding 
the  Central  American  isthmus,  and  the  Pacific, 
on  which  we  have  such  extensive  territory ; 
nor  is  it  a  long  step  from  concern  about  the 
Mediterranean,  and  anxious  watchfulness  over 
the  progressive  occupation  of  its  southern 
shores,  to  an  understanding  of  our  reluctance 
to  see  the  ambitions  and  conflicts  of  another 
hemisphere  approach,  even  remotely  and  indi- 
rectly, the  comparatively  peaceful  neighbor- 
hoods surrounding  the  Caribbean  Sea,  bearing 
a  threat  of  disturbance  to  the  political  distribu- 
tion of  power  or  of  territorial  occupation  now 
existing.  Whatever  our  interests  may  demand 
in  the  future  may  be  a  matter  of  doubt,  but  it 
is  hard  to  see  how  there  can  be  any  doubt  in 
the  mind  of  a  British  statesman  that  it  is  our 
clear  interest  now,  when  all  is  quiet,  to  see 
removed  possibilities  of  trouble  which  might 
break  out  at  a  less  propitious  season. 

Such  facility  for  reaching  an  understanding, 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  189 


due  to  experience  of  difficulties,  is  supported 
strongly  by  a  hearty  desire  for  peace,  tradi- 
tional with  a  commercial  people  who  have  not 
to  reproach  themselves  with  any  lack  of  resolu- 
tion or  tenacity  in  assuming  and  bearing  the 
burden  of  war  when  forced  upon  them.  "  Mili- 
tarism "  is  not  a  preponderant  spirit  in  either 
Great  Britain  or  the  United  States ;  their  com- 
mercial tendencies  and  their  isolation  concur 
to  exempt  them  from  its  predominance.  Pug- 
nacious, and  even  warlike,  when  aroused,  the 
idea  of  war  in  the  abstract  is  abhorrent  to  them, 
because  it  interferes  with  their  leading  occupa- 
tions, and  its  demands  are  alien  to  their  habits 
of  thought.  To  say  that  either  lacks  sensitive- 
ness to  the  point  of  honor  would  be  to  wrong 
them  ;  but  the  point  must  be  made  clear  to 
them,  and  it  will  not  be  found  in  the  refusal  of 
reasonable  demands,  because  they  involve  the 
abandonment  of  positions  hastily  or  ignorantly 
assumed,  nor  in  the  mere  attitude  of  adhering 
to  a  position  lest  there  may  be  an  appearance 
of  receding  under  compulsion.  Napoleon  I. 
phrased  the  extreme  position  of  militarism  in 
the  words,  "  If  the  British  ministry  should  inti- 
mate that  there  was  anything  the  First  Consul 


190       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


had  not  done,  because  he  was  prevented  from 
doing  it,  that  instant  he  would  do  it." 

Now  the  United  States,  speaking  by  various 
organs,  has  said,  in  language  scarcely  to  be 
misunderstood,  that  she  is  resolved  to  resort  to 
force,  if  necessary,  to  prevent  the  territorial  or 
political  extension  of  European  power  beyond 
its  present  geographical  limits  in  the  Ameri- 
can continents.  In  the  question  of  a  disputed 
boundary  she  has  held  that  this  resolve  —  de- 
pendent upon  what  she  conceives  her  reason- 
able policy  —  required  her  to  insist  that  the 
matter  should  be  submitted  to  arbitration.  If 
Great  Britain  should  see  in  this  political  stand 
the  expression  of  a  reasonable  national  policy, 
she  is  able,  by  the  training  and  habit  of  her 
leaders,  to  accept  it  as  such,  without  greatly 
troubling  over  the  effect  upon  men's  opinions 
that  may  be  produced  by  the  additional  an- 
nouncement that  the  policy  is  worth  fighting 
for,  and  will  be  fought  for  if  necessary.  It 
would  be  a  matter  of  course  for  her  to  fight 
for  her  just  interests,  if  need  be,  and  why 
should  not  another  state  say  the  same?  The 
point  —  of  honor,  if  you  like — is  not  whether 
a  nation  will  fight,  but  whether  its  claim  is 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  191 


just.  Such  an  attitude,  however,  is  not  the 
spirit  of  "militarism,"  nor  accordant  with  it; 
and  in  nations  saturated  with  the  military 
spirit,  the  intimation  that  a  policy  will  be  sup- 
ported by  force  raises  that  sort  of  point  of 
honor  behind  which  the  reasonableness  of  the 
policy  is  lost  to  sight  It  can  no  longer  be 
viewed  dispassionately ;  it  is  prejudged  by  the 
threat,  however  mildly  that  be  expressed.  And 
this  is  but  a  logical  development  of  their  insti- 
tutions. The  soldier,  or  the  state  much  of 
whose  policy  depends  upon  organized  force, 
cannot  but  resent  the  implication  that  he  or  it 
is  unable  or  unwilling  to  meet  force  with  force. 
The  life  of  soldiers  and  of  armies  is  their  spirit, 
and  that  spirit  receives  a  serious  wound  when 
it  seems  —  even  superficially  —  to  recoil  be- 
fore a  threat ;  while  with  the  weakening  of  the 
military  body  falls  an  element  of  political 
strength  which  has  no  analogue  in  Great 
Britain  or  the  United  States,  the  chief  military 
power  of  which  must  lie  ever  in  navies,  never 
an  aggressive  factor  such  as  armies  have  been. 

Now,  the  United  States  has  made  an  an- 
nouncement that  she  will  support  by  force 
a  policy  which  may  bring  her  into  collision 


192       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


with  states  of  military  antecedents,  indisposed 
by  their  interests  to  acquiesce  in  our  position, 
and  still  less  willing  to  accept  it  under  appear- 
ance of  threat  What  preparation  is  necessary 
in  case  such  a  one  is  as  determined  to  fight 
against  our  demands  as  we  to  fight  for  them  ? 

Preparation  for  war,  rightly  understood,  falls 
under  two  heads,  —  preparation  and  prepared- 
ness. The  one  is  a  question  mainly  of  ma- 
terial, and  is  constant  in  its  action.  The 
second  involves  an  idea  of  completeness. 
When,  at  a  particular  moment,  preparations 
are  completed,  one  is  prepared  —  not  other- 
wise. There  may  have  been  made  a  great 
deal  of  very  necessary  preparation  for  war 
without  being  prepared.  Every  constituent  of 
preparation  may  be  behindhand,  or  some  ele- 
ments may  be  perfectly  ready,  while  others 
are  not.  In  neither  case  can  a  state  be  said 
to  be  prepared. 

In  the  matter  of  preparation  for  war,  one 
clear  idea  should  be  absorbed  first  by  every 
one  who,  recognizing  that  war  is  still  a  possi- 
bility, desires  to  see  his  country  ready.  This 
idea  is  that,  however  defensive  in  origin  or 
in   political   character  a  war   may   be,  the 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  193 


assumption  of  a  simple  defensive  in  war  is 
ruin.  War,  once  declared,  must  be  waged 
offensively,  aggressively.  The  enemy  must  not 
be  fended  off,  but  smitten  down.  You  may 
then  spare  him  every  exaction,  relinquish  every 
gain  ;  but  till  down  he  must  be  struck  inces- 
santly and  remorselessly. 

Preparation,  like  most  other  things,  is  a 
question  both  of  kind  and  of  degree,  of  quality 
and  of  quantity.  As  regards  degree,  the 
general  lines  upon  which  it  is  determined 
have  been  indicated  broadly  in  the  preceding 
part  of  this  article.  The  measure  of  degree 
is  the  estimated  force  which  the  strongest 
probable  enemy  can  bring  against  you,  allow- 
ance being  made  for  clear  drawbacks  upon 
his  total  force,  imposed  by  his  own  embarrass- 
ments and  responsibilities  in  other  parts  of 
the  world.  The  calculation  is  partly  military, 
partly  political,  the  latter,  however,  being  the 
dominant  factor  in  the  premises. 

In  kind,  preparation  is  twofold,  —  defensive 
and  offensive.  The  former  exists  chiefly  for 
the  sake  of  the  latter,  in  order  that  offence, 
the  determining  factor  in  war,  may  put  forth 
its  full  power,  unhampered  by  concern  for  the 

13 


194       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


protection  of  the  national  interests  or  for  its 
own  resources.  In  naval  war,  coast  defence 
is  the  defensive  factor,  the  navy  the  offensive. 
Coast  defence,  when  adequate,  assures  the 
naval  commander-in-chief  that  his  base  of 
operations  —  the  dock-yards  and  coal  depots  — 
is  secure.  It  also  relieves  him  and  his  govern- 
ment, by  the  protection  afforded  to  the  chief 
commercial  centres,  from  the  necessity  of  con- 
sidering them,  and  so  leaves  the  offensive  arm 
perfectly  free. 

Coast  defence  implies  coast  attack.  To 
what  attacks  are  coasts  liable  ?  Two,  princi- 
pally, —  blockade  and  bombardment.  The  lat- 
ter, being  the  more  difficult,  includes  the 
former,  as  the  greater  does  the  lesser.  A  fleet 
that  can  bombard  can  still  more  easily  block- 
ade. Against  bombardment  the  necessary  pre- 
caution is  gun-fire,  of  such  power  and  range 
that  a  fleet  cannot  lie  within  bombarding  dis- 
tance. This  condition  is  obtained,  where  sur- 
roundings permit,  by  advancing  the  line  of 
guns  so  far  from  the  city  involved  that  bom- 
barding distance  can  be  reached  only  by 
coming  under  their  fire.  But  it  has  been 
demonstrated,  and  is  accepted,  that,  owing  to 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  195 


their  rapidity  of  movement,  —  like  a  flock  of 
birds  on  the  wing,  —  a  fleet  of  ships  can, 
without  disabling  loss,  pass  by  guns  before 
which  they  could  not  lie.  Hence  arises  the 
necessity  of  arresting  or  delaying  their  prog- 
ress by  blocking  channels,  which  in  modern 
practice  is  done  by  lines  of  torpedoes.  The 
mere  moral  effect  of  the  latter  is  a  deterrent 
to  a  dash  past, — by  which,  if  successful,  a 
fleet  reaches  the  rear  of  the  defences,  and 
appears  immediately  before  the  city,  which 
then  lies  at  its  mercy. 

Coast  defence,  then,  implies  gun-power  and 
torpedo  lines  placed  as  described.  Be  it  said 
in  passing  that  only  places  of  decisive  import- 
ance, commercially  or  militarily,  need  such 
defences.  Modern  fleets  cannot  afford  to 
waste  ammunition  in  bombarding  unimportant 
towns,  —  at  least  when  so  far  from  their  own 
base  as  they  would  be  on  our  coast.  It  is 
not  so  much  a  question  of  money  as  of  frit- 
tering their  fighting  strength.  It  would  not 
pay. 

Even  coast  defence,  however,  although  es- 
sentially passive,  should  have  an  element  of 
offensive  force,  local  in  character,  distinct  from 


196       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


the  offensive  navy,  of  which  nevertheless  it 
forms  a  part.  To  take  the  offensive  against 
a  floating  force  it  must  itself  be  afloat  — 
naval.  This  offensive  element  of  coast  de- 
fence is  to  be  found  in  the  torpedo-boat,  in 
its  various  developments.  It  must  be  kept 
distinct  in  idea  from  the  sea-going  fleet, 
although  it  is,  of  course,  possible  that  the 
two  may  act  in  concert.  The  war  very  well 
may  take  such  a  turn  that  the  sea-going 
navy  will  find  its  best  preparation  for  initiating 
an  offensive  movement  to  be  by  concentrating 
in  a  principal  seaport.  Failing  such  a  con- 
tingency, however,  and  in  and  for  coast  de- 
fence in  its  narrower  sense,  there  should  be  a 
local  flotilla  of  small  torpedo-vessels,  which 
by  their  activity  should  make  life  a  burden 
to  an  outside  enemy.  A  distinguished  British 
admiral,  now  dead,  has  said  that  he  believed 
half  the  captains  of  a  blockading  fleet  would 
break  down  —  "go  crazy"  were  the  words 
repeated  tome  —  under  the  strain  of  modern 
conditions.  The  expression,  of  course,  was  in- 
tended simply  to  convey  a  sense  of  the  im- 
mensity of  suspense  to  be  endured.  In  such 
a  flotilla,  owing  to  the  smallness  of  its  com- 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  197 


ponents,  and  to  the  simplicity  of  their  organi- 
zation and  functions,  is  to  be  found  the  best 
sphere  for  naval  volunteers  ;  the  duties  could 
be  learned  with  comparative  ease,  and  the 
whole  system  is  susceptible  of  rapid  develop- 
ment. Be  it  remembered,  however,  that  it  is 
essentially  defensive,  only  incidentally  offen- 
sive, in  character. 

Such  are  the  main  elements  of  coast  defence 
—  guns,  lines  of  torpedoes,  torpedo-boats.  Of 
these  none  can  be  extemporized,  with  the 
possible  exception  of  the  last,  and  that  would 
be  only  a  makeshift.  To  go  into  details 
would  exceed  the  limits  of  an  article, — re- 
quire a  brief  treatise.  Suffice  it  to  say,  without 
the  first  two,  coast  cities  are  open  to  bombard- 
ment ;  without  the  last,  they  can  be  blockaded 
freely,  unless  relieved  by  the  sea-going  navy. 
Bombardment  and  blockade  are  recognized 
modes  of  warfare,  subject  only  to  reasonable 
notification,  —  a  concession  rather  to  humanity 
and  equity  than  to  strict  law.  Bombardment 
and  blockade  directed  against  great  national 
centres,  in  the  close  and  complicated  net- 
work of  national  and  commercial  interests 
as  they  exist  in   modern   times,  strike  not 


198       Preparedness  for  Naval  War 


only  the  point  affected,  but  every  corner  of 
the  land. 

The  offensive  in  naval  war,  as  has  been  said, 
is  the  function  of  the  sea-going  navy  —  of  the 
battle-ships,  and  of  the  cruisers  of  various  sizes 
and  purposes,  including  sea-going  torpedo- 
vessels  capable  of  accompanying  a  fleet,  with- 
out impeding  its  movements  by  their  loss 
of  speed  or  unseaworthiness.  Seaworthiness, 
and  reasonable  speed  under  all  weather  con- 
ditions, are  qualities  necessary  to  every  con- 
stituent of  a  fleet;  but,  over  and  above  these, 
the  backbone  and  real  power  of  any  navy  are 
the  vessels  which,  by  due  proportion  of  de- 
fensive and  offensive  powers,  are  capable  of 
taking  and  giving  hard  knocks.  All  others 
are  but  subservient  to  these,  and  exist  only 
for  them. 

What  is  that  strength  to  be  ?  Ships  answer- 
ing to  this  description  are  the  kind  which  make 
naval  strength  ;  what  is  to  be  its  degree  ?  What 
their  number?  The  answer  —  a  broad  formula 
—  is  that  it  must  be  great  enough  to  take  the 
sea,  and  to  fight,  with  reasonable  chances  of 
success,  the  largest  force  likely  to  be  brought 
against  it,  as  shown  by  calculations  which  have 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  199 


been  indicated  previously.  Being,  as  we  claim, 
and  as  our  past  history  justifies  us  in  claiming, 
a  nation  indisposed  to  aggression,  unwilling  to 
extend  our  possessions  or  our  interests  by  war, 
the  measure  of  strength  we  set  ourselves  de- 
pends, necessarily,  not  upon  our  projects  of 
aggrandizement,  but  upon  the  disposition  of 
others  to  thwart  what  we  consider  our  reason- 
able policy,  which  they  may  not  so  consider. 
When  they  resist,  what  force  can  they  bring 
against  us?  That  force  must  be  naval;  we 
have  no  exposed  point  upon  which  land  opera- 
tions, decisive  in  character,  can  be  directed. 
This  is  the  kind  of  the  hostile  force  to  be 
apprehended.  What  may  its  size  be  ?  There 
is  the  measure  of  our  needed  strength.  The 
calculation  may  be  intricate,  the  conclusion 
only  approximate  and  probable,  but  it  is  the 
nearest  reply  we  can  reach.  So  many  ships  of 
such  and  such  sizes,  so  many  guns,  so  much 
ammunition — in  short,  so  much  naval  material. 

In  the  material  provisions  that  have  been 
summarized  under  the  two  chief  heads  of  de- 
fence and  offence  —  in  coast  defence  under  its 
three  principal  requirements,  guns,  lines  of 
stationary  torpedoes,  and  torpedo-boats,  and  in 


200       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


a  navy  able  to  keep  the  sea  in  the  presence  of 
a  probable  enemy  —  consist  what  may  be  called 
most  accurately  preparations  for  war.  In  so 
far  as  the  United  States  is  short  in  them,  she  is 
at  the  mercy  of  an  enemy  whose  naval  strength 
is  greater  than  that  of  her  own  available  navy. 
If  her  navy  cannot  keep  the  enemy  off  the 
coast,  blockade  at  least  is  possible.  If,  in  addi- 
tion, there  are  no  harbor  torpedo-boats,  blockade 
is  easy.  If,  further,  guns  and  torpedo  lines  are 
deficient,  bombardment  comes  within  the  range 
of  possibility,  and  may  reach  even  the  point  of 
entire  feasibility.  There  will  be  no  time  for 
preparation  after  war  begins. 

It  is  not  in  the  preparation  of  material  that 
states  generally  fall  most  short  of  being  ready 
for  war  at  brief  notice ;  for  such  preparation  is 
chiefly  a  question  of  money  and  of  manufac- 
ture, —  not  so  much  of  preservation  after  crea- 
tion. If  money  enough  is  forthcoming,  a 
moderate  degree  of  foresight  can  insure  that 
the  amount  of  material  deemed  necessary  shall 
be  on  hand  at  a  given  future  moment ;  and  a 
similar  condition  can  be  maintained  steadily. 
Losses  by  deterioration  or  expenditure,  or 
demand  for  further  increase  if  such  appear 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  201 


desirable,  can  all  be  forecast  with  reasonable 
calculations,  and  requirements  thence  arising 
can  be  made  good.  This  is  comparatively 
easy,  because  mere  material,  once  wrought  into 
shape  for  war,  does  not  deteriorate  from  its 
utility  to  the  nation  because  not  used  imme- 
diately. It  can  be  stored  and  cared  for  at  a 
relatively  small  expense,  and  with  proper  over- 
sight will  remain  just  as  good  and  just  as  ready 
for  use  as  at  its  first  production.  There  are 
certain  deductions,  a  certain  percentage  of 
impairment  to  be  allowed  for,  but  the  general 
statement  holds. 

A  very  different  question  is  confronted  in 
the  problem  how  to  be  ready  at  equally  short 
notice  to  use  this  material,  —  to  provide  in  suffi- 
cient numbers,  upon  a  sudden  call,  the  living 
agents,  without  whom  the  material  is  worthless. 
Such  men  in  our  day  must  be  especially  trained  ; 
and  not  only  so,  but  while  training  once 
acquired  will  not  be  forgot  wholly  —  stays  by 
a  man  for  a  certain  time  —  it  nevertheless  tends 
constantly  to  drop  off  from  him.  Like  all 
habits,  it  requires  continued  practice.  More- 
over, it  takes  quite  a  long  time  to  form,  in  a 
new  recruit,  not  merely  familiarity  with  the  use 


202       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


of  a  particular  weapon,  but  also  the  habit  and 
working  of  the  military  organization  of  which 
he  is  an  individual  member.  It  is  not  enough 
that  he  learn  just  that  one  part  of  the  whole 
machinery  which  falls  to  him  to  handle  ;  he 
must  be  acquainted  with  the  mutual  relations 
of  the  other  parts  to  his  own  and  to  the  whole, 
at  least  in  great  measure.  Such  knowledge  is 
essential  even  to  the  full  and  intelligent  dis- 
charge of  his  own  duty,  not  to  speak  of  the  fact 
that  in  battle  every  man  should  be  ready  to 
supply  the  place  of  another  of  his  own  class  and 
grade  who  has  been  disabled.  Unless  this  be 
so,  the  ship  will  be  very  far  short  of  her  best 
efficiency. 

Now,  to  possess  such  proficiency  in  the  hand- 
ling of  naval  material  for  war,  and  in  playing 
an  intelligent  part  in  the  general  functioning  of 
a  ship  in  action,  much  time  is  required.  Time 
is  required  to  obtain  it,  further  time  is  needed 
in  order  to  retain  it ;  and  such  time,  be  it  more 
or  less,  is  time  lost  for  other  purposes,  —  lost 
both  to  the  individual  and  to  the  community. 
When  you  have  your  thoroughly  efficient  man- 
of-war's  man,  you  cannot  store  him  as  you  do 
your  guns  and  ammunition,  or  lay  him  up  as 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  203 


you  may  your  ships,  without  his  deteriorating 
at  a  rate  to  which  material  presents  no  parallel. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  he  be  retained,  voluntarily 
or  otherwise,  in  the  naval  service,  there  ensues 
the  economical  loss  —  the  loss  of  productive 
power — which  constitutes  the  great  argument 
against  large  standing  armies  and  enforced 
military  service,  advanced  by  those  to  whom  the 
productive  energies  of  a  country  outweigh  all 
other  considerations. 

It  is  this  difficulty  which  is  felt  most  by  those 
responsible  for  the  military  readiness  of  Euro- 
pean states,  and  which  therefore  has  engaged 
their  most  anxious  attention.  The  providing 
of  material  of  war  is  an  onerous  money  ques- 
tion ;  but  it  is  simple,  and  has  some  com- 
pensation for  the  expense  in  the  resulting 
employment  of  labor  for  its  production.  It  is 
quite  another  matter  to  have  ready  the  number 
of  men  needed,  —  to  train  them,  and  to  keep 
them  so  trained  as  to  be  available  immediately. 

The  solution  is  sought  in  a  tax  upon  time  — 
upon  the  time  of  the  nation,  economically  lost 
to  production,  and  upon  the  time  of  the  indi- 
vidual, lost  out  of  his  life.  Like  other  taxes, 
the  tendency  on  all  sides  is  to  reduce  this  as 


204       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


far  as  possible,  —  to  compromise  between  ideal 
proficiency  for  probable  contingencies,  and  the 
actual  demands  of  the  existing  and  usual  con- 
ditions of  peace.  Although  inevitable,  the 
compromise  is  unsatisfactory,  and  yields  but 
partial  results  in  either  direction.  The  econo- 
mist still  deplores  and  resists  the  loss  of  pro- 
ducers, —  the  military  authorities  insist  that  the 
country  is  short  of  its  necessary  force.  To 
obviate  the  difficulty  as  far  as  possible,  to  meet 
both  of  the  opposing  demands,  resort  is  had 
to  the  system  of  reserves,  into  which  men  pass 
after  serving  in  the  active  force  for  a  period, 
which  is  reduced  to,  and  often  below,  the 
shortest  compatible  with  instruction  in  their 
duties,  and  with  the  maintenance  of  the  active 
forces  at  a  fixed  minimum.  This  instruction 
acquired,  the  recipient  passes  into  the  reserve, 
leaves  the  life  of  the  soldier  or  seaman  for  that 
of  the  citizen,  devoting  a  comparatively  brief 
time  in  every  year  to  brushing  up  the  knowl- 
edge formerly  acquired.  Such  a  system,  under 
some  form,  is  found  in  services  both  voluntary 
and  compulsory. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  such  a 
method  would  never  be  considered  satisfactory 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


205 


in  any  of  the  occupations  of  ordinary  life.  A 
man  who  learns  his  profession  or  trade,  but 
never  practises  it,  will  not  long  be  considered 
fit  for  employment.  No  kind  of  practical  prep- 
aration, in  the  way  of  systematic  instruction, 
equals  the  practical  knowledge  imbibed  in  the 
common  course  of  life.  This  is  just  as  true  of 
the  military  professions  —  the  naval  especially 
—  as  it  is  of  civil  callings ;  perhaps  even  more 
so,  because  the  former  are  a  more  unnatural, 
and  therefore,  when  attained,  a  more  highly 
specialized,  form  of  human  activity.  For  the 
very  reason  that  war  is  in  the  main  an  evil,  an 
unnatural  state,  but  yet  at  times  unavoidable, 
the  demands  upon  warriors,  when  average  men, 
are  exceptionally  exacting. 

Preparedness  for  naval  war  therefore  consists 
not  so  much  in  the  building  of  ships  and  guns 
as  it  does  in  the  possession  of  trained  men*,  in 
adequate  numbers,  fit  to  go  on  board  at  once 
and  use  the  material,  the  provision  of  which  is 
merely  one  of  the  essential  preparations  for  war. 
The  word  "  fit "  includes  fairly  all  that  detail  of 
organization  commonly  called  mobilization,  by 
which  the  movements  of  the  individual  men 
are  combined  and  directed.    But  mobilization, 


2o6       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


although  the  subjects  of  it  are  men,  is  itself  a 
piece  of  mental  machinery.  Once  devised,  it 
may  be  susceptible  of  improvement,  but  it  will 
not  become  inefficient  because  filed  away  in  a 
pigeon-hole,  any  more  than  guns  and  projectiles 
become  worthless  by  being  stored  in  their  parks 
or  magazines.  Take  care  of  the  pence  and  the 
pounds  will  take  care  of  themselves.  Provide 
your  fit  men,  —  fit  by  their  familiarity  not  only 
with  special  instruments,  but  with  a  manner  of 
life,  —  and  your  mobilization  is  reduced  to  a 
slip  of  paper  telling  each  one  where  he  is  to  go. 
He  will  get  there. 

That  a  navy,  especially  a  large  navy,  can  be 
kept  fully  manned  in  peace  —  manned  up  to 
the  requirements  of  war  —  must  be  dismissed 
as  impracticable.  If  greatly  superior  to  a  prob- 
able enemy,  it  will  be  unnecessary;  if  more 
nearly  equal,  then  the  aim  can  only  be  to  be 
superior  in  the  number  of  men  immediately 
available,  and  fit  according  to  the  standard  of 
fitness  here  generalized.  The  place  of  a  reserve 
in  any  system  of  preparation  for  war  must  be 
admitted,  because  inevitable.  The  question  of 
the  proportion  and  character  of  the  reserve, 
relatively  to  the  active  force  of  peace,  is  the 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  207 


crux  of  the  matter.  This  is  essentially  the 
question  between  long-service  and  short-service 
systems.  With  long  service  the  reserves  will 
be  fewer,  and  for  the  first  few  years  of  retire- 
ment much  more  efficient,  for  they  have  ac- 
quired, not  knowledge  only,  but  a  habit  of  life. 
With  short  service,  more  men  are  shoved 
through  the  mill  of  the  training-school.  Con- 
sequently they  pass  more  rapidly  into  the 
reserve,  are  less  efficient  when  they  get  there, 
and  lose  more  rapidly,  because  they  have 
acquired  less  thoroughly;  on  the  other  hand, 
they  will  be  decidedly  more  numerous,  on  paper 
at  least,  than  the  entire  trained  force  of  a 
long-service  system.  The  pessimists  on  either 
side  will  expound  the  dangers  — the  one,  of 
short  numbers  ;  the  others,  of  inadequate 
training. 

Long  service  must  be  logically  the  desire, 
and  the  result,  of  voluntary  systems  of  recruit- 
ing the  strength  of  a  military  force.  Where 
enrolment  is  a  matter  of  individual  choice, 
there  is  a  better  chance  of  entrance  resulting 
in  the  adoption  of  the  life  as  a  calling  to  be 
followed ;  and  this  disposition  can  be  encour- 
aged by  the  offering  of  suitable  inducements. 


2o8       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


Where  service  is  compulsory,  that  fact  alone 
tends  to  make  it  abhorrent,  and  voluntary  per- 
sistence, after  time  has  been  served,  rare.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  as  the  necessity  for  numbers 
in  war  is  as  real  as  the  necessity  of  fitness,  a 
body  where  long  service  and  small  reserves 
obtain  should  in  peace  be  more  numerous  than 
one  where  the  reserves  are  larger.  To  long 
service  and  small  reserves  a  large  standing 
force  is  the  natural  corollary.  It  may  be  added 
that  it  is  more  consonant  to  the  necessities  of 
warfare,  and  more  consistent  with  the  idea  of 
the  word  "  reserve,"  as  elsewhere  used  in  war. 
The  reserve  in  battle  is  that  portion  of  the 
force  which  is  withheld  from  engagement, 
awaiting  the  unforeseen  developments  of  the 
fight ;  but  no  general  would  think  of  carrying 
on  a  pitched  battle  with  the  smaller  part  of 
his  force,  keeping  the  larger  part  in  reserve. 
Rapid  concentration  of  effort,  anticipating  that 
of  the  enemy,  is  the  ideal  of  tactics  and  of 
strategy,  —  of  the  battle-field  and  of  tke  cam- 
paign. It  is  that,  likewise,  of  the  science  of 
mobilization,  in  its  modern  development.  The 
reserve  is  but  the  margin  of  safety,  to  compen- 
sate for  defects  in  conception  or  execution,  to 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  209 


which  all  enterprises  are  liable ;  and  it  may  be 
added  that  it  is  as  applicable  to  the  material 
force  —  the  ships,  guns,  etc.  —  as  it  is  to  the 
men. 

The  United  States,  like  Great  Britain,  de- 
pends wholly  upon  voluntary  enlistments ;  and 
both  nations,  with  unconscious  logic,  have  laid 
great  stress  upon  continuous  service,  and  com- 
paratively little  upon  reserves.  When  seamen 
have  served  the  period  which  entitles  them  to 
the  rewards  of  continuous  service,  without  fur- 
ther enlistment,  they  are,  though  still  in  the 
prime  of  life,  approaching  the  period  when  fit- 
ness, in  the  private  seaman  or  soldier,  depends 
upon  ingrained  habit  —  perfect  practical  famil- 
iarity with  the  life  which  has  been  their  one 
calling  —  rather  than  upon  that  elastic  vigor 
which  is  the  privilege  of  youth.  Should  they 
elect  to  continue  in  the  service,  there  still 
remain  some  years  in  which  they  are  an  invalu- 
able leaven,  by  character  and  tradition.  If 
they  depart,  they  are  for  a  few  years  a  reserve 
for  war  —  if  they  choose  to  come  forward  ;  but 
it  is  manifest  that  such  a  reserve  can  be  but 
small,  when  compared  with  a  system  which  in 
three  or  five  years  passes  men  through  the 


2io       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


active  force  into  the  reserve.  The  latter,  how- 
ever, is  far  less  valuable,  man  for  man.  Of 
course,  a  reserve  which  has  not  even  three 
years'  service  is  less  valuable  still. 

The  United  States  is  to  all  intents  an  insular 
power,  like  Great  Britain.  We  have  but  two 
land  frontiers,  Canada  and  Mexico.  The  latter 
is  hopelessly  inferior  to  us  in  all  the  elements 
of  military  strength.  As  regards  Canada, 
Great  Britain  maintains  a  standing  army ;  but, 
like  our  own,  its  numbers  indicate  clearly  that 
aggression  will  never  be  her  policy,  except  in 
those  distant  regions  whither  the  great  armies 
of  the  world  cannot  act  against  her,  unless  they 
first  wrench  from  her  the  control  of  the  sea. 
No  modern  state  has  long  maintained  a  su- 
premacy by  land  and  by  sea,  —  one  or  the  other 
has  been  held  from  time  to  time  by  this  or  that 
country,  but  not  both.  Great  Britain  wisely 
has  chosen  naval  powrer;  and,  independent  of 
her  reluctance  to  break  with  the  United  States 
for  other  reasons,  she  certainly  would  regret  to 
devote  to  the  invasion  of  a  nation  of  seventy 
millions  the  small  disposable  force  which  she 
maintains  in  excess  of  the  constant  require- 
ments of  her  colonial  interests.    We  are,  it 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.       2 1 1 


may  be  repeated,  an  insular  power,  dependent 
therefore  upon  a  navy. 

Durable  naval  power,  besides,  depends  ulti- 
mately upon  extensive  commercial  relations ; 
consequently,  and  especially  in  an  insular  state, 
it  is  rarely  aggressive,  in  the  military  sense. 
Its  instincts  are  naturally  for  peace,  because  it 
has  so  much  at  stake  outside  its  shores.  His- 
torically, this  has  been  the  case  with  the  con- 
spicuous example  of  sea  power,  Great  Britain, 
since  she  became  such  ;  and  it  increasingly 
tends  to  be  so.  It  is  also  our  own  case,  and  to 
a  yet  greater  degree,  because,  with  an  immense 
compact  territory,  there  has  not  been  the  dis- 
position to  external  effort  which  has  carried 
the  British  flag  all  over  the  globe,  seeking  to 
earn  by  foreign  commerce  and  distant  settle- 
ment that  abundance  of  resource  which  to  us 
has  been  the  free  gift  of  nature  —  or  of  Provi- 
dence. By  her  very  success,  however,  Great 
Britain,  in  the  vast  increase  and  dispersion  of 
her  external  interests,  has  given  hostages  to 
fortune,  which  for  mere  defence  impose  upon 
her  a  great  navy.  Our  career  has  been  differ- 
ent, our  conditions  now  are  not  identical,  yet 
our  geographical  position  and  political  con  vie- 


212       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


tions  have  created  for  us  also  external  interests 
and  external  responsibilities,  which  are  likewise 
our  hostages  to  fortune.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
roam  afar  in  search  of  adventures;  popular 
feeling  and  the  deliberate  judgment  of  states- 
men alike  have  asserted  that,  from  conditions 
we  neither  made  nor  control,  interests  beyond 
the  sea  exist,  have  sprung  up  of  themselves, 
which  demand  protection.  "  Beyond  the  sea  " 
—  that  means  a  navy.  Of  invasion,  in  any  real 
sense  of  the  word,  we  run  no  risk,  and  if  we 
did,  it  must  be  by  sea;  and  there,  at  sea,  must 
be  met  primarily,  and  ought  to  be  met  deci- 
sively, any  attempt  at  invasion  of  our  interests, 
either  in  distant  lands,  or  at  home  by  blockade 
or  by  bombardment.  Yet  the  force  of  men  in 
the  navy  is  smaller,  by  more  than  half,  than 
that  in  the  army. 

The  necessary  complement  of  those  admi- 
rable measures  which  have  been  employed  now 
for  over  a  decade  in  the  creation  of  naval  ma- 
terial is  the  preparation  of  an  adequate  force  of 
trained  men  to  use  this  material  when  com- 
pleted. Take  an  entirely  fresh  man  :  a  battle- 
ship can  be  built  and  put  in  commission  before 
he  becomes  a  trained  man-of-war's  man,  and  a 


Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  213 


torpedo-boat  can  be  built  and  ready  for  service 
before,  to  use  the  old  sea  phrase,  "  the  hay  seed 
is  out  of  his  hair."  Further,  in  a  voluntary  ser- 
vice, you  cannot  keep  your  trained  men  as  you 
can  your  completed  ship  or  gun.  The  inevita- 
ble inference  is  that  the  standing  force  must  be 
large,  because  you  can  neither  create  it  hastily 
nor  maintain  it  by  compulsion.  Having  fixed 
the  amount  of  material, —  the  numbers  and 
character  of  the  fleet,  —  from  this  follows  easily 
the  number  of  men  necessary  to  man  it.  This 
aggregate  force  can  then  be  distributed,  upon 
some  accepted  idea,  between  the  standing  navy 
and  the  reserve.  Without  fixing  a  proportion 
between  the  two,  the  present  writer  is  con- 
vinced that  the  reserve  should  be  but  a  small 
percentage  of  the  whole,  and  that  in  a  small 
navy,  as  ours,  relatively,  long  will  be,  this  is 
doubly  imperative  ;  for  the  smaller  the  navy, 
the  greater  the  need  for  constant  efficiency  to 
act  promptly,  and  the  smaller  the  expense  of 
maintenance.  In  fact,  where  quantity  —  num- 
ber—is small,  quality  should  be  all  the  more 
high.  The  quality  of  the  whole  is  a  question 
of  personnel  even  more  than  of  material ;  and 
the  quality  of  the  personnel  can  be  maintained 


214       Preparedness  for  Naval  War. 


only  by  high  individual  fitness  in  the  force, 
undiluted  by  dependence  upon  a  large,  only 
partly  efficient,  reserve  element. 

"  One  foot  on  sea  and  one  on  shore,  to  one  thing  constant 
never," 

will  not  man  the  fleet.  It  can  be  but  an  imper- 
fect palliative,  and  can  be  absorbed  effectually 
by  the  main  body  only  in  small  proportions. 
It  is  in  torpedo-boats  for  coast  defence,  and  in 
commerce-destroying  for  deep-sea  warfare,  that 
the  true  sphere  for  naval  reserves  will  be  found  ; 
for  the  duties  in  both  cases  are  comparatively 
simple,  and  the  organization  can  be  the  same. 

Every  danger  of  a  military  character  to 
which  the  United  States  is  exposed  can  be 
met  best  outside  her  own  territory  —  at  sea. 
Preparedness  for  naval  war  —  preparedness 
against  naval  attack  and  for  naval  offence  —  is 
preparedness  for  anything  that  is  likely  to 
occur. 


A  TWENTIETH-CENTURY  OUTLOOK. 


A  TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
OUTLOOK. 


May,  1897. 


INALITY,  the  close  of  a  life,  of  a  relation- 


X  ship,  of  an  era,  even  though  this  be  a  purely 
artificial  creation  of  human  arrangement,  in  all 
cases  appeals  powerfully  to  the  imagination,  and 
especially  to  that  of  a  generation  self-conscious 
as  ours,  a  generation  which  has  coined  for  itself 
the  phrase  fin  de  Steele  to  express  its  belief,  how- 
ever superficial  and  mistaken,  that  it  knows  its 
own  exponents  and  its  own  tendencies;  that, 
amid  the  din  of  its  own  progress  sounding  in 
its  ears,  it  knows  not  only  whence  it  comes  but 
whither  it  goes.  The  nineteenth  century  is 
about  to  die,  only  to  rise  again  in  the  twentieth. 
Whence  did  it  come?  How  far  has  it  gone? 
Whither  is  it  going  ? 

A  full  reply  to  such  queries  would  presume  an 
abridged  universal  history  of  the  expiring  cen- 


218       A  Twentieth- Century  Outlook. 


tury  such  as  a  magazine  article,  or  series  of  arti- 
cles, could  not  contemplate  for  a  moment.  The 
scope  proposed  to  himself  by  the  present  writer, 
itself  almost  unmanageable  within  the  necessary 
limits,  looks  not  to  the  internal  conditions  of 
states,  to  those  economical  and  social  tenden- 
cies which  occupy  so  large  a  part  of  contempo- 
rary attention,  seeming  to  many  the  sole  subjects 
that  deserve  attention,  and  that  from  the  most 
purely  material  and  fleshly  point  of  view.  Im- 
portant as  these  things  are,  it  may  be  affirmed 
at  least  that  they  are  not  everything ;  and  that, 
great  as  has  been  the  material  progress  of  the 
century,  the  changes  in  international  relations 
and  relative  importance,  not  merely  in  states 
of  the  European  family,  but  among  the  peoples 
of  the  world  at  large,  have  been  no  less  striking. 
It  is  from  this  direction  that  the  writer  wishes 
to  approach  his  subject,  which,  if  applied  to 
any  particular  country,  might  be  said  to  be 
that  of  its  external  relations ;  but  which,  in  the 
broader  view  that  it  will  be  sought  to  attain, 
regards  rather  the  general  future  of  the  world 
as  indicated  by  movements  already  begun  and 
in  progress,  as  well  as  by  tendencies  now 
dimly  discernible,  which,  if  not  counteracted, 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  219 


are  pregnant  of  further  momentous  shifting 
of  the  political  balances,  profoundly  affecting 
the  welfare  of  mankind. 

It  appears  a  convenient,  though  doubtless 
very  rough,  way  of  prefacing  this  subject  to 
say  that  the  huge  colonizing  movements  of  the 
eighteenth  century  were  brought  to  a  pause  by 
the  American  Revolution,  which  deprived  Great 
Britain  of  her  richest  colonies,  succeeded,  as  that 
almost  immediately  was,  by  the  French  Revo- 
lution and  the  devastating  wars  of  the  republic 
and  of  Napoleon,  which  forced  the  attention  of 
Europe  to  withdraw  from  external  allurements 
and  to  concentrate  upon  its  own  internal  affairs. 
The  purchase  of  Louisiana  by  the  United  States 
at  the  opening  of  the  current  century  empha- 
sized this  conclusion ;  for  it  practically  elimi- 
nated the  continent  of  North  America  from 
the  catalogue  of  wild  territories  available  for 
foreign  settlement.  Within  a  decade  this  was 
succeeded  by  the  revolt  of  the  Spanish  colo- 
nies, followed  later  by  the  pronouncements  of 
President  Monroe  and  of  Mr.  Canning,  which 
assured  their  independence  by  preventing  Euro- 
pean interference.  The  firmness  with  which 
the  position  of  the  former  statesman  has  been 


2  20       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


maintained  ever  since  by  the  great  body  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  and  the  develop- 
ments his  doctrine  afterwards  received,  have  re- 
moved the  Spanish-American  countries  equally 
from  all  probable  chance  of  further  European 
colonization,  in  the  political  sense  of  the 
word. 

Thus  the  century  opened.  Men's  energies 
still  sought  scope  beyond  the  sea,  doubtless; 
not,  however,  in  the  main,  for  the  founding  of 
new  colonies,  but  for  utilizing  ground  already 
in  political  occupation.  Even  this,  however, 
was  subsidiary.  The  great  work  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  from  nearly  its  beginning  to 
nearly  its  close,  has  been  in  the  recognition 
and  study  of  the  forces  of  nature,  and  the 
application  of  them  to  the  purposes  of  mechani- 
cal and  economical  advance.  The  means  thus 
placed  in  men's  hands,  so  startling  when  first 
invented,  so  familiar  for  the  most  part  to  us 
now,  were  devoted  necessarily,  first,  to  the 
development  of  the  resources  of  each  country. 
Everywhere  there  was  a  fresh  field ;  for  hitherto 
it  had  been  nowhere  possible  to  man  fully  to 
utilize  the  gifts  of  nature.  Energies  every- 
where turned  inward,  for  there,  in  every  region, 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook  221 


was  more  than  enough  to  do.  Naturally,  there- 
fore, such  a  period  has  been  in  the  main  one  of 
peace.  There  have  been  great  wars,  certainly ; 
but,  nevertheless,  external  peace  has  been  the 
general  characteristic  of  that  period  of  develop- 
ment, during  which  men  have  been  occupied 
in  revolutionizing  the  face  of  their  own  coun- 
tries by  means  of  the  new  powers  at  their 
disposal. 

All  such  phases  pass,  however,  as  does  every 
human  thing.  Increase  of  production  —  the 
idol  of  the  economist  —  sought  fresh  markets, 
as  might  have  been  predicted.  The  increase  of 
home  consumption,  through  increased  ease  of 
living,  increased  wealth,  increased  population, 
did  not  keep  up  with  the  increase  of  forth- 
putting  and  the  facility  of  distribution  afforded 
by  steam.  In  the  middle  of  the  century  China 
and  Japan  were  forced  out  of  the  seclusion  of 
ages,  and  were  compelled,  for  commercial  pur- 
poses at  least,  to  enter  into  relations  with  the 
European  communities,  to  buy  and  to  sell  with 
them.  Serious  attempts,  on  any  extensive  scale, 
to  acquire  new  political  possessions  abroad 
largely  ceased.  Commerce  only  sought  new 
footholds,  sure  that,  given  the  inch,  she  in  the 


222       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


end  would  have  the  ell.  Moreover,  the  growth 
of  the  United  States  in  population  and  resources, 
and  the  development  of  the  British  Australian 
colonies,  contributed  to  meet  the  demand,  of 
which  the  opening  of  China  and  Japan  was 
only  a  single  indication.  That  opening,  there- 
fore, was  rather  an  incident  of  the  general 
industrial  development  which  followed  upon 
the  improvement  of  mechanical  processes  and 
the  multiplication  of  communications. 

Thus  the  century  passed  its  meridian,  and 
began  to  decline  towards  its  close.  There  were 
wars  and  there  were  rumors  of  wars  in  the 
countries  of  European  civilization.  Dynasties 
rose  and  fell,  and  nations  shifted  their  places 
in  the  scale  of  political  importance,  as  old-time 
boys  in  school  went  up  and  down ;  but,  withal, 
the  main  characteristic  abode,  and  has  become 
more  and  more  the  dominant  prepossession  of 
the  statesmen  who  reached  their  prime  at  or 
soon  after  the  times  when  the  century  itself 
culminated.  The  maintenance  of  a  status  quo, 
for  purely  utilitarian  reasons  of  an  economical 
character,  has  gradually  become  an  ideal  —  the 
quieta  non  movere  of  Sir  Robert  Walpole.  The 
ideal  is  respectable,  certainly;  in  view  of  the 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  223 


concert  of  the  powers,  in  the  interest  of  their 
own  repose,  to  coerce  Greece  and  the  Cretans, 
we  may  perhaps  refrain  from  calling  it  noble. 
The  question  remains,  how  long  can  it  continue 
respectable  in  the  sense  of  being  practicable  of 
realization,  —  a  rational  possibility,  not  an  idle 
dream  ?  Many  are  now  found  to  say  —  and 
among  them  some  of  the  most  bitter  of  the 
advocates  of  universal  peace,  who  are  among 
the  bitterest  of  modern  disputants  —  that  when 
the  Czar  Nicholas  proposed  to  move  the  quiet 
things,  half  a  century  ago,  and  to  reconstruct 
the  political  map  of  southeastern  Europe  in  the 
interest  of  well-founded  quiet,  it  was  he  that 
showed  the  idealism  of  rational  statesmanship, 
—  the  only  truly  practical  statesmanship,  — 
while  the  defenders  of  the  status  quo  evinced 
the  crude  instincts  of  the  mere  time-serving 
politician.  That  the  latter  did  not  insure 
quiet,  even  the  quiet  of  desolation,  in  those 
unhappy  regions,  we  have  yearly  evidence. 
How  far  is  it  now  a  practicable  object,  among 
the  nations  of  the  European  family,  to  continue 
indefinitely  the  present  realization  of  peace  and 
plenty,  —  in  themselves  good  things,  but  which 
are  advocated  largely  on  the  ground  that  man 


224  Twentieth- Century  Outlook. 


lives  by  bread  alone,  —  in  view  of  the  changed 
conditions  of  the  world  which  the  departing 
nineteenth  century  leaves  with  us  as  its  be- 
quest? Is  the  outlook  such  that  our  present 
civilization,  with  its  benefits,  is  most  likely  to 
be  insured  by  universal  disarmament,  the  clamor 
for  which  rises  ominously  —  the  word  is  used 
advisedly  —  among  our  latter-day  cries  ?  None 
shares  more  heartily  than  the  writer  the  aspira- 
tion for  the  day  when  nations  shall  beat  their 
swords  into  ploughshares  and  their  spears  into 
pruning-hooks ;  but  is  European  civilization, 
including  America,  so  situated  that  it  can  afford 
to  relax  into  an  artificial  peace,  resting  not  upon 
the  working  of  national  consciences,  as  ques- 
tions arise,  but  upon  a  Permanent  Tribunal,  — 
an  external,  if  self-imposed  authority,  —  the 
realization  in  modern  policy  of  the  ideal  of  the 
mediaeval  Papacy? 

The  outlook  —  the  signs  of  the  times,  what 
are  they  ?  It  is  not  given  to  human  vision, 
peering  into  the  future,  to  see  more  than  as 
through  a  glass,  darkly ;  men  as  trees  walking, 
one  cannot  say  certainly  whither.  Yet  signs 
may  be  noted  even  if  they  cannot  be  fully  or 
precisely  interpreted ;  and  among  them  I  should 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  225 


certainly  say  is  to  be  observed  the  general  out- 
ward impulse  of  all  the  civilized  nations  of 
the  first  order  of  greatness  —  except  our  own. 
Bound  and  swathed  in  the  traditions  of  our 
own  eighteenth  century,  when  we  were  as  truly 
external  to  the  European  world  as  we  are  now  a 
part  of  it,  we,  under  the  specious  plea  of  peace 
and  plenty  —  fulness  of  bread  —  hug  an  ideal 
of  isolation,  and  refuse  to  recognize  the  soli- 
darity of  interest  with  which  the  world  of 
European  civilization  must  not  only  look  for- 
ward to,  but  go  out  to  meet,  the  future  that, 
whether  near  or  remote,  seems  to  await  it.  I 
say  we  do  so ;  I  should  more  surely  express  my 
thought  by  saying  that  the  outward  impulse 
already  is  in  the  majority  of  the  nation,  as 
shown  when  particular  occasions  arouse  their 
attention,  but  that  it  is  as  yet  retarded,  and 
may  be  retarded  perilously  long,  by  those 
whose  views  of  national  policy  are  governed 
by  maxims  framed  in  the  infancy  of  the 
Republic. 

This  outward  impulse  of  the  European 
nations,  resumed  on  a  large  scale  after  nearly 
a  century  of  intermission,  is  not  a  mere  sud- 
den appearance,  sporadic,  and  unrelated  to  the 

15 


226        A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


past.  The  signs  of  its  coming,  though  un- 
noted, were  visible  soon  after  the  century- 
reached  its  half-way  stage,  as  was  also  its 
great  correlative,  equally  unappreciated  then, 
though  obvious  enough  now,  the  stirring  of 
the  nations  of  Oriental  civilization.  It  is  a 
curious  reminiscence  of  my  own  that  when  in 
Yokohama,  Japan,  in  1868,  I  was  asked  to 
translate  a  Spanish  letter  from  Honolulu, 
relative  to  a  ship-load  of  Japanese  coolies  to 
be  imported  into  Hawaii.  I  knew  the  person 
engaged  to  go  as  physician  to  the  ship,  and, 
unless  my  memory  greatly  deceives  me,  he 
sailed  in  this  employment  while  I  was  still  in 
the  port.  Similarly,  when  my  service  on  the 
station  was  ended,  I  went  from  Yokohama  to 
Hong-kong,  prior  to  returning  home  by  way 
of  Suez.  Among  my  fellow-passengers  was 
an  ex-Confederate  naval  officer,  whose  busi- 
ness was  to  negotiate  for  an  immigration  of 
Chinese  into,  I  think,  the  Southern  States  — 
in  momentary  despair,  perhaps,  of  black  labor 
—  but  certainly  into  the  United  States.  We 
all  know  what  has  come  in  our  own  country 
of  undertakings  which  then  had  attracted  little 
attention. 


A  Twentieth- Century  Outlook.  227 


It  is  odd  to  watch  the  unconscious,  resist- 
less movements  of  nations,  and  at  the  same 
time  read  the  crushing  characterization  by  our 
teachers  of  the  press  of  those  who,  by  per- 
sonal characteristics  or  by  accident,  happen  to 
be  thrust  into  the  position  of  leaders,  when  at 
the  most  they  only  guide  to  the  least  harm 
forces  which  can  no  more  be  resisted  perma- 
nently than  can  gravitation.  Such  would  have 
been  the  role  of  Nicholas,  guiding  to  a  timely 
end  the  irresistible  course  of  events  in  the 
Balkans,  which  his  opponents  sought  to  with- 
stand, but  succeeded  only  in  prolonging  and 
aggravating.  He  is  honored  now  by  those 
who  see  folly  in  the  imperial  aspirations  of 
Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain,  and  piracy  in  Mr. 
Cecil  Rhodes ;  yet,  after  all,  in  his  day,  what 
right  had  he,  by  the  code  of  strict  construc- 
tionists of  national  legal  rights,  to  put  Turkey 
to  death  because  she  was  sick  ?  Was  not 
Turkey  in  occupation  ?  Had  she  not,  by 
strict  law,  a  right  to  her  possessions,  and  to 
live ;  yea,  and  to  administer  what  she  con- 
sidered justice  to  those  who  were  legally  her 
subjects  ?  But  men  are  too  apt  to  forget  that 
law  is  the  servant  of  equity,  and  that  while 


228       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


the  world  is  in  its  present  stage  of  develop- 
ment equity  which  cannot  be  had  by  law  must 
be  had  by  force,  upon  which  ultimately  law 
rests,  not  for  its  sanction,  but  for  its  efficacy. 

We  have  been  familiar  latterly  with  the  term 
"  buffer  states  ; "  the  pleasant  function  dis- 
charged by  Siam  between  Great  Britain  and 
France.  Though  not  strictly  analogous,  the 
term  conveys  an  idea  of  the  relations  that 
have  hitherto  obtained  between  Eastern  and 
Western  civilizations.  They  have  existed 
apart,  each  a  world  of  itself;  but  they  are 
approaching  not  only  in  geographical  propin- 
quity, a  recognized  source  of  danger,  but,  what 
is  more  important,  in  common  ideas  of  material 
advantage,  without  a  corresponding  sympathy 
in  spiritual  ideas.  It  is  not  merely  that  the 
two  are  in  different  stages  of  development 
from  a  common  source,  as  are  Russia  and 
Great  Britain.  They  are  running  as  yet  on 
wholly  different  lines,  springing  from  concep- 
tions radically  different.  To  bring  them  into 
correspondence  in  that,  the  most  important 
realm  of  ideas,  there  is  needed  on  the  one  side  ■ 
—  or  on  the  other  —  not  growth,  but  conver- 
sion.   However  far  it  has  wandered,  and  how- 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  229 


ever  short  of  its  pattern  it  has  come,  the  civi- 
lization of  modern  Europe  grew  up  under  the 
shadow  of  the  Cross,  and  what  is  best  in  it 
still  breathes  the  spirit  of  the  Crucified.  It  is 
to  be  feared  that  Eastern  thinkers  consider  it 
rather  an  advantage  than  a  detriment  that  they 
are  appropriating  the  material  progress  of 
Europe  unfettered  by  Christian  traditions,  —  \ 
as  agnostic  countries.  But,  for  the  present  at 
least,  agnosticism  with  Christian  ages  behind 
it  is  a  very  different  thing  from  agnosticism 
which  has  never  known  Christianity. 

What  will  be  in  the  future  the  dominant 
spiritual  ideas  of  those  nations  which  hitherto 
have  been  known  as  Christian,  is  scarcely  a 
question  of  the  twentieth  century.  Whatever 
variations  of  faith,  in  direction  or  in  degree, 
the  close  of  that  century  may  show,  it  is  not 
probable  that  so  short  a  period  will  reveal  the 
full  change  of  standards  and  of  practice  which 
necessarily  must  follow  ultimately  upon  a  radi- 
cal change  of  belief.  That  the  impress  of 
Christianity  will  remain  throughout  the  com- 
ing century  is  reasonably  as  certain  as  that  it 
took  centuries  of  nominal  faith  to  lift  Christian 
standards  and  practice  even  to  the  point  they 


230        A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


now  have  reached.  Decline,  as  well  as  rise, 
must  be  gradual;  and  gradual  likewise,  grant- 
ing the  utmost  possible  spread  of  Christian 
beliefs  among  them,  will  be  the  approximation 
of  the  Eastern  nations,  as  nations,  to  the  prin- 
ciples which  powerfully  modify,  though  they 
cannot  control  wholly  even  now,  the  merely 
natural  impulses  of  Western  peoples.  And 
if,  as  many  now  say,  faith  has  departed  from 
among  ourselves,  and  still  more  will  depart  in 
the  coming  years;  if  we  have  no  higher  sanc- 
tion to  propose  for  self-restraint  and  righteous- 
ness than  enlightened  self-interest  and  the 
absurdity  of  war,  war  —  violence  —  will  be 
absurd  just  so  long  as  the  balance  of  interest 
is  on  that  side,  and  no  longer.  Those  who 
want  will  take,  if  they  can,  not  merely  from 
motives  of  high  policy  and  as  legal  opportunity 
offers,  but  for  the  simple  reasons  that  they  have 
not,  that  they  desire,  and  that  they  are  able. 
The  European  world  has  known  that  stage 
already;  it  has  escaped  from  it  only  partially 
by  the  gradual  hallowing  of  public  opinion  and 
its  growing  weight  in  the  political  scale.  The 
Eastern  world  knows  not  the  same  motives, 
but  it  is  rapidly  appreciating   the  material 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  231 


advantages  and  the  political  traditions  which 
have  united  to  confer  power  upon  the  West ; 
and  with  the  appreciation  desire  has  arisen. 

Coincident  with  the  long  pause  which  the 
French  Revolution  imposed  upon  the  process 
of  external  colonial  expansion  which  was  so 
marked  a  feature  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
there  occurred  another  singular  manifestation 
of  national  energies,  in  the  creation  of  the 
great  standing  armies  of  modern  days,  them- 
selves the  outcome  of  the  levee  en  masse,  and 
of  the  general  conscription,  which  the  Revolu- 
tion bequeathed  to  us  along  with  its  expositions 
of  the  Rights  of  Man.  Beginning  with  the 
birth  of  the  century,  perfected  during  its  con- 
tinuance, its  close  finds  them  in  full  maturity 
and  power,  with  a  development  in  numbers,  in 
reserve  force,  in  organization,  and  in  material 
for  war,  over  which  the  economist  perpetually 
wails,  whose  existence  he  denounces,  and  whose 
abolition  he  demands.  As  freedom  has  grown 
and  strengthened,  so  have  they  grown  and 
strengthened.  Is  this  singular  product  of  a 
century  whose  gains  for  political  liberty  are 
undeniable,  a  mere  gross  perversion  of  human 
activities,  as  is  so  confidently  claimed  on  many 


232       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


sides  ?  or  is  there  possibly  in  it  also  a  sign  of 
the  times  to  come,  to  be  studied  in  connec- 
tion with  other  signs,  some  of  which  we  have 
noted  ? 

What  has  been  the  effect  of  these  great 
armies  ?  Manifold,  doubtless.  On  the  economi- 
cal side  there  is  the  diminution  of  production, 
the  tax  upon  men's  time  and  lives,  the  disad- 
vantages or  evils  so  dinned  daily  into  our  ears 
that  there  is  no  need  of  repeating  them  here. 
But  is  there  nothing  to  the  credit  side  of  the 
account,  even  perhaps  a  balance  in  their  favor? 
Is  it  nothing,  in  an  age  when  authority  is 
weakening  and  restraints  are  loosening,  that 
the  youth  of  a  nation  passes  through  a  school 
in  which  order,  obedience,  and  reverence  are 
learned,  where  the  body  is  systematically  devel- 
oped, where  ideals  of  self-surrender,  of  courage, 
of  manhood,  are  inculcated,  necessarily,  because 
fundamental  conditions  of  military  success  ? 
Is  it  nothing  that  masses  of  youths  out  of  the 
fields  and  the  streets  are  brought  together, 
mingled  with  others  of  higher  intellectual  an- 
tecedents, taught  to  work  and  to  act  together, 
mind  in  contact  with  mind,  and  carrying 
back  into  civil  life  that  respect  for  constituted 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  233 


authority  which  is  urgently  needed  in  these 
days  when  lawlessness  is  erected  into  a  religion  ? 
It  is  a  suggestive  lesson  to  watch  the  expres- 
sion and  movements  of  a  number  of  rustic 
conscripts  undergoing  their  first  drills,  and  to 
contrast  them  with  the  finished  result  as  seen 
in  the  faces  and  bearing  of  the  soldiers  that 
throng  the  streets.  A  military  training  is  not 
the  worst  preparation  for  an  active  life,  any 
more  than  the  years  spent  at  college  are  time 
lost,  as  another  school  of  utilitarians  insists. 
Is  it  nothing  that  wars  are  less  frequent,  peace 
better  secured,  by  the  mutual  respect  of  na- 
tions for  each  other  s  strength  ;  and  that,  when 
a  convulsion  does  come,  it  passes  rapidly,  leav- 
ing the  ordinary  course  of  events  to  resume 
sooner,  and  therefore  more  easily  ?  War  now 
not  only  occurs  more  rarely,  but  has  rather  the 
character  of  an  occasional  excess,  from  which 
recovery  is  easy.  A  century  or  more  ago  it 
was  a  chronic  disease.  And  withal,  the  mili- 
tary spirit,  the  preparedness  —  not  merely  the 
willingness,  which  is  a  different  thing  —  to 
fight  in  a  good  cause,  which  is  a  distinct  good, 
is  more  widely  diffused  and  more  thoroughly 
possessed  than  ever  it  was  when  the  soldier 


234       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


was  merely  the  paid  man.  It  is  the  nations 
now  that  are  in  arms,  and  not  simply  the  ser- 
vants of  the  king. 

In  forecasting  the  future,  then,  it  is  upon 
these  particular  signs  of  the  times  that  I 
dwell :  the  arrest  of  the  forward  impulse 
towards  political  colonization  which  coincided 
with  the  decade  immediately  preceding  the 
French  Revolution ;  the  absorption  of  the 
European  nations,  for  the  following  quarter  of 
a  century,  with  the  universal  wars,  involving 
questions  chiefly  political  and  European  ;  the 
beginning  of  the  great  era  of  coal  and  iron,  of 
mechanical  and  industrial  development,  which 
succeeded  the  peace,  and  during  which  it  was 
not  aggressive  colonization,  but  the  develop- 
ment of  colonies  already  held  and  of  new  com- 
mercial centres,  notably  in  China  and  Japan, 
that  was  the  most  prominent  feature ;  finally, 
we  have,  resumed  at  the  end  of  the  century, 
the  forward  movement  of  political  colonization 
by  the  mother  countries,  powerfully  incited 
thereto,  doubtless,  by  the  citizens  of  the  old 
colonies  in  different  parts  of  the  world.  The 
restlessness  of  Australia  and  the  Cape  Colony 
has  doubtless  counted  for  much  in  British  ad- 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  235 


vances  in  those  regions.  Contemporary  with 
all  these  movements,  from  the  first  to  the  last, 
has  been  the  development  of  great  standing 
armies,  or  rather  of  armed  nations,  in  Europe ; 
and,  lastly,  the  stirring  of  the  East,  its  entrance 
into  the  field  of  Western  interests,  not  merely 
as  a  passive  something  to  be  impinged  upon, 
but  with  a  vitality  of  its  own,  formless  yet,  but 
significant,  inasmuch  as  where  before  there 
was  torpor,  if  not  death,  now  there  is  indis- 
putable movement  and  life.  Never  again,  prob- 
ably, can  there  of  it  be  said, 

"  It  heard  the  legions  thunder  past, 
Then  plunged  in  thought  again." 

Of  this  the  astonishing  development  of  Japan 
is  the  most  obvious  evidence ;  but  in  India, 
though  there  be  no  probability  of  the  old  mu- 
tinies reviving,  there  are  signs  enough  of  the 
awaking  of  political  intelligence,  restlessness 
under  foreign  subjection,  however  beneficent, 
desire  for  greater  play  for  its  own  individuali- 
ties; a  movement  which,  because  intellectual 
and  appreciative  of  the  advantages  of  Western 
material  and  political  civilization,  is  less  imme- 
diately threatening  than  the  former  revolt,  but 
much  more  ominous  of  great  future  changes. 


236       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


Of  China  we  know  less ;  but  many  observ- 
ers testify  to  the  immense  latent  force  of  the 
Chinese  character.  It  has  shown  itself  hitherto 
chiefly  in  the  strength  with  which  it  has  ad- 
hered to  stereotyped  tradition.  But  stereo- 
typed traditions  have  been  overthrown  already 
more  than  once  even  in  this  unprogressive  peo- 
ple, whose  conservatism,  due  largely  to  igno- 
rance of  better  conditions  existing  in  other 
lands,  is  closely  allied  also  to  the  unusual  stay- 
ing powers  of  the  race,  to  the  persistence  of 
purpose,  the  endurance,  and  the  vitality  charac- 
teristic of  its  units.  To  ambition  for  individual 
material  improvement  they  are  not  insensible. 
The  collapse  of  the  Chinese  organization  in  all 
its  branches  during  the  late  war  with  Japan, 
though  greater  than  was  expected,  was  not 
unforeseen.  It  has  not  altered  the  fact  that 
the  raw  material  so  miserably  utilized  is,  in 
point  of  strength,  of  the  best ;  that  it  is  abun- 
dant, racially  homogeneous,  and  is  multiplying 
rapidly.  Nor,  with  the  recent  resuscitation  of 
the  Turkish  army  before  mens  eyes,  can  it 
be  thought  unlikely  that  the  Chinese  may  yet 
obtain  the  organization  by  which  alone  poten- 
tial force  receives  adequate  military  develop- 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook,  237 


ment,  the  most  easily  conferred  because  the 
simplest  in  conception.  The  Japanese  have 
shown  great  capacity,  but  they  met  little  resist- 
ance ;  and  it  is  easier  by  far  to  move  and  to 
control  an  island  kingdom  of  forty  millions 
than  a  vast  continental  territory  containing 
near  tenfold  that  number  of  inhabitants.  Com- 
parative slowness  of  evolution  may  be  predi- 
cated, but  that  which  for  so  long  has  kept 
China  one,  amid  many  diversities,  may  be 
counted  upon  in  the  future  to  insure  a  substan- 
tial unity  of  impulse  which,  combined  with  its 
mass,  will  give  tremendous  import  to  any 
movement  common  to  the  whole. 

To  assert  that  a  few  selected  characteristics, 
such  as  the  above,  summarize  the  entire  ten- 
dency of  a  century  of  teeming  human  life,  and 
stand  alone  among  the  signs  that  are  chiefly 
to  be  considered  in  looking  to  the  future, 
would  be  to  take  an  untenable  position.  It 
may  be  said  safely,  however,  that  these  factors, 
because  the  future  to  which  they  point  is  more 
remote,  are  less  regarded  than  others  which 
are  less  important ;  and  further,  that  those 
among  them  which  mark  our  own  day  are  also 
the  factors  whose  very  existence  is  specially 


238       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


resented,  criticised,  and  condemned  by  that 
school  of  political  thought  which  assumes  for 
itself  the  title  of  economical,  which  attained  its 
maturity,  and  still  lives,  amid  the  ideas  of  that 
stage  of  industrial  progress  coincident  with 
the  middle  of  the  century,  and  which  sees  all 
things  from  the  point  of  view  of  production 
and  of  internal  development.  Powerfully  ex- 
erted throughout  the  world,  nowhere  is  the  in- 
fluence of  this  school  so  unchecked  and  so 
injurious  as  in  the  United  States,  because, 
having  no  near  neighbors  to  compete  with  us 
in  point  of  power,  military  necessities  have 
been  to  us  not  imminent,  so  that,  like  all  dis- 
tant dangers,  they  have  received  little  regard  ; 
and  also  because,  with  our  great  resources  only 
partially  developed,  the  instinct  to  external  ac- 
tivities has  remained  dormant.  At  the  same 
period  and  from  the  same  causes  that  the 
European  world  turned  its  eyes  inward  from 
the  seaboard,  instead  of  outward,  the  people 
of  the  United  States  were  similarly  diverted 
from  the  external  activities  in  which  at  the 
beginning  of  the  century  they  had  their  wealth. 
This  tendency,  emphasized  on  the  political 
side  by  the  civil  war,  was  reinforced  and  has 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  239 


been  prolonged  by  well-known  natural  condi- 
tions. A  territory  much  larger,  far  less  re- 
deemed from  its  original  wildness,  and  with 
perhaps  even  ampler  proportionate  resources 
than  the  continent  of  Europe,  contained  a 
much  smaller  number  of  inhabitants.  Hence, 
despite  an  immense  immigration,  we  have 
lagged  far  behind  in  the  work  of  completing 
our  internal  development,  and  for  that  reason 
have  not  yet  felt  the  outward  impulse  that 
now  markedly  characterizes  the  European 
peoples.  That  we  stand  far  apart  from  the 
general  movement  of  our  race  calls  of  itself  for 
consideration. 

For  the  reasons  mentioned  it  has  been  an 
easy  but  a  short-sighted  policy,  wherever  it  has 
been  found  among  statesmen  or  among  jour- 
nalists, to  fasten  attention  purely  on  internal 
and  economical  questions,  and  to  reject,  if  not 
to  resent,  propositions  looking  towards  the 
organization  and  maintenance  of  military  force, 
or  contemplating  the  extension  of  our  national 
influence  beyond  our  own  borders,  on  the  plea 
that  we  have  enough  to  do  at  home,  —  forgetful 
that  no  nation,  as  no  man,  can  live  to  itself  or 
die  to  itself.    It  is  a  policy  in  which  we  are 


240       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


behind  our  predecessors  of  two  generations 
ago,  men  who  had  not  felt  the  deadening  in- 
fluence of  merely  economical  ideas,  because 
they  reached  manhood  before  these  attained 
the  preponderance  they  achieved  under  politi- 
cians of  the  Manchester  school ;  a  preponder- 
ance which  they  still  retain  because  the  youths 
of  that  time,  who  grew  up  under  them,  have 
not  yet  quite  passed  off  the  stage.  It  is  the 
lot  of  each  generation,  salutary  no  doubt,  to  be 
ruled  by  men  whose  ideas  are  essentially  those 
of  a  former  day.  Breaches  of  continuity  in 
national  action  are  thus  moderated  or  avoided ; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  tendency  of  such  a 
condition  is  to  blind  men  to  the  spirit  of  the 
existing  generation,  because  its  rulers  have  the 
tone  of  their  own  past,  and  direct  affairs  in 
accordance  with  it.  On  the  very  day  of  this 
writing  there  appears  in  an  American  journal 
a  slashing  contrast  between  the  action  of  Lord 
Salisbury  in  the  Cretan  business  and  the  spir- 
ited letter  of  Mr.  Gladstone  upon  the  failure  of 
the  Concert.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  both 
those  British  statesmen,  while  belonging  to 
parties  traditionally  opposed,  are  imbued  above 
all  with  the  ideas  of  the  middle  of  the  century^ 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  241 


and,  governed  by  them,  consider  the  disturb- 
ance of  quiet  the  greatest  of  all  evils.  It  is 
difficult  to  believe  that  if  Mr.  Gladstone  were 
now  in  his  prime,  and  in  power,  any  object 
would  possess  in  his  eyes  an  importance  at  all 
comparable  to  that  of  keeping  the  peace.  He 
would  feel  for  the  Greeks,  doubtless,  as  Lord 
Salisbury  doubtless  does ;  but  he  would  main- 
tain the  Concert  as  long  as  he  believed  that 
alone  would  avoid  war.  When  men  in  sym- 
pathy with  the  ideas  now  arising  among  Eng. 
lishmen  come  on  the  stage,  we  shall  see  a 
change  —  not  before. 

The  same  spirit  has  dominated  in  our  own 
country  ever  since  the  civil  war  —  a  far  more 
real  "  revolution  "  in  its  consequences  than  the 
struggle  of  the  thirteen  colonies  against  Great 
Britain,  which  in  our  national  speech  has  re- 
ceived the  name  —  forced  our  people,  both 
North  and  South,  to  withdraw  their  eyes  from 
external  problems,  and  to  concentrate  heart  and 
mind  with  passionate  fervor  upon  an  internal 
strife,  in  which  one  party  was  animated  by  the 
inspiring  hope  of  independence,  while  before 
the  other  was  exalted  the  noble  ideal  of  union. 

That  war,  however,  was  directed,  on  the  civil 

16 


242       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


side,  by  men  who  belonged  to  a  generation  even 
then  passing  away.  The  influence  of  their  own 
youth  reverted  with  the  return  of  peace,  and 
was  to  be  seen  in  the  ejection  —  by  threat  of 
force  —  of  the  third  Napoleon  from  Mexico,  in 
the  acquisition  of  Alaska,  and  in  the  negotia- 
tions for  the  purchase  of  the  Danish  islands  and 
of  Samana  Bay.  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
wisdom  of  these  latter  attempts,  —  and  the 
writer,  while  sympathizing  with  the  spirit  that 
suggested  them,  questions  it  from  a  military,  01 
rather  naval,  stand-point,  —  they  are  particu- 
larly interesting  as  indicating  the  survival  in 
elderly  men  of  the  traditions  accepted  in  their 
youth,  but  foreign  to  the  generation  then 
rapidly  coming  into  power,  which  rejected  and 
frustrated  them. 

The  latter  in  turn  is  now  disappearing,  and 
its  successors,  coming  and  to  come,  are  crowd- 
ing into  its  places.  Is  there  any  indication  of 
the  ideas  these  bring  with  them,  in  their  own 
utterances,  or  in  the  spirit  of  the  world  at 
large,  which  they  must  needs  reflect ;  or,  more 
important  perhaps  still,  is  there  any  indication 
in  the  conditions  of  the  outside  world  itself 
which  they  should  heed,  and  the  influence  of 


\ 

A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  243 


which  they  should  admit,  in  modifying  and 
shaping  their  policies,  before  these  have  be- 
come hardened  into  fixed  lines,  directive  for 
many  years  of  the  future  welfare  of  their 
people  ? 

To  all  these  questions  the  writer,  as  one  of 
the  departing  generation,  would  answer  yes ; 
but  it  is  to  the  last  that  his  attention,  possibly  by 
constitutional  bias,  is  more  naturally  directed. 
It  appears  to  him  that  in  the  ebb  and  flow  of 
human  affairs,  under  those  mysterious  im- 
pulses the  origin  of  which  is  sought  by  some 
in  a  personal  Providence,  by  some  in  laws  not 
yet  fully  understood,  we  stand  at  the  opening 
of  a  period  when  the  question  is  to  be  settled 
decisively,  though  the  issue  may  be  long  de- 
layed, whether  Eastern  or  Western  civilization 
is  to  dominate  throughout  the  earth  and  to 
control  its  future.  The  great  task  now  before 
the  world  of  civilized  Christianity,  its  great 
mission,  which  it  must  fulfil  or  perish,  is  to 
receive  into  its  own  bosom  and  raise  to  its  own 
ideals  those  ancient  and  different  civilizations 
by  which  it  is  surrounded  and  outnumbered, — 
the  civilizations  at  the  head  of  which  stand 
China,  India,  and  Japan.    This,  to  cite  the 


244       -A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


most  striking  of  the  many  forms  in  which  it  is 
presented  to  us,  is  surely  the  mission  which 
Great  Britain,  sword  ever  at  hand,  has  been  dis- 
charging towards  India;  but  that  stands  not 
alone.  The  history  of  the  present  century  has 
been  that  of  a  constant  increasing  pressure  of 
our  own  civilization  upon  these  older  ones,  till 
now,  as  we  cast  our  eyes  in  any  direction,  there 
is  everywhere  a  stirring,  a  rousing  from  sleep, 
drowsy  for  the  most  part,  but  real,  unorganized 
as  yet,  but  conscious  that  that  wrhich  rudely  in- 
terrupts their  dream  of  centuries  possesses  over 
them  at  least  two  advantages, — power  and 
material  prosperity,  —  the  things  which  un- 
spiritual  humanity,  the  world  over,  most  craves. 

What  the  ultimate  result  will  be  it  would  be 
vain  to  prophesy,  —  the  data  for  a  guess  even  are 
not  at  hand ;  but  it  is  not  equally  impossible  to 
note  present  conditions,  and  to  suggest  present 
considerations,  which  may  shape  proximate 
action,  and  tend  to  favor  the  preponderance  of 
that  form  of  civilization  which  we  cannot  but 
deem  the  most  promising  for  the  future,  not  of 
our  race  only,  but  of  the  world  at  large.  We 
are  not  living  in  a  perfect  world,  and  we  may 
not  expect  to  deal  with  imperfect  conditions 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  245 


by  methods  ideally  perfect.  Time  and  staying 
power  must  be  secured  for  ourselves  by  that 
rude  and  imperfect,  but  not  ignoble,  arbiter, 
force, — force  potential  and  force  organized, — 
which  so  far  has  won,  and  still  secures,  the 
greatest  triumphs  of  good  in  the  checkered  his- 
tory of  mankind.  Our  material  advantages, 
once  noted,  will  be  recognized  readily  and  ap- 
propriated with  avidity;  while  the  spiritual 
ideas  which  dominate  our  thoughts,  and  are 
weighty  in  their  influence  over  action,  even  with 
those  among  us  who  do  not  accept  historic 
Christianity  or  the  ordinary  creeds  of  Christen- 
dom, will  be  rejected  for  long.  The  eternal 
law,  first  that  which  is  natural,  afterwards  that 
which  is  spiritual,  will  obtain  here,  as  in  the 
individual,  and  in  the  long  history  of  our  own 
civilization.  Between  the  two  there  is  an  in- 
terval, in  which  force  must  be  ready  to  redress 
any  threatened  disturbance  of  an  equal  balance 
between  those  who  stand  on  divergent  planes  of 
thought,  without  common  standards. 

And  yet  more  is  this  true  if,  as  is  commonly 
said,  faith  is  failing  among  ourselves,  if  the  prog- 
ress of  our  own  civilization  is  towards  the  loss 
of  those  spiritual  convictions  upon  which  it  was 


246       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


founded,  and  which  in  early  days  were  mighty 
indeed  towards  the  overthrowing  of  strongholds 
of  evil.  What,  in  such  a  case,  shall  play  the 
tremendous  part  which  the  Church  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  with  all  its  defects  and  with  all 
the  shortcomings  of  its  ministers,  played  amid 
the  ruin  of  the  Roman  Empire  and  the  flood 
of  the  barbarians  ?  If  our  own  civilization  is 
becoming  material  only,  a  thing  limited  in  hope 
and  love  to  this  world,  I  know  not  what  we 
have  to  offer  to  save  ourselves  or  others ;  but  in 
either  event,  whether  to  go  down  finally  under 
a  flood  of  outside  invasion,  or  whether  to  suc- 
ceed, by  our  own  living  faith,  in  converting  to 
our  ideal  civilization  those  who  shall  thus  press 
upon  us, — in  either  event  we  need  time,  and 
time  can  be  gained  only  by  organized  material 
force. 

Nor  is  this  view  advanced  in  any  spirit  of 
unfriendliness  to  the  other  ancient  civilizations, 
whose  genius  admittedly  has  been  and  is  foreign 
to  our  own.  One  who  believes  that  God  has 
made  of  one  blood  all  nations  of  men  who  dwell 
on  the  face  of  the  whole  earth  cannot  but  check 
and  repress,  if  he  ever  feels,  any  movement  of 
aversion  to  mankind  outside  his  own  race.  But 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  247 


it  is  not  necessary  to  hate  Carthage  in  order  to 
admit  that  it  was  well  for  mankind  that  Rome 
triumphed;  and  we  at  this  day,  and  men  to  all 
time,  may  be  thankful  that  a  few  decades  after 
the  Punic  Wars  the  genius  of  Caesar  so  ex- 
panded the  bounds  of  the  dominions  of  Rome, 
so  extended,  settled,  and  solidified  the  outworks 
of  her  civilization  and  polity,  that  when  the 
fated  day  came  that  her  power  in  turn  should 
reel  under  the  shock  of  conquest,  with  which 
she  had  remodelled  the  world,  and  she  should 
go  down  herself,  the  time  of  the  final  fall  was  pro- 
tracted for  centuries  by  these  exterior  defences. 
They  who  began  the  assault  as  barbarians 
entered  upon  the  imperial  heritage  no  longer 
aliens  and  foreigners,  but  impregnated  already 
with  the  best  of  Roman  ideas,  converts  to 
Roman  law  and  to  Christian  faith. 

"  When  the  course  of  history,"  says  Moinm- 
sen,  "turns  from  the  miserable  monotony  of 
the  political  selfishness  which  fought  its  battles 
in  the  Senate  House  and  in  the  streets  of 
Rome,  we  may  be  allowed  —  on  the  threshold 
of  an  event  the  effects  of  which  still  at  the 
present  day  influence  the  destinies  of  the 
world  —  to  look  round  us  for  a  moment,  and  to 


248       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


indicate  the  point  of  view  under  which  the  con- 
quest of  what  is  now  France  by  the  Romans, 
and  their  first  contact  with  the  inhabitants  of 
Germany  and  of  Great  Britain,  are  to  be  re- 
garded in  connection  with  the  general  history 
of  the  world.  .  .  .  The  fact  that  the  great  Cel- 
tic people  were  ruined  by  the  transalpine  wars 
of  Caesar  was  not  the  most  important  result  of 
that  grand  enterprise,  —  far  more  momentous 
than  the  negative  was  the  positive  result.  It 
hardly  admits  of  a  doubt  that  if  the  rule  of  the 
Senate  had  prolonged  its  semblance  of  life  for 
some  generations  longer,  the  migration  of  the 
peoples,  as  it  is  called,  would  have  occurred  four 
hundred  years  sooner  than  it  did,  and  would 
have  occurred  at  a  time  when  the  Italian  civili- 
zation had  not  become  naturalized  either  in 
Gaul  or  on  the  Danube  or  in  Africa  and  Spain. 
Inasmuch  as  Caesar  with  sure  glance  perceived 
in  the  German  tribes  the  rival  antagonists  of 
the  Romano-Greek  world,  inasmuch  as  with 
firm  hand  he  established  the  new  system  of 
aggressive  defence  down  even  to  its  details,  and 
taught  men  to  protect  the  frontiers  of  the  em- 
pire by  rivers  or  artificial  ramparts,  to  colonize 
the  nearest  barbarian  tribes  along  the  frontier 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  249 


with  the  view  of  warding  off  the  more  remote, 
and  to  recruit  the  Roman  army  by  enlistment 
from  the  enemy's  country,  he  gained  for  the 
Hellenic-Italian  culture  the  interval  necessary 
to  civilize  the  West,  just  as  it  had  already  civ- 
ilized the  East.  .  .  .  Centuries  elapsed  before 
men  understood  that  Alexander  had  not  merely 
erected  an  ephemeral  kingdom  in  the  East,  but 
had  carried  Hellenism  to  Asia ;  centuries  again 
elapsed  before  men  understood  that  Caesar  had 
not  merely  conquered  a  new  province  for  the 
Romans,  but  had  laid  the  foundation  for  the 
Romanizing  of  the  regions  of  the  West.  It 
was  only  a  late  posterity  that  perceived  the 
meaning  of  those  expeditions  to  England  and 
Germany,  so  inconsiderate  in  a  military  point 
of  view,  and  so  barren  of  immediate  result.  .  .  . 
That  there  is  a  bridge  connecting  the  past  glory 
of  Hellas  and  Rome  with  the  prouder  fabric  of 
modern  history ;  that  western  Europe  is  Ro- 
manic, and  Germanic  Europe  classic ;  that  the 
names  of  Themistocles  and  Scipio  have  to 
us  a  very  different  sound  from  those  of  Asoka 
and  Salmanassar;  that  Homer  and  Sophocles 
are  not  merely  like  the  Vedas  and  Kalidasa, 
attractive  to  the  literary  botanist,  but  bloom 


250       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


for  us  in  our  own  garden,  —  all  this  is  the  work 
of  Caesar." 

History  at  times  reveals  her  foresight  con- 
crete in  the  action  of  a  great  individuality  like 
Caesars.  More  often  her  profounder  move- 
ments proceed  from  impulses  whose  origin  and 
motives  cannot  be  traced,  although  a  succes- 
sion of  steps  may  be  discerned  and  their  re- 
sults stated.  A  few  names,  for  instance, 
emerge  amid  the  obscure  movements  of  the 
peoples  which  precipitated  the  outer  peoples 
upon  the  Roman  Empire,  but,  with  rare  excep- 
tions, they  are  simply  exponents,  pushed  for- 
ward and  upward  by  the  torrent ;  at  the 
utmost  guides,  not  controllers,  of  those  whom 
they  represent  but  do  not  govern.  It  is  much 
the  same  now.  The  peoples  of  European  civi- 
lization, after  a  period  of  comparative  repose, 
are  again  advancing  all  along  the  line,  to 
occupy  not  only  the  desert  places  of  the  earth, 
but  the  debatable  grounds,  the  buffer  terri- 
tories, which  hitherto  have  separated  them 
from  those  ancient  nations,  with  whom  they 
now  soon  must  stand  face  to  face  and  border 
to  border.  But  who  will  say  that  this  vast 
general   movement   represents    the  thought, 


A  Twentieth- Century  Outlook.  251 


even  the  unconscious  thought,  of  any  one  man, 
as  Caesar,  or  of  any  few  men  ?  To  whatever 
cause  we  may  assign  it,  whether  to  the  simple 
conception  of  a  personal  Divine  Monarchy 
that  shapes  our  ends,  or  to  more  complicated 
ultimate  causes,  the  responsibility  rests  upon 
the  shoulders  of  no  individual  men.  Necessity 
is  laid  upon  the  peoples,  and  they  move,  like 
the  lemmings  of  Scandinavia ;  but  to  man, 
being  not  without  understanding  like  the 
beasts  that  perish,  it  is  permitted  to  ask, 
"Whither?"  and  "What  shall  be  the  end 
hereof  ?  "  Does  this  tend  to  universal  peace, 
general  disarmament,  and  treaties  of  perma- 
nent arbitration?  Is  it  the  harbinger  of  ready 
mutual  understanding,  of  quick  acceptance  of, 
and  delight  in,  opposing  traditions  and  habits 
of  life  and  thought  ?  Is  such  quick  acceptance 
found  now  where  Easterns  and  Westerns  im- 
pinge ?  Does  contact  forebode  the  speedy  dis- 
appearance of  great  armies  and  navies,  and 
dictate  the  wisdom  of  dispensing  with  that 
form  of  organized  force  which  at  present  is 
embodied  in  them? 

What,  then,  will  be  the  actual  conditions 
when  these  civilizations,  of  diverse  origin  and 


252        A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


radically  distinct,  —  because  the  evolution  of 
racial  characteristics  radically  different,  —  con- 
front each  other  without  the  interposition  of 
any  neutral  belt,  by  the  intervention  of  which 
the  contrasts,  being  more  remote,  are  less 
apparent,  and  within  which  distinctions  shade 
one  into  the  other? 

There  will  be  seen,  on  the  one  hand,  a  vast 
preponderance  of  numbers,  and  those  numbers, 
however  incoherent  now  in  mass,  composed 
of  units  which  in  their  individual  capacity 
have  in  no  small  degree  the  great  elements 
of  strength  whereby  man  prevails  over  man 
and  the  fittest  survives.  Deficient,  apparently, 
in  aptitude  for  political  and  social  organization, 
they  have  failed  to  evolve  the  aggregate  power 
and  intellectual  scope  of  which  as  communi- 
ties they  are  otherwise  capable.  This  lesson 
too  they  may  learn,  as  they  already  have  learned 
from  us  much  that  they  have  failed  themselves 
to  originate  ;  but  to  the  lack  of  it  is  chiefly 
due  the  inferiority  of  material  development 
under  which,  as  compared  to  ourselves,  they 
now  labor.  But  men  do  not  covet  less  the 
prosperity  which  they  themselves  cannot  or 
do  not  create,     a  trait  wherein  lies  the  strength 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  253 


of  communism  as  an  aggressive  social  force. 
Communities  which  want  and  cannot  have, 
except  by  force,  will  take  by  force,  unless 
they  are  restrained  by  force  ;  nor  will  it  be 
unprecedented  in  the  history  of  the  world 
that  the  flood  of  numbers  should  pour  over 
and  sweep  away  the  barriers  which  intelligent 
foresight,  like  Caesars,  may  have  erected 
against  them.  Still  more  will  this  be  so  if 
the  barriers  have  ceased  to  be  manned  —  for- 
saken or  neglected  by  men  in  whom  the  proud 
combative  spirit  of  their  ancestors  has  given 
way  to  the  cry  for  the  abandonment  of  mili- 
tary preparation  and  to  the  decay  of  warlike 
habits. 

Nevertheless,  even  under  such  conditions, 
—  which  obtained  increasingly  during  the  de- 
cline of  the  Roman  Empire,  —  positions  suit- 
ably chosen,  frontiers  suitably  advanced,  will 
do  much  to  retard  and,  by  gaining  time,  to 
modify  the  disaster  to  the  one  party,  and 
to  convert  the  general  issue  to  the  benefit  of 
the  world.  Hence  the  immense  importance 
of  discerning  betimes  what  the  real  value  of 
positions  is,  and  where  occupation  should 
betimes  begin.    Here,  in  part  at  least,  is  the 


254       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


significance  of  the  great  outward  movement 
of  the  European  nations  to-day.  Consciously 
or  unconsciously,  they  are  advancing  the  out- 
posts of  our  civilization,  and  accumulating 
the  line  of  defences  which  will  permit  it  to 
survive,  or  at  the  least  will  insure  that  it 
shall  not  go  down  till  it  has  leavened  the 
character  of  the  world  for  a  future  brighter 
even  than  its  past,  just  as  the  Roman  civiliza- 
tion inspired  and  exalted  its  Teutonic  con- 
querors, and  continues  to  bless  them  to  this 
day. 

Such  is  the  tendency  of  movement  in  that 
which  we  in  common  parlance  call  the  Old 
World.  As  the  nineteenth  century  closes,  the 
tide  has  already  turned  and  the  current  is 
flowing  strongly.  It  is  not  too  soon,  for  vast 
is  the  work  before  it.  Contrasted  to  the  out- 
side world  in  extent  and  population,  the  civili- 
zation of  the  European  group  of  families, 
to  which  our  interests  and  anxieties,  our  hopes 
and  fears,  are  so  largely  confined,  has  been 
as  an  oasis  in  a  desert.  The  seat  and  scene 
of  the  loftiest  culture,  of  the  highest  intellectual 
activities,  it  is  not  in  them  so  much  that  it  has 
exceeded  the  rest  of  the  world  as  in  the  politi- 


A  Twentieth- Century  Outlook.  255 


cal  development  and  material  prosperity  which 
it  has  owed  to  the  virile  energies  of  its  sons, 
alike  in  commerce  and  in  war.  To  these 
energies  the  mechanical  and  scientific  acquire- 
ments of  the  past  half-century  or  more  have 
extended  means  whereby  prosperity  has  in- 
creased manifold,  as  have  the  inequalities  in 
material  well-being  existing  between  those  with- 
in its  borders  and  those  without,  who  have  not 
had  the  opportunity  or  the  wit  to  use  the 
same  advantages.  And  along  with  this  pre- 
eminence in  wealth  arises  the  cry  to  disarm, 
as  though  the  race,  not  of  Europe  only,  but 
of  the  world,  were  already  run,  and  the  goal 
of  universal  peace  not  only  reached  but  se- 
cured. Yet  are  conditions  such,  even  within 
our  favored  borders,  that  we  are  ready  to  dis- 
band the  particular  organized  manifestation 
of  physical  force  which  we  call  the  police? 

Despite  internal  jealousies  and  friction  on 
the  continent  of  Europe,  perhaps  even  because 
of  them,  the  solidarity  of  the  European  family 
therein  contained  is  shown  in  this  great 
common  movement,  the  ultimate  beneficence 
of  which  is  beyond  all  doubt,  as  evidenced  by 
the  British  domination  in  India  and  Egypt, 


256       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


and  to  which  the  habit  of  arms  not  only  con- 
tributes, but  is  essential.  India  and  Egypt 
are  at  present  the  two  most  conspicuous, 
though  they  are  not  the  sole,  illustrations  of 
benefits  innumerable  and  lasting,  which  rest 
upon  the  power  of  the  sword  in  the  hands 
of  enlightenment  and  justice.  It  is  possible, 
of  course,  to  confuse  this  conclusion,  to  ob- 
scure the  real  issue,  by  dwelling  upon  details 
of  wrongs  at  times  inflicted,  of  blunders  often 
made.  Any  episode  in  the  struggling  progress 
of  humanity  may  be  thus  perplexed;  but  look- 
ing at  the  broad  result,  it  is  indisputable  that 
the  vast  gains  to  humanity  made  in  the 
regions  named  not  only  once  originated,  but 
still  rest,  upon  the  exertion  and  continued 
maintenance  of  organized  physical  force. 

The  same  general  solidarity  as  against  the 
outside  world,  which  is  unconsciously  mani- 
fested in  the  general  resumption  of  colonizing 
movements,  receives  particular  conscious  ex- 
pression in  the  idea  of  imperial  federation, 
which,  amid  the  many  buffets  and  reverses 
common  to  all  successful  movements,  has 
gained  such  notable  ground  in  the  sentiment 
of  the  British  people  and  of  their  colonists. 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  257 


That  immense  practical  difficulties  have  to  be 
overcome,  in  order  to  realize  the  ends  towards 
which  such  sentiments  point,  is  but  a  common- 
place of  human  experience  in  all  ages  and 
countries.  They  give  rise  to  the  ready  sneer 
of  impossible,  just  as  any  project  of  extending 
the  sphere  of  the  United  States,  by  annexation 
or  otherwise,  is  met  by  the  constitutional  lion 
in  the  path,  which  the  unwilling  or  the  appre- 
hensive is  ever  sure  to  find;  yet,  to  use  words 
of  one  who  never  lightly  admitted  impossibili- 
ties, "  If  a  thing  is  necessary  to  be  done,  the 
more  difficulties,  the  more  necessary  to  try 
to  remove  them."  As  sentiment  strengthens, 
it  undermines  obstacles,  and  they  crumble 
before  it. 

The  same  tendency  is  shown  in  the  undeni- 
able disposition  of  the  British  people  and  of 
British  statesmen  to  cultivate  the  good-will  of 
the  United  States,  and  to  draw  closer  the  rela- 
tions between  the  two  countries.  For  the 
disposition  underlying  such  a  tendency  Mr.  Bal- 
four has  used  an  expression,  "  race  patriotism," 
—  a  phrase  which  finds  its  first  approximation, 
doubtless,  in  the  English-speaking  family,  but 
which  may  well  extend  its  embrace,  in  a  time 

17 


258       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


yet  distant,  to  all  those  who  have  drawn  their 
present  civilization  from  the  same  remote 
sources.  The  phrase  is  so  pregnant  of  solution 
for  the  problems  of  the  future,  as  conceived  by 
the  writer,  that  he  hopes  to  see  it  obtain  the 
currency  due  to  the  value  of  the  idea  which  it 
formulates.  That  this  disposition  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain,  towards  her  colonies  and 
towards  the  United  States,  shows  sound  policy 
as  well  as  sentiment,  may  be  granted  readily ; 
but  why  should  sound  policy,  the  seeking  of 
one's  own  advantage,  if  by  open  and  honest 
means,  be  imputed  as  a  crime  ?  In  democra- 
cies, however,  policy  cannot  long  dispute  the 
sceptre  with  sentiment.  That  there  is  luke- 
warm response  in  the  United  States  is  due  to 
that  narrow  conception  which  grew  up  with 
the  middle  of  the  century,  whose  analogue  in 
Great  Britain  is  the  Little  England  party,  and 
which  in  our  own  country  would  turn  all  eyes 
inward,  and  see  no  duty  save  to  ourselves. 
How  shall  two  walk  together  except  they  be 
agreed  ?  How  shall  there  be  true  sympathy 
between  a  nation  whose  political  activities  are 
world-wide,  and  one  that  eats  out  its  heart  in 
merely  internal  political  strife  ?     When  we 


A  Twentieth- Century  Outlook.  259 


begin  really  to  look  abroad,  and  to  busy  our- 
selves with  our  duties  to  the  world  at  large  in 
our  generation  —  and  not  before  —  we  shall 
stretch  out  our  hands  to  Great  Britain,  realiz- 
ing that  in  unity  of  heart  among  the  English- 
speaking  races  lies  the  best  hope  of  humanity 
in  the  doubtful  days  ahead. 

In  the  determination  of  the  duties  of  nations, 
nearness  is  the  most  conspicuous  and  the  most 
general  indication.  Considering  the  American 
states  as  members  of  the  European  family,  as 
they  are  by  traditions,  institutions,  and  lan- 
guages, it  is  in  the  Pacific,  where  the  westward 
course  of  empire  again  meets  the  East,  that 
their  relations  to  the  future  of  the  world 
become  most  apparent.  The  Atlantic,  bor- 
dered on  either  shore  by  the  European  family 
in  the  strongest  and  most  advanced  types  of  its 
political  development,  no  longer  severs,  but 
binds  together,  by  all  the  facilities  and  abun- 
dance of  water  communications,  the  once 
divided  children  of  the  same  mother;  the  in- 
heritors of  Greece  and  Rome,  and  of  the  Teu- 
tonic conquerors  of  the  latter.  A  limited 
express  or  a  flying  freight  may  carry  a  few  pas- 
sengers or  a  small  bulk  overland  from  the 


260       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  more  rapidly  than 
modern  steamers  can  cross  the  former  ocean, 
but  for  the  vast  amounts  in  numbers  or  in 
quantity  which  are  required  for  the  full  fruition 
of  communication,  it  is  the  land  that  divides, 
and  not  the  sea.  On  the  Pacific  coast,  severed 
from  their  brethren  by  desert  and  mountain 
range,  are  found  the  outposts,  the  exposed  pio- 
neers of  European  civilization,  whom  it  is  one 
of  the  first  duties  of  the  European  family  to 
bind  more  closely  to  the  main  body,  and  to 
protect,  by  due  foresight  over  the  approaches 
to  them  on  either  side. 

It  is  in  this  political  fact,  and  not  in  the 
weighing  of  merely  commercial  advantages, 
that  is  to  be  found  the  great  significance  of  the 
future  canal  across  the  Central  American  isth- 
mus, as  well  as  the  importance  of  the  Carib- 
bean Sea;  for  the  latter  is  inseparably  intwined 
with  all  international  consideration  of  the  isth- 
mus problem.  Wherever  situated,  whether  at 
Panama  or  at  Nicaragua,  the  fundamental 
meaning  of  the  canal  will  be  that  it  advances 
by  thousands  of  miles  the  frontiers  of  European 
civilization  in  general,  and  of  the  United  States 
in  particular;  that  it  knits  together  the  whole 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  261 


system  of  American  states  enjoying  that  civili- 
zation as  in  no  other  way  they  can  be  bound. 
In  the  Caribbean  Archipelago  —  the  very  do- 
main of  sea  power,  if  ever  region  could  be 
called  so  —  are  the  natural  home  and  centre  of 
those  influences  by  which  such  a  maritime 
highway  as  a  canal  must  be  controlled,  even  as 
the  control  of  the  Suez  Canal  rests  in  the 
Mediterranean.  Hawaii,  too,  is  an  outpost  of 
the  canal,  as  surely  as  Aden  or  Malta  is  of 
Suez;  or  as  Malta  was  of  India  in  the  days 
long  before  the  canal,  when  Nelson  proclaimed 
that  in  that  point  of  view  chiefly  was  it  impor- 
tant to  Great  Britain.  In  the  cluster  of  island 
fortresses  of  the  Caribbean  is  one  of  the  great- 
est of  the  nerve  centres  of  the  whole  body  of 
European  civilization;  and  it  is  to  be  regretted 
that  so  serious  a  portion  of  them  now  is  in 
hands  which  not  only  never  have  given,  but  to 
all  appearances  never  can  give,  the  development 
which  is  required  by  the  general  interest. 

For  what  awaits  us  in  the  future,  in  common 
with  the  states  of  Europe,  is  not  a  mere  ques- 
tion of  advantage  or  disadvantage  —  of  more 
or  less.  Issues  of  vital  moment  are  involved. 
A  present  generation  is  trustee  for  its  succes- 


262       A  Twentieth- Century  Outlook. 


sors,  and  may  be  faithless  to  its  charge  quite 
as  truly  by  inaction  as  by  action,  by  omission 
as  by  commission.  Failure  to  improve  oppor- 
tunity, where  just  occasion  arises,  may  entail 
upon  posterity  problems  and  difficulties  which, 
if  overcome  at  all  —  it  may  then  be  too  late  — 
will  be  so  at  the  cost  of  blood  and  tears  that 
timely  foresight  might  have  spared.  Such 
preventive  measures,  if  taken,  are  in  no  true 
sense  offensive  but  defensive.  Decadent  con- 
ditions, such  as  we  observe  in  Turkey  —  and 
not  in  Turkey  alone — cannot  be  indefinitely 
prolonged  by  opportunist  counsels  or  timid 
procrastination.  A  time  comes  in  human 
affairs,  as  in  physical  ailments,  when  heroic 
measures  must  be  used  to  save  the  life  of  a 
patient  or  the  welfare  of  a  community ;  and  if 
that  time  is  allowed  to  pass,  as  many  now 
think  that  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean 
war,  the  last  state  is  worse  than  the  first,  —  an 
opinion  which  these  passing  days  of  the  hesi- 
tancy of  the  Concert  and  the  anguish  of 
Greece,  not  to  speak  of  the  Armenian  outrages, 
surely  indorse.  Europe,  advancing  in  distant 
regions,  still  allows  to  exist  in  her  own  side, 
unexcised,  a  sore  that  may  yet  drain  her  life- 


/ 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  263 


blood  ;  still  leaves  in  recognized  dominion,  over 
fair  regions  of  great  future  import,  a  system 
whose  hopelessness  of  political  and  social  im- 
provement the  lapse  of  time  renders  continu- 
ally more  certain,  —  an  evil  augury  for  the 
future,  if  a  turning  tide  shall  find  it  unchanged, 
an  outpost  of  barbarism  ready  for  alien  oc- 
cupation. 

It  is  essential  to  our  own  good,  it  is  yet  more 
essential  as  part  of  our  duty  to  the  common- 
wealth of  peoples  to  which  we  racially  belong, 
that  we  look  with  clear,  dispassionate,  but 
resolute  eyes  upon  the  fact  that  civilizations  on 
different  planes  of  material  prosperity  and 
progress,  with  different  spiritual  ideals,  and 
with  very  different  political  capacities,  are  fast 
closing  together.  It  is  a  condition  not  unpre- 
cedented in  the  history  of  the  world.  When 
it  befell  a  great  united  empire,  enervated  by 
long  years  of  unwarlike  habits  among  its  chief 
citizens,  it  entailed  ruin,  but  ruin  deferred 
through  centuries,  thanks  to  the  provision 
made  beforehand  by  a  great  general  and  states- 
man. The  Saracenic  and  Turkish  invasions, 
on  the  contrary,  after  generations  of  advance, 
were  first  checked,  and  then  rolled  back;  for 


264       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


they  fell  upon  peoples,  disunited  indeed  by 
internal  discords  and  strife,  like  the  nations  of 
Europe  to-day,  but  still  nations  of  warriors, 
ready  by  training  and  habit  to  strike  for  their 
rights,  and,  if  need  were,  to  die  for  them.  In 
the  providence  of  God,  along  with  the  immense 
increase  of  prosperity,  of  physical  and  mental 
luxury,  brought  by  this  century,  there  has 
grown  up  also  that  counterpoise  stigmatized  as 
u  militarism,"  which  has  converted  Europe  into 
a  great  camp  of  soldiers  prepared  for  war.  The 
ill-timed  cry  for  disarmament,  heedless  of  the 
menacing  possibilities  of  the  future,  breaks  idly 
against  a  great  fact,  which  finds  its  sufficient 
justification  in  present  conditions,  but  which 
is,  above  all,  an  unconscious  preparation  for 
something  as  yet  noted  but  by  few. 

On  the  side  of  the  land,  these  great  armies, 
and  the  blind  outward  impulse  of  the  Euro- 
pean peoples,  are  the  assurance  that  genera- 
tions must  elapse  ere  the  barriers  can  be 
overcome  behind  which  rests  the  citadel  of 
Christian  civilization.  On  the  side  of  the  sea 
there  is  no  state  charged  with  weightier  re- 
sponsibilities than  the  United  States.  In  the 
Caribbean,  the  sensitive  resentment   by  our 


A  Twentieth- Century  Outlook,  265 


people  of  any  supposed  fresh  encroachment  by 
another  state  of  the  European  family  has  been 
manifested  too  plainly  and  too  recently  to 
admit  of  dispute.  Such  an  attitude  of  itself 
demands  of  us  to  be  ready  to  support  it  by 
organized  force,  exactly  as  the  mutual  jealousy 
of  states  within  the  European  Continent  im- 
poses upon  them  the  maintenance  of  their  great 
armies  —  destined,  we  believe,  in  the  future,  to 
fulfil  a  nobler  mission.  Where  we  thus  ex- 
elude  others,  we  accept  for  ourselves  the 
responsibility  for  that  which  is  due  to  the  gen- 
eral family  of  our  civilization ;  and  the  Carib- 
bean Sea,  with  its  isthmus,  is  the  nexus  where 
will  meet  the  chords  binding  the  East  to  the 
West,  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific. 

The  Isthmus,  with  all  that  depends  upon  it, — 
its  canal  and  its  approaches  on  either  hand, — 
will  link  the  eastern  side  of  the  American  conti- 
nent to  the  western  as  no  network  of  land  com- 
munications ever  can.  In  it  the  United  States 
has  asserted  a  special  interest.  In  the  present 
she  can  maintain  her  claim,  and  in  the  future 
perform  her  duty,  only  by  the  creation  of  that 
sea  power  upon  which  predominance  in  the 
Caribbean  must  ever  depend.    In  short,  as  the 


266       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


internal  jealousies  of  Europe,  and  the  purely 
democratic  institution  of  the  levee  en  masse  — 
the  general  enforcement  of  military  training  — 
have  prepared  the  way  for  great  national  armies, 
whose  mission  seems  yet  obscure,  so  the  gradual 
broadening  and  tightening  hold  upon  the  senti- 
ment of  American  democracy  of  that  conviction 
loosely  characterized  as  the  Monroe  doctrine 
finds  its  logical  and  inevitable  outcome  in  a 
great  sea  power,  the  correlative,  in  connection 
with  that  of  Great  Britain,  of  those  armies 
which  continue  to  flourish  under  the  most 
popular  institutions,  despite  the  wails  of  econo- 
mists and  the  lamentations  of  those  who  wish 
peace  without  paying  the  one  price  which  alone 
has.  ever  insured  peace,  —  readiness  for  war. 

Thus  it  was,  while  readiness  for  war  lasted, 
that  the  Teuton  was  held  back  until  he  became 
civilized,  humanized,  after  the  standard  of  that 
age;  till  the  root  of  the  matter  was  in  him,  sure 
to  bear  fruit  in  due  season.  He  was  held  back 
by  organized  armed  force  —  by  armies.  Will 
it  be  said  that  that  was  in  a  past  barbaric  age  ? 
Barbarism,  however,  is  not  in  more  or  less 
material  prosperity,  or  even  political  develop- 
ment, but  in  the  inner  man,  in  the  spiritual 


A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  267 


ideal ;  and  the  material,  which  comes  first  and 
has  in  itself  no  salt  of  life  to  save  from  corrup- 
tion, must  be  controlled  by  other  material  forces, 
until  the  spiritual  can  find  room  and  time  to 
germinate.  We  need  not  fear  but  that  that 
which  appeals  to  the  senses  in  our  civilization 
will  be  appropriated,  even  though  it  be  neces- 
sary to  destroy  us,  if  disarmed,  in  order  to  ob- 
tain it.  Our  own  civilization  less  its  spiritual 
element  is  barbarism;  and  barbarism  will  be  the 
civilization  of  those  who  assimilate  its  material 
progress  without  imbibing  the  indwelling  spirit. 

Let  us  worship  peace,  indeed,  as  the  goal  at 
which  humanity  must  hope  to  arrive;  but  let 
us  not  fancy  that  peace  is  to  be  had  as  a  boy 
wrenches  an  unripe  fruit  from  a  tree.  Nor  will 
peace  be  reached  by  ignoring  the  conditions 
that  confront  us,  or  by  exaggerating  the  charms 
of  quiet,  of  prosperity,  of  ease,  and  by  contrast- 
ing these  exclusively  with  the  alarms  and 
horrors  of  war.  Merely  utilitarian  arguments 
have  never  convinced  nor  converted  mankind, 
and  they  never  will ;  for  mankind  knows  that 
there  is  something  better.  Its  homage  will 
never  be  commanded  by  peace,  presented  as  the 
tutelary  deity  of  the  stock-market. 


268       A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook. 


Nothing  is  more  ominous  for  the  future  of  our 
race  than  that  tendency,  vociferous  at  present, 
which  refuses  to  recognize  in  the  profession  of 
arms,  in  war,  that  something  which  inspired 
Wordsworth's  "  Happy  Warrior,"  which  soothed 
the  dying  hours  of  Henry  Lawrence,  who  framed 
the  ideals  of  his  career  on  the  poet's  concep- 
tion, and  so  nobly  illustrated  it  in  his  self- 
sacrifice  ;  that  something  which  has  made  the 
soldier  to  all  ages  the  type  of  heroism  and 
of  self-denial.  When  the  religion  of  Christ,  of 
Him  who  was  led  as  a  lamb  to  the  slaughter, 
seeks  to  raise  before  its  followers  the  image  of 
self-control,  and  of  resistance  to  evil,  it  is  the 
soldier  whom  it  presents.  He  Himself,  if  by 
office  King  of  Peace,  is,  first  of  all,  in  the 
essence  of  His  Being,  King  of  Righteousness, 
without  which  true  peace  cannot  be. 

Conflict  is  the  condition  of  all  life,  material 
and  spiritual ;  and  it  is  to  the  soldier's  expe- 
rience that  the  spiritual  life  goes  for  its  most 
vivid  metaphors  and  its  loftiest  inspirations. 
Whatever  else  the  twentieth  century  may  bring 
us,  it  will  not,  from  anything  now  current  in 
the  thought  of  the  nineteenth,  receive  a  nobler 
ideal. 


THE  STRATEGIC  FEATURES  OF  THE 
GULF  OF  MEXICO  AND  THE 
CARIBBEAN  SEA. 


rHE  STRATEGIC  FEATURES  OF  THE  GULF 
OF  MEXICO  AND  THE  CARIBBEAN  SEA. 


June,  1897. 


HE  importance,  absolute  and  relative,  of 


X  portions  of  the  earth's  surface,  and  their 
consequent  interest  to  mankind,  vary  from 
time  to  time.  The  Mediterranean  was  for 
many  ages  the  centre  round  which  gathered 
all  the  influences  and  developments  of  those 
earlier  civilizations  from  which  our  own,  medi- 
ately or  immediately,  derives.  During  the  cha- 
otic period  of  struggle  that  intervened  between 
their  fall  and  the  dawn  of  our  modern  condi- 
tions, the  Inland  Sea,  through  its  hold  upon 
the  traditions  and  culture  of  antiquity,  still 
retained  a  general  ascendency,  although  at 
length  its  political  predominance  was  chal- 
lenged, and  finally  overcome,  by  the  younger, 
more  virile,  and  more  warlike  nationalities  that 
had  been  forming  gradually  beyond  the  Alps, 
and  on  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic  and  North- 


272     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


ern  oceans.  It  was,  until  the  close  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  the  one  route  by  which  the  East 
and  the  West  maintained  commercial  relations; 
for,  although  the  trade  eastward  from  the  Le- 
vant was  by  long  and  painful  land  journeys, 
over  mountain  range  and  desert  plain,  water 
communication,  in  part  and  up  to  that  point, 
was  afforded  by  the  Mediterranean,  and  by  it 
alone.  With  the  discovery  of  the  passage  by 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  this  advantage  de- 
parted, while  at  the  same  instant  the  discovery 
of  a  New  World  opened  out  to  the  Old  new 
elements  of  luxury  and  a  new  sphere  of  am- 
bition. Then  the  Mediterranean,  thrown  upon 
its  own  productive  resources  alone,  swayed  in 
the  East  by  the  hopeless  barbarism  of  the 
Turk,  in  the  West  by  the  decadent  despotism 
of  Spain,  and,  between  the  two,  divided  among 
a  number  of  petty  states,  incapable  of  united 
and  consequently  of  potent  action,  sank  into 
a  factor  of  relatively  small  consequence  to  the 
onward  progress  of  the  world.  During  the 
wars  of  the  French  Revolution,  when  the  life 
of  Great  Britain,  and  consequently  the  issue 
of  the  strife,  depended  upon  the  vigor  of  British 
commerce,    British   merchant   shipping  was 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  2J3 


nearly  driven  from  that  sea ;  and  but  two  per 
cent  of  a  trade  that  was  increasing  mightily  all 
the  time  was  thence  derived.  How  the  Suez 
Canal  and  the  growth  of  the  Eastern  Question, 
in  its  modern  form,  have  changed  all  that,  it  is 
needless  to  say.  Yet,  through  all  the  period 
of  relative  insignificance,  the  relations  of  the 
Mediterranean  to  the  East  and  to  the  West, 
in  the  broad  sense  of  those  expressions,  pre- 
served to  it  a  political  importance  to  the  world 
at  large  which  rendered  it  continuously  a  scene 
of  great  political  ambitions  and  military  enter- 
prise. Since  Great  Britain  first  actively  inter- 
vened in  those  waters,  two  centuries  ago,  she 
at  no  time  has  surrendered  willingly  her  pre- 
tensions to  be  a  leading  Mediterranean  Power, 
although  her  possessions  there  are  of  purely 
military,  or  rather  naval,  value. 

The  Caribbean  Sea  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
taken  together,  form  an  inland  sea  and  an 
archipelago.  They  too  have  known  those  mu- 
tabilities of  fortune  which  receive  illustration 
alike  in  the  history  of  countries  and  in  the 
lives  of  individuals.  The  first  scene  of  dis- 
covery and  of  conquest  in  the  New  World, 

these  twin  sheets  of  water,  with  their  islands 

18 


274     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


and  their  mainlands,  became  for  many  gener 
ations,  and  nearly  to  our  own  time,  a  veritable 
El  Dorado,  —  a  land  where  the  least  of  labor, 
on  the  part  of  its  new  possessors,  rendered  the 
largest  and  richest  returns.  The  bounty  of 
nature,  and  the  ease  with  which  climatic  con- 
ditions, aided  by  the  unwarlike  character  of 
most  of  the  natives,  adapted  themselves  to  the 
institution  of  slavery,  insured  the  cheap  and 
abundant  production  of  articles  which,  when 
once  enjoyed,  men  found  indispensable,  as  they 
already  had  the  silks  and  spices  of  the  East 
In  Mexico  and  in  Peru  were  realized  also,  in 
degree,  the  actual  gold-mine  sought  by  the 
avarice  of  the  earlier  Spanish  explorers ;  while 
a  short  though  difficult  tropical  journey 
brought  the  treasures  of  the  west  coast  across 
the  Isthmus  to  the  shores  of  the  broad  ocean, 
nature's  great  highway,  which  washed  at  once 
the  shores  of  Old  and  of  New  Spain.  From  the 
Caribbean,  Great  Britain,  although  her  rivals 
had  anticipated  her  in  the  possession  of  the 
largest  and  richest  districts,  derived  nearly 
twenty-five  per  cent  of  her  commerce,  during 
the  strenuous  period  when  the  Mediterranean 
contributed  but  two  per  cent. 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  275 


But  over  these  fair  regions  too  passed  the 
blight,  not  of  despotism  merely,  for  despotism 
was  characteristic  of  the  times,  but  of  a  des- 
potism which  found  no  counteractive,  no  ele- 
ment of  future  deliverance,  in  the  temperament 
or  in  the  political  capacities  of  the  people  over 
whom  it  ruled.  Elizabeth,  as  far  as  she  dared, 
was  a  despot ;  Philip  II.  was  a  despot;  but 
there  was  already  manifest  in  her  subjects, 
while  there  was  not  in  his,  a  will  and  a  power 
not  merely  to  resist  oppression,  but  to  organize 
freedom.  This  will  and  this  power,  after  gain- 
ing many  partial  victories  by  the  way,  culmi- 
nated once  for  all  in  the  American  Revolution. 
Great  Britain  has  never  forgotten  the  lesson 
then  taught ;  for  it  was  one  she  herself  had 
been  teaching  for  centuries,  and  her  people 
and  statesmen  were  therefore  easy  learners. 
A  century  and  a  quarter  has  passed  since 
that  warning  was  given,  not  to  Great  Britain 
only,  but  to  the  world;  and  we  to-day  see, 
in  the  contrasted  colonial  systems  °f  the 
two  states,  the  results,  on  the  one  hand  of 
political  aptitude,  on  the  other  of  political 
obtuseness  and  backwardness,  which  cannot 
struggle  from  the  past  into  the  present  until 


2  J 6     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


the  present  in  turn  has  become  the  past  — 
irreclaimable. 

Causes  superficially  very  diverse  but  essen- 
tially the  same,  in  that  they  arose  from  and 
still  depend  upon  a  lack  of  local  political  ca- 
pacity, have  brought  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  Caribbean,  in  our  own  time,  to  similar  con- 
ditions, regarded  as  quantities  of  interest  in 
the  sphere  of  international  relations.  What- 
ever the  intrinsic  value  of  the  two  bodies  of 
water,  in  themselves  or  in  their  surroundings,- 
whatever  their  present  contributions  to  the 
prosperity  or  to  the  culture  of  mankind,  their 
conspicuous  characteristics  now  are  their  politi- 
cal and  military  importance,  in  the  broadest 
sense,  as  concerning  not  only  the  countries 
that  border  them,  but  the  world  at  large.  Both 
are  land-girt  seas;  both  are  links  in  a  chain  of 
communication  between  an  East  and  a  West  ; 
in  both  the  chain  is  broken  by  an  isthmus  ; 
both  are  of  contracted  extent  when  compared 
with  great  oceans,  and.  in  consequence  of  these 
common  features,  both  present  in  an  intensified 
form  the  advantages  and  the  limitations,  politi- 
cal and  military,  which  condition  the  influence 
of  sea  power.    This  conclusion  is  notably  true 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  277 


of  the  Mediterranean,  as  is  shown  by  its  his- 
tory. It  is  even  more  forcibly  true  of  the  Car- 
ibbean, partly  because  the  contour  of  its  shores 
does  not,  as  in  the  Mediterranean  peninsulas, 
thrust  the  power  of  the  land  so  far  and  so  sus- 
tainedly  into  the  sea ;  partly  because,  from  his- 
torical antecedents  already  alluded  to,  in  the 
character  of  the  first  colonists,  and  from  the 
shortness  of  the  time  the  ground  has  been  in 
civilized  occupation,  there  does  not  exist  in 
the  Caribbean  or  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  — 
apart  from  the  United  States  —  any  land  power 
at  all  comparable  with  those  great  Continental 
states  of  Europe  whose  strength  lies  in  their 
armies  far  more  than  in  their  navies.  So  far 
as  national  inclinations,  as  distinct  from  the 
cautious  actions  of  statesmen,  can  be  discerned, 
in  the  Mediterranean  at  present  the  Sea 
Powers,  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy,  are 
opposed  to  the  Land  Powers,  Germany,  Aus- 
tria, and  Russia ;  and  the  latter  dominate 
action.  It  cannot  be  so,  in  any  near  future,  in 
the  Caribbean.  As  affirmed  in  a  previous 
paper,  the  Caribbean  is  pre-eminently  the  do- 
main of  sea  power.  It  is  in  this  point  of  view 
—  the  military  or  naval  —  that  it  is  now  to 


278     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


be  considered.  Its  political  importance  will  be 
assumed,  as  recognized  by  our  forefathers,  and 
enforced  upon  our  own  attention  by  the  sud- 
den apprehensions  awakened  within  the  last 
two  years. 

It  may  be  well,  though  possibly  needless,  to 
ask  readers  to  keep  clearly  in  mind  that  the 
Caribbean  Sea  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  while 
knit  together  like  the  Siamese  twins,  are  dis- 
tinct geographical  entities.  A  leading  British 
periodical  once  accused  the  writer  of  calling 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  the  Caribbean  Sea,  because 
of  his  unwillingness  to  admit  the  name  of  any 
other  state  in  connection  with  a  body  of  water 
over  which  his  own  country  claimed  predom- 
inance. The  Gulf  of  Mexico  is  very  clearly 
defined  by  the  projection,  from  the  north,  of 
the  peninsula  of  Florida,  and  from  the  south, 
of  that  of  Yucatan.  Between  the  two  the 
island  of  Cuba  interposes  for  a  distance  of  two 
hundred  miles,  leaving  on  one  side  a  passage 
of  nearly  a  hundred  miles  wide  — the  Strait 
of  Florida  —  into  the  Atlantic,  while  on  the 
other,  the  Yucatan  Channel,  somewhat  broader, 
leads  into  the  Caribbean  Sea.  It  may  be  men- 
tioned here,  as  an  important  military  consider- 


\ 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  279 

ation,  that  from  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi 
westward  to  Cape  Catoche- — the  tip  of  the 
Yucatan  Peninsula  —  there  is  no  harbor  that 
can  be  considered  at  all  satisfactory  for  ships 
of  war  of  the  larger  classes.  The  existence  of 
many  such  harbors  in  other  parts  of  the  regions 
now  under  consideration  practically  eliminates 
this  long  stretch  of  coast,  regarded  as  a  factor 
of  military  importance  in  the  problem  be- 
fore us. 

In  each  of  these  sheets  of  water,  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  and  the  Caribbean,  there  is  one 
position  of  pre-eminent  commercial  impor- 
tance. In  the  Gulf  the  mouth  of  the  Missis- 
sippi is  the  point  where  meet  all  the  exports 
and  imports,  by  water,  of  the  Mississippi  Val- 
ley. However  diverse  the  directions  from 
which  they  come,  or  the  destinations  to  which 
they  proceed,  all  come  together  here  as  at  a 
great  crossroads,  or  as  the  highways  of  an 
empire  converge  on  the  metropolis.  Whatever 
value  the  Mississippi  and  the  myriad  miles  of 
its  subsidiary  water-courses  represent  to  the 
United  States,  as  a  facile  means  of  commu- 
nication from  the  remote  interior  to  the  ocean 
highways  of  the  world,  all  centres  here  at  the 


280     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


mouth  of  the  river.  The  existence  of  the 
smaller  though  important  cities  of  the  Gulf 
coast —  Mobile,  Galveston,  or  the  Mexican  ports 
—  does  not  diminish,  but  rather  emphasizes  by 
contrast,  the  importance  of  the  Mississippi 
entrance.  They  all  share  its  fortunes,  in  that 
all  alike  communicate  with  the  outside  world 
through  the  Strait  of  Florida  or  the  Yucatan 
Channel. 

In  the  Caribbean,  likewise,  the  existence  of 
numerous  important  ports,  and  a  busy  traffic 
in  tropical  produce  grown  within  the  region 
itself,  do  but  make  more  striking  the  predom- 
inance in  interest  of  that  one  position  known 
comprehensively,  but  up  to  the  present  some- 
what indeterminately,  as  the  Isthmus.  Here 
again  the  element  of  decisive  value  is  the  cross- 
ing of  the  roads,  the  meeting  of  the  ways, 
which,  whether  imposed  by  nature  itself,  as  in 
the  cases  before  us,  or  induced,  as  sometimes 
happens,  in  a  less  degree,  by  simple  human  dis- 
positions, are  prime  factors  in  mercantile  or 
strategic  consequence.  For  these  reasons  the 
Isthmus,  even  under  the  disadvantages  of  land 
carriage  and  transshipment  of  goods,  has  ever 
been  an  important  link  in  the  communications 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  281 


from  East  to  West,  from  the  days  of  the  first 
discoverers  and  throughout  all  subsequent  cen- 
turies, though  fluctuating  in  degree  from  age  to 
age ;  but  when  it  shall  be  pierced  by  a  canal,  it 
will  present  a  maritime  centre  analogous  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi.  They  will  differ  in 
this,  that  in  the  latter  case  the  converging 
water  routes  on  one  side  are  interior  to  a  great 
state  whose  resources  they  bear,  whereas  the 
roads  which  on  either  side  converge  upon  the 
Isthmus  lie  wholly  upon  the  ocean,  the  common 
possession  of  all  nations.  Control  of  the  lat- 
ter, therefore,  rests  either  upon  local  control 
of  the  Isthmus  itself,  or,  indirectly,  upon  con- 
trol of  its  approaches,  or  upon  a  distinctly  pre- 
ponderant navy.  In  naval  questions  the  latter 
is  always  the  dominant  factor,  exactly  as  on 
land  the  mobile  army  —  the  army  in  the  field 
- —  must  dominate  the  question  of  fortresses, 
unless  war  is  to  be  impotent. 

We  have  thus  the  two  centres  round  which 
revolve  all  the  military  study  of  the  Caribbean 
Sea  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  two  sheets 
of  water,  taken  together,  control  or  affect  the 
approaches  on  one  side  to  these  two  supreme 
centres  of  commercial,  and  therefore  of  political 


282     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


and  military,  interest.  The  approaches  on  the 
other  side  —  the  interior  communications  of 
the  Mississippi,  that  is,  or  the  maritime  routes 
in  the  Pacific  converging  upon  the  Isthmus  — 
do  not  here  concern  us.  These  approaches,  in 
terms  of  military  art,  are  known  as  the  "  com- 
munications." Communications  are  probably 
the  most  vital  and  determining  element  in 
strategy,  military  or  naval.  They  are  literally 
the  most  radical ;  for  all  military  operations 
depend  upon  communications,  as  the  fruit  of 
a  plant  depends  upon  communication  with  its 
root.  We  draw  therefore  upon  the  map  the 
chief  lines  by  which  communication  exists  be- 
tween these  two  centres  and  the  outside  world. 
Such  lines  represent  the  mutual  dependence 
of  the  centres  and  the  exterior,  by  which  each 
ministers  to  the  others,  and  by  severance  of 
which  either  becomes  useless  to  the  others.  It 
is  from  their  potential  effect  upon  these  lines 
of  communication  that  all  positions  in  the  Gulf 
or  the  Caribbean  derive  their  military  value,  or 
want  of  value. 

It  is  impossible  to  precede  or  to  accom- 
pany a  discussion  of  this  sort  with  a  technical 
exposition  of  naval  strategy.    Such  definitions 


I 

Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  283 

of  the  art  as  may  be  needed  must  be  given  in 
loco,  cursorily  and  dogmatically.  Therefore  it 
will  be  said  here  briefly  that  the  strategic  value 
of  any  position,  be  it  body  of  land  large  or  small, 
or  a  seaport,  or  a  strait,  depends,  1,  upon  situa- 
tion (with  reference  chiefly  to  communications), 

2,  upon  its  strength  (inherent  or  acquired),  and, 

3,  upon  its  resources  (natural  or  stored).  As 
strength  and  resources  are  matters  which  man 
can  accumulate  where  suitable  situation  offers, 
whereas  he  cannot  change  the  location  of  a 
place  in  itself  otherwise  advantageous,  it  is 
upon  situation  that  attention  must  primarily  be 
fixed.  Strength  and  resources  may  be  artifi- 
cially supplied  or  increased,  but  it  passes  the 
power  of  man  to  move  a  port  which  lies  out- 
side the  limits  of  strategic  effect.  Gibraltar 
in  mid-ocean  might  have  fourfold  its  present 
power,  yet  would  be  valueless  in  a  military 
sense. 

The  positions  which  are  indicated  on  the 
map  by  the  dark  squares  have  been  selected, 
therefore,  upon  these  considerations,  after  a 
careful  study  of  the  inherent  advantages  of  the 
various  ports  and  coast-lines  of  the  Caribbean 
Sea  and  the  Gulf.    It  is  by  no  means  meant 


284     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


that  there  are  not  others  which  possess  merits 
of  various  kinds ;  or  that  those  indicated,  and 
to  be  named,  exhaust  the  strategic  possibilities 
of  the  region  under  examination.  But  there 
are  qualifying  circumstances  of  degree  in  par- 
ticular cases ;  and  a  certain  regard  must  be  had 
to  political  conditions,  which  may  be  said  to 
a  great  extent  to  neutralize  some  positions. 
Some,  too,  are  excluded  because  overshadowed 
by  others  so  near  and  so  strong  as  practically 
to  embrace  them,  when  under  the  same  politi- 
cal tenure.  Moreover,  it  is  a  commonplace 
of  strategy  that  passive  positions,  fortified 
places,  however  strong,  although  indispensable 
as  supports  to  military  operations,  should  not 
be  held  in  great  number.  To  do  so  wastes 
force.  Similarly,  in  the  study  of  a  field  of 
maritime  operations,  the  number  of  available 
positions,  whose  relative  and  combined  influ- 
ence upon  the  whole  is  to  be  considered,  should 
be  narrowed,  by  a  process  of  gradual  elimina- 
tion, to  those  clearly  essential  and  representa- 
tive. To  embrace  more  confuses  the  attention, 
wastes  mental  force,  and  is  a  hindrance  to  cor- 
rect appreciation.  The  rejection  of  details, 
where  permissible,  and  understandingly  done, 


I 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  285 

facilitates  comprehension,  which  is  baffled  by  a 
multiplication  of  minutiae,  just  as  the  impres- 
sion of  a  work  of  art,  or  of  a  story,  is  lost  amid 
a  multiplicity  of  figures  or  of  actors.  The  in- 
vestigation precedent  to  formulation  of  ideas 
must  be  close  and  minute,  but  that  done,  the 
unbiassed  selection  of  the  most  important, 
expressed  graphically  by  a  few  lines  and  a  few 
dots,  leads  most  certainly  to  the  comprehension 
of  decisive  relations  in  a  military  field  of  action. 

In  the  United  States,  Pensacola  and  the 
Mississippi  River  have  been  rivals  for  the  pos- 
session of  a  navy-yard.  The  recent  decision 
of  a  specially  appointed  board  in  favor  of  the 
latter,  while  it  commands  the  full  assent  of  the 
writer,  by  no  means  eliminates  the  usefulness 
of  the  former.  Taken  together,  they  fulfil  a 
fair  requirement  of  strategy,  sea  and  land,  that 
operations  based  upon  a  national  frontier, 
which  a  coast-line  is,  should  not  depend  upon 
a  single  place  only.  They  are  closer  together 
than  ideal  perfection  would  wish  ;  too  easily, 
therefore,  to  be  watched  by  an  enemy  without 
great  dispersal  of  his  force,  which  Norfolk  and 
New  York,  for  instance,  are  not ;  but  still,  con- 
jointly, they  are  the  best  we  can  do  on  that 


286     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


line,  having  regard  to  the  draught  of  water  for 
heavy  ships.  Key  West,  an  island  lying  off 
the  end  of  the  Florida  Peninsula,  has  long 
been  recognized  as  the  chief,  and  almost  the 
only,  good  and  defensible  anchorage  upon  the 
Strait  of  Florida,  reasonable  control  of  which 
is  indispensable  to  water  communication  be- 
tween our  Atlantic  and  Gulf  seaboards  in  time 
of  war.  In  case  of  war  in  the  direction  of  the 
Caribbean,  Key  West  is  the  extreme  point  now 
in  our  possession  upon  which,  granting  ade- 
quate fortification,  our  fleets  could  rely  ;  and, 
so  used,  it  would  effectually  divert  an  enemy's 
force  from  Pensacola  and  the  Mississippi.  It 
can  never  be  the  ultimate  base  of  operations, 
as  Pensacola  or  New  Orleans  can,  because  it 
is  an  island,  a  small  island,  and  has  no  re- 
sources —  not  even  water ;  but  for  the  daily 
needs  of  a  fleet  —  coal,  ammunition,  etc.  —  it 
can  be  made  most  effective.  Sixty  miles  west 
of  it  stands  an  antiquated  fortress  on  the  Dry 
Tortugas.  These  are  capable  of  being  made 
a  useful  adjunct  to  Key  West,  but  at  present 
they  scarcely  can  be  so  considered.  Key  West 
is  550  miles  distant  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  1200  from  the  Isthmus. 


/ 

Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  287 

The  islands  of  Santa  Lucia  and  of  Marti- 
nique have  been  selected  because  they  represent 
the  chief  positions  of,  respectively,  Great  Brit- 
ain and  France  on  the  outer  limits  of  the 
general  field  under  consideration.  For  the 
reasons  already  stated,  Grenada,  Barbadoes, 
Dominica,  and  the  other  near  British  islands 
are  not  taken  into  account,  or  rather  are  con- 
sidered to  be  embraced  in  Santa  Lucia,  which 
adequately  represents  them.  If  a  secondary 
position  on  that  line  were  required,  it  would 
be  at  Antigua,  which  would  play  to  Santa 
Lucia  the  part  which  Pensacola  does  to  the 
Mississippi.  In  like  manner  the  French  Gua- 
deloupe merges  in  Martinique.  The  intrinsic 
importance  of  these  positions  consists  in  the 
fact  that,  being  otherwise  suitable  and  properly 
defended,  they  are  the  nearest  to  the  mother- 
countries,  between  whom  and  themselves  there 
lies  no  point  of  danger  near  which  it  is  neces- 
sary to  pass.  They  have  the  disadvantage  of 
being  very  small  islands,  consequently  without 
adequate  natural  resources,  and  easy  to  be 
blockaded  on  all  sides.  They  are  therefore 
essentially  dependent  for  their  usefulness  in 
war  upon  control  of  the  sea,  which  neither 


288    Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


Pensacola  nor  New  Orleans  is,  having  the  con- 
tinent at  their  backs. 

It  is  in  this  respect  that  the  pre-eminent  in- 
trinsic advantages  of  Cuba,  or  rather  of  Spain 
in  Cuba,  are  to  be  seen ;  and  also,  but  in  much 
less  degree,  those  of  Great  Britain  in  Jamaica. 
Cuba,  though  narrow  throughout,  is  over  six 
hundred  miles  long,  from  Cape  San  Antonio 
to  Cape  Maysi.  It  is,  in  short,  not  so  much 
an  island  as  a  continent,  susceptible,  under 
proper  development,  of  great  resources  —  of 
self-sufficingness.  In  area  it  is  half  as  large 
again  as  Ireland,  but,  owing  to  its  peculiar  form, 
is  much  more  than  twice  as  long.  Marine  dis- 
tances, therefore,  are  drawn  out  to  an  extreme 
degree.  Its  many  natural  harbors  concentrate 
themselves,  to  a  military  examination,  into 
three  principal  groups,  whose  representatives 
are,  in  the  west,  Havana;  in  the  east,  Santi- 
ago ;  while  near  midway  of  the  southern  shore 
lies  Cienfuegos.  The  shortest  water  distance 
separating  any  two  of  these  is  335  miles,  from 
Santiago  to  Cienfuegos.  To  get  from  Cienfue- 
gos to  Havana  450  miles  of  water  must  be 
traversed  and  the  western  point  of  the  island 
doubled ;  yet  the  two  ports  are  distant  by  land 


I 

Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  289 

only  a  little  more  than  a  hundred  miles  of 
fairly  easy  country.  Regarded,  therefore,  as  a 
base  of  naval  operations,  as  a  source  of  sup 
plies  to  a  fleet,  Cuba  presents  a  condition 
wholly  unique  among  the  islands  of  the  Carib- 
bean and  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico ;  to  both  which 
it,  and  it  alone  of  all  the  archipelago,  belongs. 
It  is  unique  in  its  size,  which  should  render  it 
largely  self-supporting,  either  by  its  own  prod- 
ucts, or  by  the  accumulation  of  foreign  neces- 
saries which  naturally  obtains  in  a  large  and 
prosperous  maritime  community;  and  it  is 
unique  in  that  such  supplies  can  be  conveyed 
from  one  point  to  the  other,  according  to  the 
needs  of  a  fleet,  by  interior  lines,  not  exposed  to 
risks  of  maritime  capture.  The  extent  of  the 
coast-line,  the  numerous  harbors,  and  the  many 
directions  from  which  approach  can  be  made, 
minimize  the  dangers  of  total  blockade,  to 
which  all  islands  are  subject.  Such  conditions 
are  in  themselves  advantageous,  but  they  are 
especially  so  to  a  navy  inferior  to  its  adversary, 
for  they  convey  the  power — subject,  of  course, 
to  conditions  of  skill  —  of  shifting  operations 
from  side  to  side,  and  finding  refuge  and  sup- 
plies in  either  direction. 

19 


290    Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 

Jamaica,  being  but  one-tenth  the  size  of 
Cuba,  and  one-fifth  of  its  length,  does  not  pre- 
sent the  intrinsic  advantages  of  the  latter 
island,  regarded  either  as  a  source  of  supplies 
or  as  a  centre  from  which  to  direct  effort ;  but 
when  in  the  hands  of  a  power  supreme  at  sea, 
as  at  the  present  Great  Britain  is,  the  questions 
of  supplies,  of  blockade,  and  of  facility  in  direc- 
tion of  effort  diminish  in  importance.  That 
which  in  the  one  case  is  a  matter  of  life  and 
death,  becomes  now  only  an  embarrassing 
problem,  necessitating  watchfulness  and  pre- 
caution, but  by  no  means  insoluble.  No  ad- 
vantages of  position  can  counterbalance,  in  the 
long-run,  decisive  inferiority  in  organized  mo- 
bile force,  —  inferiority  in  troops  in  the  field, 
and  yet  much  more  in  ships  on  the  sea.  If 
Spain  should  become  involved  in  war  with 
Great  Britain,  as  she  so  often  before  has  been, 
the  advantage  she  would  have  in  Cuba  as 
against  Jamaica  would  be  that  her  communi- 
cations with  the  United  States,  especially  with 
the  Gulf  ports,  would  be  well  under  cover.  By 
this  is  not  meant  that  vessels  bound  to  Cuba 
by  such  routes  would  be  in  unassailable  secur- 
ity ;  no  communications,  maritime  or  terres- 


I 

Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  291 

trial,  can  be  so  against  raiding.  What  is  meant 
is  that  they  can  be  protected  with  much  less 
effort  than  they  can  be  attacked ;  that  the  raid- 
ers—  the  offence  —  must  be  much  more  nu- 
merous and  active  than  the  defence,  because 
much  farther  from  their  base ;  and  that  the 
question  of  such  raiding  would  depend  conse- 
quently upon  the  force  Great  Britain  could 
spare  from  other  scenes  of  war,  for  it  is  not 
likely  that  Spain  would  fight  her  single-handed. 
It  is  quite  possible  that  under  such  condi- 
tions advantage  of  position  would  more  than 
counterbalance  a  small  disadvantage  in  local 
force.  "  War,"  said  Napoleon,  "  is  a  business 
of  positions ;  "  by  which  that  master  of  light- 
ning-like rapidity  of  movement  assuredly  did 
not  mean  that  it  was  a  business  of  getting  into 
a  position  and  sticking  there.  It  is  in  the 
utilization  of  position  by  mobile  force  that 
war  is  determined,  just  as  the  effect  of  a  chess- 
man depends  upon  both  its  individual  value 
and  its  relative  position.  While,  therefore,  in 
the  combination  of  the  two  factors,  force  and 
position,  force  is  intrinsically  the  more  valu- 
able, it  is  always  possible  that  great  advantage 
of  position  may  outweigh  small  advantage  of 


292     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


force,  as  1  +  5  is  greater  than  2  +  3.  The  posi- 
tional value  of  Cuba  is  extremely  great. 

Regarded  solely  as  a  naval  position,  without 
reference  to  the  force  thereon  based,  Jamaica 
is  greatly  inferior  to  Cuba  in  a  question  of 
general  war,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  in 
Kingston  it  possesses  an  excellent  harbor  and 
naval  station.  It  is  only  with  direct  reference 
to  the  Isthmus,  and  therefore  to  the  local  ques- 
tion of  the  Caribbean  as  the  main  scene  of  hos- 
tilities, that  it  possesses  a  certain  superiority 
which  will  be  touched  on  later.  It  is  advisable 
first  to  complete  the  list,  and  so  far  as  neces- 
sary to  account  for  the  selection,  of  the  other 
points  indicated  by  the  squares. 

Of  these,  three  are  so  nearly  together  at 
the  Isthmus  that,  according  to  the  rule  before 
adopted,  they  might  be  reduced  very  properly  to 
a  single  representative  position.  Being,  how- 
ever, so  close  to  the  great  centre  of  interest  in 
the  Caribbean,  and  having  different  specific 
reasons  constituting  their  importance,  it  is  es- 
sential to  a  full  statement  of  strategic  condi 
tions  in  that  sea  to  mention  briefly  each  and 
all.  They  are,  the  harbor  and  town  of  Colon, 
sometimes  called  Aspinwall;  the  harbor  and 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  293 


city  of  Cartagena,  300  miles  to  the  eastward  ot 
Colon;  and  the  Chiriqui  Lagoon,  150  miles 
west  of  Colon,  a  vast  enclosed  bay  with  many 
islands,  giving  excellent  and  diversified  anchor- 
age, the  shores  of  which  are  nearly  uninhab- 
ited. Colon  is  the  Caribbean  terminus  of  the 
Panama  Railroad,  and  is  also  that  of  the  canal 
projected,  and  partly  dug,  under  the  De  Les- 
seps  scheme.  The  harbor  being  good,  though 
open  to  some  winds,  it  is  naturally  indicated 
as  a  point  where  Isthmian  transit  may  begin 
or  end.  As  there  is  no  intention  of  entering 
into  the  controversy  about  the  relative  merits 
of  the  Panama  and  Nicaragua  canal  schemes, 
it  will  be  sufficient  here  to  say  that,  if  the  former 
be  carried  through,  Colon  is  its  inevitable  issue 
on  one  side.  The  city  of  Cartagena  is  the 
largest  and  most  flourishing  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  Isthmus,  and  has  a  good  harbor. 
With  these  conditions  obtaining,  its  advantage 
rests  upon  the  axiomatic  principle  that,  other 
things  being  nearly  equal,  a  place  where  com- 
merce centres  is  a  better  strategic  position  than 
one  which  it  neglects.  The  latter  is  the  con- 
dition of  the  Chiriqui  Lagoon.  This  truly 
noble  sheet  of  water,  which  was  visited  by 


294     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


Columbus  himself,  and  bears  record  of  the  fact 
in  the  name  of  one  of  its  basins, —  the  Bay  of 
the  Admiral,  —  has  every  natural  adaptation  for 
a  purely  naval  base,  but  has  not  drawn  to  it- 
self the  operations  of  commerce.  Everything 
would  need  there  to  be  created,  and  to  be  main- 
tained continuously.  It  lies  midway  between 
Colon  and  the  mouth  of  the  river  San  Juan, 
where  is  Grey  town,  which  has  been  selected 
as  the  issue  of  the  projected  Nicaragua  Canal ; 
and  therefore,  in  a  peculiar  way,  Chiriqui  sym- 
bolizes the  present  indeterminate  phase  of  the 
Isthmian  problem.  With  all  its  latent  pos- 
sibilities, however,  little  can  be  said  now  of 
Chiriqui,  except  that  a  rough  appreciation  of  its 
existence  and  character  is  essential  to  an  ade- 
quate understanding  of  Isthmian  conditions. 

The  Dutch  island  of  Cura9ao  has  been 
marked,  chiefly  because,  with  its  natural  char- 
acteristics, it  cannot  be  passed  over;  but  it 
now  is,  and  it  may  be  hoped  will  remain  in- 
definitely, among  the  positions  of  which  it  has 
been  said  that  they  are  neutralized  by  political 
circumstances.  Cura9ao  possesses  a  fine  har- 
bor, which  may  be  made  impregnable,  and  it 
lies  unavoidably  near  the  route  of  any  vessel 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  295 


bound  to  the  Isthmus  and  passing  eastward 
of  Jamaica.  Such  conditions  constitute  unde- 
niable military  importance ;  but  Holland  is  a 
small  state,  unlikely  to  join  again  in  a  general 
war.  There  is,  indeed,  a  floating  apprehension 
that  the  German  Empire,  in  its  present  desires 
of  colonial  extension,  may  be  willing  to  ab- 
sorb Holland,  for  the  sake  of  her  still  exten- 
sive colonial  possessions.  Improbable  as  this 
may  seem,  it  is  scarcely  more  incomprehensible 
than  the  recent  mysterious  movements  upon 
the  European  chess-board,  attributed  by  com- 
mon rumor  to  the  dominating  influence  of 
the  Emperor  of  Germany,  which  we  puzzled 
Americans  for  months  past  have  sought  in 
vain  to  understand. 

The  same  probable  neutrality  must  be  ad- 
mitted for  the  remaining  positions  that  have 
been  distinguished :  Mujeres  Island,  Samana 
Bay,  and  the  island  of  St.  Thomas.  The  first 
of  these,  at  the  extremity  of  the  Yucatan 
Peninsula,  belongs  to  Mexico,  a  country  whose 
interest  in  the  Isthmian  question  is  very  real ; 
for,  like  the  United  States,  she  has  an  exten- 
sive seaboard  both  upon  the  Pacific  and  —  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  —  upon  the  Atlantic  Oceaa 


296     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


Mujeres  Island,  however,  has  nothing  to  offer 
but  situation,  being  upon  the  Yucatan  Passage, 
the  one  road  from  all  the  Gulf  ports  to  the 
Caribbean  and  the  Isthmus.  The  anchorage 
is  barely  tolerable,  the  resources  nil,  and  defen- 
sive strength  could  be  imparted  only  by  an 
expense  quite  disproportionate  to  the  result 
obtained.  The  consideration  of  the  island  as 
a  possible  military  situation  does  but  empha- 
size the  fact,  salient  to  the  most  superficial 
glance,  that,  so  far  as  position  goes,  Cuba  has 
no  possible  rival  in  her  command  of  the  Yuca- 
tan Passage,  just  as  she  has  no  competitor,  in 
point  of  natural  strength  and  resources,  for  the 
control  of  the  Florida  Strait,  which  connects 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  with  the  Atlantic. 

Samana  Bay,  at  the  northeast  corner  of 
Santo  Domingo,  is  but  one  of  several  fine  an- 
chorages in  that  great  island,  whose  territory 
is  now  divided  between  two  negro  republics 
—  French  and  Spanish  in  tongue.  Its  selec- 
tion to  figure  in  our  study,  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  others,  is  determined  by  its  situation,  and 
by  the  fact  that  we  are  seeking  to  take  a  com- 
prehensive glance  of  the  Caribbean  as  a  whole, 
and  not  merely  of  particular  districts.    For  in- 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  297 


stance,  it  might  be  urged  forcibly,  in  view  of 
the  existence  of  two  great  naval  ports  like  San- 
tiago de  Cuba  and  Port  Royal  in  Jamaica, 
close  to  the  Windward  Passage,  through  which 
lies  the  direct  route  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
to  the  Isthmus,  that  St.  Nicholas  Mole,  imme- 
diately on  the  Passage,  offers  the  natural  posi- 
tion for  checking  the  others  in  case  of  need. 
The  reply  is  that  we  are  not  seeking  to  check 
anything  or  anybody,  but  simply  examining  in 
the  large  the  natural  strategic  features,  and 
incidentally  thereto  noting  the  political  con- 
ditions, of  a  maritime  region  in  which  the 
United  States  is  particularly  interested  ;  polit- 
ical conditions,  as  has  been  remarked,  having 
an  unavoidable  effect  upon  military  values. 

The  inquiry  being  thus  broad,  Samana  Bay 
and  the  island  of  St.  Thomas  are  entitled  to 
the  pre-eminence  here  given  to  them,  because 
they  represent,  efficiently  and  better  than  any 
other  positions,  the  control  of  two  principal 
passages  into  the  Caribbean  Sea  from  the 
Atlantic.  The  Mona  Passage,  on  which  Sa- 
mana lies,  between  Santo  Domingo  and  Puerto 
Rico,  is  particularly  suited  to  sailing-vessels 
from  the  northward,  because  free  from  dangers 


298     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


to  navigation.  This,  of  course,  in  these  days 
of  steam,  is  a  small  matter  militarily  ;  in  the 
latter  sense  the  Mona  Passage  is  valuable  be- 
cause it  is  an  alternative  to  the  Windward 
Passage,  or  to  those  to  the  eastward,  in  case 
of  hostile  predominance  in  one  quarter  or  the 
other.  St.  Thomas  is  on  the  Anegada  Passage, 
actually  much  used,  and  which  better  than  any 
other  represents  the  course  from  Europe  to 
the  Isthmus,  just  as  the  Windward  Passage 
does  that  from  the  North  American  Atlantic 
ports.  Neither  of  these  places  can  boast  of 
great  natural  strength  nor  of  resources ;  St. 
Thomas,  because  it  is  a  small  island  with  the 
inherent  weaknesses  attending  all  such,  which 
have  been  mentioned  ;  Samana  Bay,  because, 
although  the  island  on  which  it  is  is  large  and 
productive,  it  has  not  now,  and  gives  no  hope 
of  having,  that  political  stability  and  commer- 
cial prosperity  which  bring  resources  and  power 
in  their  train.  Both  places  would  need  also 
considerable  development  of  defensive  works 
to  meet  the  requirements  of  a  naval  port.  De- 
spite these  defects,  their  situations  on  the  pas- 
sages named  entitle  them  to  paramount  con- 
sideration in  a  general  study  of  the  Caribbean 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  299 


Sea  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Potentially, 
though  not  actually,  they  lend  control  of  the 
Mona  and  Anegada  Passages,  exactly  as  King- 
ston and  Santiago  do  of  the  Windward. 

For,  granting  that  the  Isthmus  is  in  the  Car- 
ibbean the  predominant  interest,  commercial, 
and  therefore  concerning  the  whole  world,  but 
also  military,  and  so  far  possessing  peculiar 
concern  for  those  nations  whose  territories  lie 
on  both  oceans,  which  it  now  severs  and  will 
one  day  unite  —  of  which  nations  the  United 
States  is  the  most  prominent  —  granting  this, 
and  it  follows  that  entrance  to  the  Caribbean, 
and  transit  across  the  Caribbean  to  the  Isthmus, 
are  two  prime  essentials  to  the  enjoyment  of 
the  advantages  of  the  latter.  Therefore,  in 
case  of  war,  control  of  these  two  things  be- 
comes a  military  object  not  second  to  the  Isth- 
mus itself,  access  to  which  depends  upon  them  ; 
and  in  their  bearing  upon  these  two  things 
the  various  positions  that  are  passed  under 
consideration  must  be  viewed  —  individually 
first,  and  afterwards  collectively. 

The  first  process  of  individual  consideration 
the  writer  has  asked  the  reader  to  take  on 
faith ;  neither  time  nor  space  permits  its  elab- 


300     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


oration  here ;  but  the  reasons  for  choosing 
those  that  have  been  named  have  been  given 
as  briefly  as  possible.  Let  us  now  look  at  the 
map,  and  regard  as  a  collective  whole  the  pic- 
ture there  graphically  presented. 

Putting  to  one  side,  for  the  moment  at  least, 
the  Isthmian  points,  as  indicating  the  end 
rather  than  the  precedent  means,  we  see  at 
the  present  time  that  the  positions  at  the  ex- 
tremes of  the  field  under  examination  are  held 
by  Powers  of  the  first  rank, —  Martinique  and 
Santa  Lucia  by  France  and  Great  Britain, 
Pensacola  and  the  Mississippi  by  the  United 
States. 

Further,  there  are  held  by  these  same  states 
of  the  first  order  two  advanced  positions, 
widely  separated  from  the  first  bases  of  their 
power ;  namely,  Key  West,  which  is  460  miles 
from  Pensacola,  and  Jamaica,  which  is  930 
miles  from  Santa  Lucia.  From  the  Isthmus, 
Key  West  is  distant  1200  miles;  Jamaica,  500 
miles. 

Between  and  separating  these  two  groups,  of 
primary  bases  and  advanced  posts,  extends  the 
chain  of  positions  from  Yucatan  to  St.  Thomas. 
As  far  as  is  possible  to  position,  apart  from 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  301 


mobile  force,  these  represent  control  over  the 
northern  entrances  —  the  most  important  en- 
trances— into  the  Caribbean  Sea.  No  one  of 
this  chain  belongs  to  any  of  the  Powers  com- 
monly reckoned  as  being  of  the  first  order  of 
strength. 

The  entrances  on  the  north  of  the  sea,  as 
far  as,  but  not  including,  the  Anegada  Passage, 
are  called  the  most  important,  because  they 
are  so  few  in  number,  —  a  circumstance  which 
always  increases  value ;  because  they  are  so 
much  nearer  to  the  Isthmus ;  and,  very  es- 
pecially to  the  United  States,  because  they  are 
the  ones  by  which,  and  by  which  alone, — ex- 
cept at  the  cost  of  a  wide  circuit,  —  she  com- 
municates with  the  Isthmus,  and,  generally, 
with  all  the  region  lying  within  the  borders  of 
the  Caribbean. 

In  a  very  literal  sense  the  Caribbean  is  a 
mediterranean  sea ;  but  the  adjective  must  be 
qualified  when  comparison  is  made  with  the 
Mediterranean  of  the  Old  World  or  with  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  last-named  bodies  of 
water  communicate  with  the  outer  oceans  by 
passages  so  contracted  as  to  be  easily  watched 
from  near-by  positions,  and   for  both  there 


302     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


exist  such  positions  of  exceptional  strength,  — 
Gibraltar  and  some  others  in  the  former  case, 
Havana  and  no  other  in  the  latter.  The 
Caribbean,  on  the  contrary,  is  enclosed  on  its 
eastern  side  by  a  chain  of  small  islands,  the 
passages  between  which,  although  practically 
not  wider  than  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar,  are  so 
numerous  that  entrance  to  the  sea  on  that  side 
may  be  said  correctly  to  extend  over  a  stretch 
of  near  400  miles.  The  islands,  it  is  true,  are 
so  many  positions,  some  better,  some  worse, 
from  which  military  effort  to  control  entrance 
can  be  exerted;  but  their  number  prevents 
that  concentration  and  that  certainty  of  effect 
which  are  possible  to  adequate  force  resting 
upon  Gibraltar  or  Havana. 

On  the  northern  side  of  the  sea  the  case  is 
quite  different.  From  the  western  end  of 
Cuba  to  the  eastern  end  of  Puerto  Rico  ex- 
tends a  barrier  of  land  for  1200  miles  —  as 
against  400  on  the  east  —  broken  only  by  two 
straits,  each  fifty  miles  wide,  from  side  to  side 
of  which  a  steamer  of  but  moderate  power  can 
pass  in  three  or  four  hours.  These  natural 
conditions,  governing  the  approach  to  the  Isth- 
mus, reproduce  as  nearly  as  possible  the  stra- 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  303 


tegic  effect  of  Ireland  upon  Great  Britain. 
There  a  land  barrier  of  300  miles,  midway  be- 
tween the  Pentland  Firth  and  the  English 
Channel  —  centrally  situated,  that  is,  with  ref- 
erence to  all  the  Atlantic  approaches  to  Great 
Britain  —  gives  to  an  adequate  navy  a  unique 
power  to  flank  and  harass  either  the  one  or 
the  other,  or  both.  Existing  political  condi- 
tions and  other  circumstances  unquestionably 
modify  the  importance  of  these  two  barriers, 
relatively  to  the  countries  affected  by  them. 
Open  communication  with  the  Atlantic  is  vi- 
tal to  Great  Britain,  which  the  Isthmus,  up  to 
the  present  time,  is  not  to  the  United  States. 
There  are,  however,  varying  degrees  of  impor- 
tance below  that  which  is  vital.  Taking  into 
consideration  that  of  the  1200-mile  barrier  to 
the  Caribbean  600  miles  is  solid  in  Cuba,  that 
after  the  50-mile  gap  of  the  Windward  Passage 
there  succeeds  300  miles  more  of  Haiti  before 
the  Mona  Passage  is  reached,  it  is  indisputable 
that  a  superior  navy,  resting  on  Santiago  de 
Cuba  or  Jamaica,  could  very  seriously  incom- 
mode all  access  of  the  United  States  to  the 
Caribbean  mainland,  and  especially  to  the 
Isthmus. 


304     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


In  connection  with  this  should  be  consid- 
ered also  the  influence  upon  our  mercantile  and 
naval  communication  between  the  Atlantic  and 
the  Gulf  coasts  exercised  by  the  peninsula  of 
Florida,  and  by  the  narrowness  of  the  channels 
separating  the  latter  from  the  Bahama  Banks 
and  from  Cuba.  The  effect  of  this  long  and 
not  very  broad  strip  of  land  upon  our  maritime 
interests  can  be  realized  best  by  imagining  it 
wholly  removed,  or  else  turned  into  an  island 
by  a  practicable  channel  crossing  its  neck.  In 
the  latter  case  the  two  entrances  to  the  chan- 
nel would  have  indeed  to  be  assured ;  but  our 
shipping  would  not  be  forced  to  pass  through 
a  long,  narrow  waterway,  bordered  throughout 
on  one  side  by  foreign  and  possibly  "hostile 
territories.  In  case  of  war  with  either  Great 
Britain  or  Spain,  this  channel  would  be  likely 
to  be  infested  by  hostile  cruisers,  close  to  their 
own  base,  the  very  best  condition  for  a  com- 
merce-destroying war;  and  its  protection  by 
us  under  present  circumstances  will  exact  a 
much  greater  effort  than  with  the  supposed 
channel,  or  than  if  the  Florida  Peninsula  did 
not  exist.  The  effect  of  the  peninsula  is  to 
thrust  our  route  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Gulf 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  305 


300  miles  to  the  southward,  and  to  make  im- 
perative a  base  for  control  of  the  strait ;  while 
the  case  is  made  worse  by  an  almost  total 
lack  of  useful  harbors.  On  the  Atlantic,  the 
most  exposed  side,  there  is  none ;  and  on  the 
Gulf  none  nearer  to  Key  West  than  175  miles,1 
where  we  find  Tampa  Bay.  There  is,  indeed, 
nothing  that  can  be  said  about  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  in  an  Isthmian  canal  that 
does  not  apply  now  with  equal  force  to  the 
Strait  of  Florida.  The  one  links  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Gulf,  as  the  other  would  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Pacific.  It  may  be  added  here  that  the 
phenomenon  of  the  long,  narrow  peninsula  of 
Florida,  with  its  strait,  is  reproduced  succes- 
sively in  Cuba,  Haiti,  and  Puerto  Rico,  with 
the  passages  dividing  them.  The  whole  to- 
gether forms  one  long  barrier,  the  strategic 
significance  of  which  cannot  be  overlooked  in 
its  effect  upon  the  Caribbean ;  while  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  is  assigned  to  absolute  seclusion  by 
it,  if  the  passages  are  in  hostile  control. 

The  relations  of  the  island  of  Jamaica  to 
the  great  barrier  formed  by  Cuba,  Haiti,  and 

1  There  is  Charlotte  Harbor,  at  120  miles,  but  it  can  be  used 
only  by  medium-sized  vessels. 

20 


306    Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


Puerto  Rico  are  such  as  to  constitute  it  the 
natural  stepping-stone  by  which  to  pass  from 
the  consideration  of  entrance  into  the  Carib- 
bean, which  has  been  engaging  our  attention, 
to  that  of  the  transit  across,  from  entrance  to 
the  Isthmus,  which  we  must  next  undertake. 

In  the  matters  of  entrance  to  the  Caribbean, 
and  of  general  interior  control  of  that  sea, 
Jamaica  has  a  singularly  central  position.  It 
is  equidistant  (500  miles)  from  Colon,  from  the 
Yucatan  Channel,  and  from  the  Mona  Passage ; 
it  is  even  closer  (450  miles)  to  the  nearest  main- 
land of  South  America  at  Point  Gallinas,  and 
of  Central  America  at  Cape  Gracias-a-Dios  ; 
while  it  lies  so  immediately  in  rear  of  the 
Windward  Passage  that  its  command  of  the 
latter  can  scarcely  be  considered  less  than  that 
of  Santiago.  The  analogy  of  its  situation,  as 
a  station  for  a  great  fleet,  to  that  for  an  army 
covering  a  frontier  which  is  passable  at  but  a 
few  points,  will  scarcely  escape  a  military 
reader.  A  comparatively  short  chain  of  swift 
lookout  steamers,  in  each  direction,  can  give 
timely  notice  of  any  approach  by  either  of  the 
three  passages  named ;  while,  if  entrance  be 
gained  at  any  other  point,  the  arms  stretched 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  307 


out  towards  Gallinas  and  Gracias-a-Dios  will 
give  warning  of  transit  before  the  purposes  of 
such  transit  can  be  accomplished  undisturbed. 

With  such  advantages  of  situation,  and  with 
a  harbor  susceptible  of  satisfactory  develop- 
ment as  a  naval  station  for  a  great  fleet,  Ja- 
maica is  certainly  the  most  important  single 
position  in  the  Caribbean  Sea.  When  one 
recalls  that  it  passed  into  the  hands  of  Great 
Britain,  in  the  days  of  Cromwell,  by  accidental 
conquest,  the  expedition  having  been  intended 
primarily  against  Santo  Domingo  ;  that  in  the 
two  centuries  and  a  half  which  have  since  in- 
tervened it  has  played  no  part  adequate  to  its 
advantages,  such  as  now  looms  before  it ;  that, 
by  all  the  probabilities,  it  should  have  been 
reconquered  and  retained  by  Spain  in  the  war 
of  the  American  Revolution ;  and  when,  again, 
it  is  recalled  that  a  like  accident  and  a  like  sub- 
sequent uncertainty  attended  the  conquest  and 
retention  of  the  decisive  Mediterranean  posi- 
tions of  Gibraltar  and  Malta,  one  marvels 
whether  incidents  so  widely  separated  in  time 
and  place,  all  tending  towards  one  end  —  the 
maritime  predominance  of  Great  Britain  —  can 
be  accidents,  or  are  simply  the  exhibition  of 


308     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


a  Personal  Will,  acting  through  all  time,  with 
purpose  deliberate  and  consecutive,  to  ends 
not  yet  discerned. 

Nevertheless,  when  compared  to  Cuba,  Ja- 
maica cannot  be  considered  the  preponderant 
position  of  the  Caribbean.  The  military  ques- 
tion of  position  is  quantitative  as  well  as  quali- 
tative ;  and  situation,  however  excellent,  can 
rarely,  by  itself  alone,  make  full  amends  for 
defect  in  the  power  and  resources  which  are 
the  natural  property  of  size  —  of  mass.  Gib- 
raltar, the  synonym  of  intrinsic  strength,  is  an 
illustration  in  point ;  its  smallness,  its  isolation, 
and  its  barrenness  of  resource  constitute  limits 
to  its  offensive  power,  and  even  to  its  impreg- 
nability, which  are  well  understood  by  military 
men.  Jamaica,  by  its  situation,  flanks  the 
route  from  Cuba  to  the  Isthmus,  as  indeed  it 
does  all  routes  from  the  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf 
to  that  point;  but,  as  a  military  entity,  it  is 
completely  overshadowed  by  the  larger  island, 
which  it  so  conspicuously  confronts.  If,  as  has 
just  been  said,  it  by  situation  intercepts  the 
access  of  Cuba  to  the  Isthmus,  it  is  itself 
cut  off  by  its  huge  neighbor  from  secure  com- 
munication with  the  North  American  Con- 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  309 


tinent,  now  as  always  the  chief  natural  source 
of  supplies  for  the  West  Indies,  which  do  not 
produce  the  great  staples  of  life.  With  the 
United  States  friendly  or  neutral,  in  a  case  of 
war,  there  can  be  no  comparison  between  the 
advantages  of  Cuba,  conferred  by  its  situation 
and  its  size,  and  those  of  Jamaica,  which,  by 
these  qualities  of  its  rival,  is  effectually  cut 
off  from  that  source  of  supplies.  Nor  is  the 
disadvantage  of  Jamaica  less  marked  with  ref- 
erence to  communication  with  other  quarters 
than  the  United  States  —  with  Halifax,  with 
Bermuda,  with  Europe.  Its  distance  from 
these  points,  and  from  Santa  Lucia,  where  the 
resources  of  Europe  may  be  said  to  focus  for 
it,  makes  its  situation  one  of  extreme  isolation ; 
a  condition  emphasized  by  the  fact  that  both 
Bermuda  and  Santa  Lucia  are  themselves  de- 
pendent upon  outside  sources  for  anything 
they  may  send  to  Jamaica.  At  all  these  points, 
coal,  the  great  factor  of  modern  naval  war,  must 
be  stored  and  the  supply  maintained.  They 
do  not  produce  it.  The  mere  size  of  Cuba, 
the  amount  of  population  which  it  has,  or 
ought  to  have,  the  number  of  its  seaports,  the 
extent  of  the  industries  possible  to  it,  tend 


310     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


naturally  to  an  accumulation  of  resources  such 
as  great  mercantile  communities  always  entail. 
These,  combined  with  its  nearness  to  the 
United  States,  and  its  other  advantages  of 
situation,  make  Cuba  a  position  that  can  have 
no  military  rival  among  the  islands  of  the 
world,  except  Ireland.  With  a  friendly  United 
States,  isolation  is  impossible  to  Cuba. 

The  aim  of  any  discussion  such  as  this 
should  be  to  narrow  down,  by  a  gradual  elimi- 
nation, the  various  factors  to  be  considered,  in 
order  that  the  decisive  ones,  remaining,  may 
become  conspicuously  visible.  The  trees  being 
thus  thinned  out,  the  features  of  the  strategic 
landscape  can  appear.  The  primary  processes 
in  the  present  case  have  been  carried  out  be- 
fore seeking  the  attention  of  the  reader,  to 
whom  the  first  approximations  have  been  pre- 
sented under  three  heads.  First,  the  two  deci- 
sive centres,  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  and 
the  Isthmus.  Second,  the  four  principal  routes, 
connecting  these  two  points  with  others,  have 
been  specified;  these  routes  being,  i,  between 
the  Isthmus  and  the  Mississippi  themselves ; 
2,  from  the  Isthmus  to  the  North  American 
coast,  by  the  Windward  Passage ;  3,  from  the 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.       3 1 1 


Gulf  of  Mexico  to  the  North  American  coast, 
by  the  Strait  of  Florida;  and,  4,  from  the 
Isthmus  to  Europe,  by  the  Anegada  Passage. 
Third,  the  principal  military  positions  through- 
out  the  region  in  question  have  been  laid 
down,  and  their  individual  and  relative  impor- 
tance indicated. 

From  the  subsequent  discussion  it  seems 
evident  that,  as  "  communications  "  are  so  lead- 
ing an  element  in  strategy,  the  position  or 
positions  which  decisively  affect  the  greatest 
number  or  extent  of  the  communications  will 
be  the  most  important,  so  far  as  situation  goes. 
Of  the  four  principal  lines  named,  three  pass 
close  to,  and  are  essentially  controlled  by,  the 
islands  of  Cuba  and  Jamaica,  namely,  from  the 
Mississippi  to  the  Isthmus  by  the  Yucatan 
Channel,  from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Atlantic 
coast  of  America  by  the  Strait  of  Florida,  and 
from  the  Isthmus  to  the  Atlantic  coast  by  the  " 
Windward  Passage.  The  fourth  route,  which 
represents  those  from  the  Isthmus  to  Europe, 
passes  nearer  to  Jamaica  than  to  Cuba ;  but 
those  two  islands  exercise  over  it  more  con- 
trol than  does  any  other  one  of  the  archipel- 
ago, for  the  reason  that  any  other  can  be  avoided 


312     Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf  of 


more  easily,  and  by  a  wider  interval,  than  either 
Jamaica  or  Cuba. 

Regarded  as  positions,  therefore,  these  two 
islands  are  the  real  rivals  for  control  of  the 
Caribbean  and  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico ;  and  it 
may  be  added  that  the  strategic  centre  of  in- 
terest for  both  Gulf  and  Caribbean  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Windward  Passage,  because  it 
furnishes  the  ultimate  test  of  the  relative  power 
of  the  two  islands  to  control  the  Caribbean. 
For,  as  has  been  said  before,  and  cannot  be 
repeated  too  often,  it  is  not  position  only,  nor 
chiefly,  but  mobile  force,  that  is  decisive  in 
war.  In  the  combination  of  these  two  ele- 
ments rests  the  full  statement  of  any  case. 
The  question  of  position  has  been  adjudged 
in  favor  of  Cuba,  for  reasons  which  have  been 
given.  In  the  case  of  a  conflict  between  the 
powers  holding  the  two  islands,  the  question  of 
controlling  the  Windward  Passage  would  be 
the  test  of  relative  mobile  strength ;  because 
that  channel  is  the  shortest  and  best  line  of 
communications  for  Jamaica  with  the  American 
coast,  with  Halifax,  and  with  Bermuda,  and  as 
such  it  must  be  kept  open.  If  the  power  of 
Jamaica  is  not  great  enough  to  hold  the  pas- 


Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  313 


sage  open  by  force,  she  is  thrown  upon  evasion 
—  upon  furtive  measures  —  to  maintain  essen- 
tial supplies;  for,  if  she  cannot  assert  her 
strength  so  far  in  that  direction,  she  cannot', 
from  her  nearness,  go  beyond  Cuba's  reach 
in  any  direction.  Abandonment  of  the  best 
road  in  this  case  means  isolation ;  and  to 
that  condition,  if  prolonged,  there  is  but  one 
issue. 

The  final  result,  therefore,  may  be  stated 
in  this  way :  The  advantages  of  situation, 
strength,  and  resources  are  greatly  and  deci- 
sively in  favor  of  Cuba.  To  bring  Jamaica 
to  a  condition  of  equality,  or  superiority,  is 
needed  a  mobile  force  capable  of  keeping  the 
Windward  Passage  continuously  open,  not  only 
for  a  moment,  nor  for  any  measurable  time, 
but  throughout  the  war.  Under  the  present 
conditions  of  political  tenure,  in  case  of  a  war 
involving  only  the  two  states  concerned,  such 
a  question  could  admit  of  no  doubt ;  but  in  a 
war  at  all  general,  involving  several  naval 
powers,  the  issue  would  be  less  certain.  In 
the  war  of  1778  the  tenure,  not  of  the  Wind- 
ward Passage  merely,  but  of  Jamaica  itself,  was 
looked  upon  by  a  large  party  in  Great  Britain 


314    Strategic  Features  of  the  Gulf,  etc. 


as  nearly  hopeless ;  and  it  is  true  that  only  a 
happy  concurrence  of  blundering  and  bad  luck 
on  the  part  of  its  foes  then  saved  the  island. 
It  is  conceivable  that  odds  which  have  hap- 
pened once  may  happen  again. 


THE  END. 


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